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I would like to begin my dissertation with a canonical passage in Hemingway’s A 
Farewell to Arms, a passage that fully encapsulates the issue that I want to pursue in the 
following pages: the felt eclipse among writers of the modernist era—and moderns more 
broadly—of the transcendental and a recourse to a certain kind of materiality to achieve a 
renewed sense of belief. On talking with an Italian soldier who claims that “the soil is 
sacred” (184), Frederic Henry avoids openly taking issue with the soldier’s unabashed 
patriotism, presenting instead the novel’s most extensive inner monologue, which 
revolves around the incorrigible bifurcation of language: one aspect belongs to the 
abstract and religious, whilst the other is decidedly concrete and prosaic: 
I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the 
expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of 
earshot, so that only the shouted words came through and had read them, on 
proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now for 
a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no 
glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with 
the meat except to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear 
and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same 
way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say 
and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or 
hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, 
the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates. (184-185) 
The loss of materiality is suggested as the crucial cause of spiritual decay in the modern 
era. The desperate paucity of meaningful objects—of objects that speak of the possibility 
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of transcendental experience—has made it impossible to feel a certain kind of spiritual 
presence. As Loren Glass points out, the passage eloquently provokes a sense of 
“disenchantment,” a definitively modern disposition most frequently connected with “the 
lost generation,” of which Hemingway was a champion and a key figure (209).  
What is relevant to my argument is that such disenchantment is deeply tied to a 
certain kind of semantic exploitation endemic to modernity. Henry (a thinly veiled 
Hemingway) laments that words once used to express transcendental experiences—of the 
“sacred,” the “glorious,” and “sacrifice”—have undergone a thorough abstraction by their 
overuse in various forms of mass advertisement, including the ubiquitous instances of 
jingoistic billposters. The language of the sacred has become corrupted and promiscuous, 
showing up anytime anywhere, drained of all the meanings that it once possessed. Only 
proper nouns, Henry says to himself, can maintain their own dignity and so remain truly 
meaningful. Henry’s disillusionment derives from the elusiveness of meaning caused by 
the chasm between the abstract and the concrete, the authentically religious and the 
plainly nonsymbolic. Hemingway thus locates meaningfulness within the robust 
materiality of proper nouns; their firm embeddedness in quotidian contexts is a potential 
route to transcendence.  
My dissertation explores the type of modernist project that Hemingway evinced in 
A Farewell to Arms. If the conventional notion of religious feeling came to look 
especially volatile under the sway of modernity, how could spirituality be felt, discovered, 
and expressed? How to arrest the rapid process of abstraction that caused a semantic 
stalemate, turning once precious, transcendental objects into mass-produced goods 
completely tamed by the capitalist imperative to classify every matter into two kinds: 
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products or waste? All the four novelists I deal with in the subsequent chapters—
Nathanael West, William Faulkner, Theodore Dreiser, and Scott Fitzgerald—were deeply 
enmeshed in their contemporary consumer culture and acutely felt the waning of 
spirituality, which they considered most apparent in the futility of  organized religion. As 
Hemingway proposed that spiritual enervation was brought forth by the exploitation of 
materiality in modern society, these four writers sought to rediscover spirituality by 
embracing the kind of materiality within certain objects that reject facile signification, 
such as trash, waste heaps, unclassified newspaper articles, and counter-monuments. By 
examining how each novelist transformed familiar objects into bearers of the magical, I 
intend for my argument to contribute to current scholarship of modernist literature, a field 
whose inclination toward secular issues became especially explicit toward the end of the 
twentieth century.  
While modernist studies in the 1980s and 1990s largely focused on exposing the 
constructed nature of ranks and social identities (race, class, gender, sexuality, age, etc.), 
citizenship, and nation-state, critics after 9/11 have begun to show an acute concern for 
questions that were suppressed or left unasked by proponents of the influential (new-) 
historicist approach. How were religious discourses interwoven into the aforementioned 
issues of racial, national, and class boundaries that U. S. modernity scrupulously 
attempted to police?
1
 In looking back over the cultural and academic climate in the late 
                                                 
1
 Pricilla Wald’s Constituting Americans (1995) is a representative work on citizenship, a 
category which became increasingly hard to define in the late nineteenth century. Carrie 
Bramen’s The Uses of Variety (2000) explores how the process of Americanization 
operated in turn-of-the-century U. S. culture, in which emergent immigrant cultures 
coexisted with the dominant culture, forming a kind of cultural pluralism. Walter Benn 
Michaels’s Our America (1995) also explores the impact of the Immigrant Act on the 
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twentieth century, Lawrence Buell, writing in 2007, recognized a marked discrepancy 
between the U. S. public culture that increasingly leaned toward evangelical Christianity 
and contemporary American literary studies, which “has moved decisively away from 
religiocentric explanations of the dynamics of cultural history” (32, emphasis original). 
For instance, Buell contends that in the 1950s Melville studies considered 
the question of Melville’s religious orientation—how deeply marked he was by 
Calvinism, whether or not he was God-defiant to the last, etc—was a burning 
question. By century’s end, Moby-Dick’s whiteness had come to seem more 
compelling for its racial than for its religious symbolism, its politics much more so 
than its metaphysics, and the author’s attitudes toward cannibalism and body-
piercing more consequential than his religious convictions. (32-33) 
Such a secular turn—from the religiously-inflected New Criticism and archetypal/myth 
criticism of the 1950s to postcolonial studies in the late twentieth century—could 
certainly be observed in American modernist scholarship as well, within which the 
materialist approach became most prominent. Critics argued with notable acuity that the 
definitive change in the cultural landscape of modern U. S. society was brought about by 
the inundation of mass-produced commodities, which drastically changed people’s 
perception of objects and their meanings. For instance, Rachel Bowlby’s Just Looking 
(1985) offered an influential reading of the centrality of women in turn-of-the-century 
consumer culture, in which women simultaneously took on the passive role of 
“commodified self-display” and the more agential role of “consumer” (11). Itself drawing 
on Marxist feminist criticism, Just Looking can be seen as one of the best examples of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
pluralist politics shown in the texts of the 1920s. Michael Szalay’s New Deal Modernism 
(2000) illustrates marked similarities between New Deal policies and modernist arts.  
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consumer-commodity theoretical approach, which oftentimes concerns itself with the 
emergence of consumer culture at the dawn of the twentieth century.  
While I am greatly indebted to those Marxist critiques for my understanding of 
American modernism as a response to structural challenges of American modernity, I am 
also aware of the conspicuous absence of religion as an object of analysis, a discursive 
formation, or a cultural context in those studies.
2
 If material objects in capitalist society 
cannot but become objects for consumption, why did Hemingway contrast advertisement 
(the visualization of the commodified words of religion) with concrete objects, 
denouncing the former as producing a semantic deadlock and hailing the latter as the key 
to a certain kind of transcendental spirituality unavailable to organized Christianity? 
Because of its exclusive focus on the processes of alienation and reification within the 
capitalist market economy, Marxist criticism seems to have placed too much emphasis on 
reified objects devoid of what Hemingway termed the “dignity” that concrete matters 
inherently possess. 
Like Hemingway, the four writers I deal with in the subsequent chapters turned to 
a certain kind of materiality that figures as an excess beyond capitalist systems of 
production and consumption, thereby opening the possibility of attributing alternative 
spirituality to objects. For instance, in the case of Nathanael West’s Miss Lonelyhearts, 
the futility of the columnist’s words of Christian benevolence in the medium of mass 
newspaper is juxtaposed with the uncanny materiality of words that become “things,” 
                                                 
2
 Such a secular tendency seems to be widely shared across disciplines. Some art 
historians offer very useful exposition on the secularization of academia (see Promey). 
James Elkins also points to a crucial divide between popular religious art and 
modernist/postmodernist art. Art historians obviously take a more serious interest in the 
latter type of art, mostly located in museums and rarely in churches.  
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challenging Miss Lonelyhearts’s obsession with the Eucharistic identification with the 
other.  
Recent American literary criticism has begun to pay closer attention to religious 
issues, a critical trend which the editors of Early American Literature in 2010 termed 
“the ‘religious turn’ in literary studies” (Stein and Murison 1). Among an impressive 
array of religious approaches in American literary studies,
3
 Pericles Lewis’s Religious 
Experience and the Modernist Novel (2010) seems closest to my interest. While I agree 
with Lewis’s suggestion that “for the modernists, transcendence generally meant 
experiences that originated in the ordinary world, not the supernatural, but that opened 
some sort of insight beyond the realm of the ordinary” (20), my approach to the issue 
differs from his with respect to its scope, which is mostly European in its selection of 
texts by such figures as Proust, Kafka, and Durkheim. More importantly, I am interested 
in probing the reason why American modernist writers specified the concreteness of 
objects as a site of religious experience no longer available in the Church. 
My reading of materiality is much inspired by the fresh view of things posited by 
the new materialist criticism that began to appear at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. In 2001, Critical Inquiry published an award-winning issue titled “Things,” 
guest edited by Bill Brown, who provided an extremely insightful articulation of the 
ontology of things. As I delineate fully in Chapter 1 of my dissertation, the basic tenet of 
                                                 
3
 See for instance, Amy Hungerford in Postmodern Belief (2010), which deals with 
writers after 1960 and their investment in the nonsemantic aspect of language to express 
faith. Crawford Gribben’s Writing the Rapture (2009) overlaps with Hungerford’s 
periodical interest, but his is specifically focused on prophecy fiction, which has become 
especially popular in these few decades. Gregory Jackson’s The Word and Its Witness 
(2009) offers an innovative account of realist novels that locates them within the tradition 
of homiletic literature.  
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the “thing theory” Brown espouses is that things have a life, or qualities that cannot fully 
be incorporated in commodity form, which Marxists tend to overlook because they 
situate materiality itself within the realm of class struggles under the oppressive system 
of capitalism.  
The relevance of thing theory to my argument lies in its moral implications. How 
should we properly treat things as things? Brown pursues this ethical conundrum by 
distinguishing things from objects, defining the latter as those in the service of human 
beings, and the former as those potentially recalcitrant to our utilitarian treatment: “We 
begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us” (“Thing Theory” 
4). As a possessor of thingness, a thing reveals its agential potency, exerting the potential 
for subversive power over a human/matter dichotomy that modernity sought to reinforce 
through various technologies of classification and distribution. It was a kind of rational 
management of production which Marxism harshly condemned as the cause of alienation, 
stripping laborers of their sense of self, turning them, in other words, into subhuman 
entities.  
Thing theory thus probes “otherness as such” via investigation into the thingness 
of things, and by extension, offers a new way to think about various modes of 
representation regarding those human agents standing at social peripheries. Throughout 
the dissertation, I carefully track the ways in which each novelist transforms a given 
object into a spiritual entity, whose magical power is directed toward the reinvigoration 
of a character often described as the lowest in social ranks. Significantly, the novels I 
discuss represent waste, useless, and trash objects as those equipped with a quality of 
wonder. As Brown notes, the thingness of objects is “temporalized as the before and after 
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of the object” (5). As an object’s afterlife, extrinsic to commodity form, trash creates a 
moment of possible magical transcendence, animates reified human beings, and 
challenges the validity of such socially sanctioned objects as advertisements, public 
monuments, and scientific data. 
With this interest, my dissertation aligns itself with the ongoing discussions about 
the ontology of things in various historical contexts, ranging from Elaine Freedgood’s 
investigation of Victorian commodities in The Ideas in Things (2006), and Peter 
Schwenger’s psychoanalytic approach to modernist engagement with objects in The 
Tears of Things (2006), to a collection of essays on the materiality of photographs titled 
Photographs Objects Histories (2004), and Bill Brown’s A Sense of Things (2004), a 
fascinating account of turn-of-the-century American protomodernist renditions of 
thingness that went in tandem with contemporaneous anthropological discourses of 
materiality. In dialogue with these readings, what I want to highlight is the hitherto 
unattended aspect of the interpenetration of materiality and spirituality in American 
modernist novels, as A Farewell to Arms so poignantly expresses in the aforementioned 
passage. To be sure, thing theory manages to recuperate the potential aspect of things left 
unenvisioned by commodity culture criticism, but its largely secular standpoint doesn’t 
really articulate the reason why modernist writers repeatedly showed qualms about the 
inefficacy of disembodied spirituality, and turned instead to the materiality of objects as 
embodying an alternative spirituality. The absence of the religious as a category of 
concern in thing theory seems all the more surprising, given the fact that none other than 
Bill Brown himself called for a more multifaceted analysis of the current religious 
conflicts than the one practiced by such Marxist critics as Slavoj Žižek, who contended 
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that the rise of ultra-fundamentalism in Islamic cultures should be read not as religious 
proper, but as an economically motivated reaction against global capitalism. Brown 
criticizes these theorists as “unwilling to grant the religious and theological aspirations of 
9/11” (“The Dark Wood” 46-47), but his otherwise very impressive readings of 
modernism have not yet touched upon the very aspirations that his artists of choice seem 
to have embraced.  
Here again, the aforementioned passage in A Farewell to Arms works as a telling 
example. In it, the narrator connects the holy deaths of soldiers with “the stockyards at 
Chicago,” suggesting the futility of soldiers’ sacrifices by comparing their dead bodies to 
heaps of spoiled meat. Hemingway’s reference to the Chicago stockyards may very well 
stem from his occasional exposure to the sites in his childhood, but more importantly, it 
recalls Upton Sinclair’s 1906 bestseller The Jungle, a novel which shares with 
Hemingway’s the same kind of seething repugnance for modernity’s relentless mass 
production as a cause of spiritual decay.  
What appeared most devastating in the Chicago stockyards for Sinclair was their 
seamless processing of meat, in which “everything about the hog except the squeal” was 
turned into products (42). Unlike soldiers, whose bodies at least can be buried in the 
ground, every part of the hogs was turned into profitable objects, including their 
dunghills and spoiled meat, leaving no possibility for the hogs to retain their own 
“dignity,” to use Hemingway’s phrase. Indeed what makes hogs more like humans than 
animals is the very element that cannot be made into a product, the squeal: “they were so 
very human in their protest—and so perfectly within their rights!” (44). Conversely, 
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factory workers who process the carcasses have lost their voices of protest and become 
more akin to fragmentary objects, the “cogs in the great packing machine” (96).  
 A political radical greatly influenced by Marxist theory, Sinclair viewed 
Packingtown as the perfect locus of the human alienation, which must be superseded by a 
labor union with a socialist bent. Just as Frederic Henry feels disenchanted by the 
religious propaganda of a warfare that produced heaps of soldiers’ bodies, The Jungle’s 
main protagonist Jurgis becomes disillusioned by the exploitive mass-production system 
of the meatpacking factories. What Jurgis discovers as his saving belief is the capacity to 
raise a protesting voice as a member of a labor union: 
Since the time of his disillusionment, Jurgis had sworn to trust no man, except in his 
own family; but here he discovered that he had brothers in affliction, and allies. 
Their one chance for life was in union, and so the struggle became a crusade. Jurgis 
had always been a member of the church, because it was the right thing to be, but 
the church had never touched him, he left all that for the women. Here, however, 
was a new religion—one that did touch him, that took hold of every fibre of him; 
and with all the zeal and fury of a convert he went out as a missionary. (110) 
4
 
What should be noted is that, even though Jurgis is described here as an incorrigible 
skeptic of formal religion, he is not incapable of holding any kind of belief or faith. 
Rather, the passage reveals Jurgis’s moment of re-enchantment through disillusionment, a 
utopian moment that comes after he has been exposed to a bleak vision of the truths of 
modernity: a hope for the liberation from the spiritual malaise endemic to modern society.  
                                                 
4
 Clearly gender functions as a key trope in this passage. As was typical of male naturalist 
writers, Sinclair wanted to establish male authority in his writings by attributing 
willpower to his male characters. However, it always ended up in failure, for the 
manliness featured in Sinclair’s novels (as well as in the works of Norris, London, and 
Dreiser) is constantly undermined by the presence of forceful, somewhat excessive 
female characters. For more detail, see Derrick. 
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By making his character into an evangelical figure of socialism, Sinclair sought to find a 
viable form of faith that seemed well attuned to the felt experiences of working-class 
people. To make religion consistent with their sense of actuality was his lifelong project. 
Born into a highly pious family, Sinclair had taken a missionary role in his adolescence, 
teaching biblical episodes to the working-class children around him, only to find that 
those stories “seemed to me futile, not to the point” since they “lacked relationship to the 
lives of little slum-boys” (Profits of Religion 86-87). Evangelical socialism was therefore 
Sinclair’s way to give ongoing and meaning form to both the religious and sociopolitical 
aspirations that he had retained from his youth.
5
 
Throughout the dissertation, I pay attention to a moment Sinclair evinces in his 
writings, the moment when the writers in modernity reveal their craving for a certain kind 
of spirituality that resides in the very materiality of objects, a thingness that rejects facile 
signification, as it is made extrinsic to the seamless flow of the marketplace. I contend 
that the writers’ strong investment in alternative spirituality through thingness is a 
characteristically modernist gesture. As Alex Woloch notes, what defines modernist 
writers is their move “away from the observed object toward the observing subject, away 
from exterior description toward inner apprehension” (28). I want to argue further that 
they were not merely interested in “the observing subject” but in the presence of a certain 
object within the subject, an object that is not wholly incorporated into the subject, but is 
the otherness within the self, born out of an interaction with the thingness of objects that 
                                                 
5
  In Ministers of Reform, Robert Crunden gives a very insightful account of Sinclair’s 
lifelong devotion to Christian evangelicalism, a faith he retained even after he openly 
castigated formal religion. 
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suddenly emerges within the everyday, seemingly nonreligious context. I suggest that 
such an interaction is what modernist writers viewed as an authentic religious experience.  
Indeed, what motivated William James, whose interest in human consciousness 
greatly inspired modernist artists, to explore religion was precisely its personal as well as 
material quality. In The Varieties of Religious Experiences (1902), James emphasizes the 
centrality of a material presence within human consciousness, an object that cannot be 
fully grasped but only be felt as a “something.” James argues that such extrasensory 
perceptions form the basis of religious experiences: 
It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of 
objective presence, a perception of what we may call “something there,” more deep 
and more general than any of the special and particular “senses” by which the 
current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. (44, 
emphasis original) 
James terms this interstitial phenomenological space “transmarginal consciousness,” 
which is “some part of the Self unmanifested” (379), and in this borderland mindscape a 
certain kind of spiritual materiality inhabits.  
Modernist writers, I suggest, defined a spiritual experience as a moment of 
interaction between an uncontainable aspect of objects and the subject’s transmarginal 
consciousness. In each of the chapters that follows, I focus on how each novelist 
transforms a particular object into something spiritual by exposing its thingness, and how 
such unruly materiality resonates with the alterity of the human subject. In my first 
chapter, I focus on West’s Miss Lonelyhearts, paying particular attention to West’s 
idiosyncratic formulation of similes that resists mass media’s enormous capacity to turn 
once truly spiritual words into mere clichés. Featuring trashy objects and thing theory 
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side by side with the Eucharist and other religious symbolism, this chapter serves as a 
foundation of my dissertation, which traces in varying contexts the transformative 
process of a given object being turned into something completely unusable for dominant 
discourse (such as consumerism and populism), but spiritually revelatory for those people 
unassimilable to formal religion.  
The concept of found objects as embodiments of alternative spirituality is central 
to my second chapter as well. When we think about the tangled relationship of modernity 
and religion in the early twentieth century U. S., the distinctive culture of the U. S. South 
emerges as an especially contested field of inquiry. H. L. Mencken, the arbiter of taste in 
the twenties, famously attributed the cause of the cultural decline in the South to 
evangelical Christianity, which he considered the perpetuator of superstitious, 
retrogressive thinking among southerners. In this chapter I take up Faulkner’s The Sound 
and the Fury to explore how Faulkner found a nexus between the highly religious 
atmosphere of the New South (one in which he was deeply steeped), and the modernist 
aesthetics whose emphasis on the revolutionary and the transient were directly at odds 
with his cultural upbringings. My reading of the novel illuminates certain objects hitherto 
neglected in Faulkner scholarship—namely, monumental objects—as the point of 
convergence of the two lines of influence on Faulkner as a modernist of the South. The 
ubiquitous presence of monuments in the novel shows the profound degree to which 
Faulkner was a part of the culture of the Lost Cause, a culture commemorating the 
tragedy of Confederate soldiers by erecting countless monuments in the region. I suggest 
that Faulkner included traditional Confederate monuments to juxtapose them with a 
peculiar kind of monuments that deviated from the traditional notion of monumentality. 
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Faulkner, I argue, seems to designate monuments made of discarded objects as a more 
faithful embodiment of commemoration than ones made of marble and bronze.  
Through a reading of Dreiser’s An American Tragedy, my third chapter focuses 
on Dreiser’s interest in “facts” as supernatural entities. Against the traditional image of 
Dreiser as an atheist and proponent of science, my analysis illuminates another side of 
Dreiser, a devotee of a self-imposed researcher of anomalous phenomena, Charles Fort. 
Dreiser incorporated in his fiction Fort’s emphasis on the anti-theoretical impulse that a 
certain collection of facts inspires. Critics have long accounted for Dreiser’s penchant for 
facts as proof of his allegiance to literary naturalism, in which facts function as the last 
instance in describing the social reality of modern life from an objective standpoint. I 
attempt to unsettle such a secularist reading by delineating the ways in which Dreiser was 
much influenced by Fort’s conception of facts. An idiosyncratic collector of newspaper 
articles reporting anomalous happenings inexplicable by the normative science of the day, 
Fort viewed these accounts as embodying a class of objects or events resistant to abstract 
theory, calling it “a procession of the damned,” “a procession of data that Science has 
excluded.” For Fort, newspaper articles were important objects through which he gained 
access to something magical, something denounced as totally irrelevant by both dogmatic 
science and formal religion. It is my argument that Dreiser incorporated this magical 
aspect of Fort’s facts in An American Tragedy, a novel often viewed as a masterpiece of 
American naturalism, and sought to describe the hard facts of a Godless reality in a 
highly secularized society. By exploring the haunting power of the newspaper articles 
which dominate Clyde Griffith’s mind, my analysis probes how Dreiser recontextualized 
facts from the realm of science into that of the spiritual.  
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My final chapter focuses on Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby to pursue how the 
author sought to experience a sense of wonder in the age of disillusionment. Much like 
the other writers I discuss, Fitzgerald was deeply aware of the difficulty of having a sense 
of wonder in an urban culture in which formal religion seemed dysfunctional. Previous 
Fitzgerald studies dealing with religion have focused almost exclusively on his Catholic 
background, but as his first novel already shows, Fitzgerald was explicitly skeptical of 
dogmatic Christianity. What he turned to as a medium for exploring spiritual experience 
was not the traditional objects of Catholic ritual but instead a heap of trash, whose 
transcendental presence is repeatedly emphasized in Gatsby. The novel has often been 
considered as a uniquely revealing document of the culture of consumption in the 
twenties, but Fitzgerald seems to encapsulate the most powerfully epiphanic moments 
within those things outside the circuit of production and consumption, such as a discarded 
advertisement. Fitzgerald’s investment in a sense of wonder through the transformative 
encounter with discarded objects can be regarded as his attempt to present a more 
positive view of modernity than the one his predecessors posited. 
Collectively, these modernist writers saw spiritual manifestations within the 
thingness of objects. I suggest that they discerned a complicitous relationship between 
dogmatic religiosity and consumerism, both of which enervated the expressive power of 
language and objects. In order to attend to the actuality of the people whose precarious 
lives were constantly driven to self-effacement, modernists turned toward alternative 
spirituality via an unraveling materiality of words and things. Theirs is therefore an 
essentially ethical engagement with representing otherness, a kind of alterity that not only 
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arises through an interaction between the self and the other, but is always already 




“Life is . . .”: Nathanael West’s Anti-symbolism in Miss Lonelyhearts 
 
In one of the letters written during his engagement with the Hollywood film industry, 
Nathanael West shows his qualms about projecting his own political beliefs onto his 
writings: “Is it possible to contrive a right-about face with one’s writing because of a 
conviction based on a theory? I doubt it” (“A Letter” 794). West’s decision to separate 
his political concerns from his writings in no way attests to any personal sympathy 
toward his predecessors’ slogan, “Art for Art’s sake,” but it does betray his acute sense of 
the political injustice of his times, since West had devoted “a great deal of time” to “a 
strong progressive movement,” including “the Anti-Nazi league” (794-5).  
West could have incorporated his political consciousness in his writing as Steinbeck 
did in The Grapes of Wrath, a novel West viewed as an exemplary work which channeled 
the writer’s political passion into his novelistic endeavor, albeit with the following 
reservation: “Take the ‘mother’ in Steinbeck’s swell novel—I want to believe in her and 
yet inside myself I honestly can’t. When not writing a novel—say at a meeting of a 
committee we have out here to help the migratory worker—I do believe it and try to act 
on that belief. But at the typewriter by myself I can’t” (795). Steinbeck becomes a 
reference point in West’s argument, for, while Steinbeck could so easily (or too easily) 
bridge the two activities (politics and literature) through his creation of “the ‘mother,’” 
West ended up bringing out his own version of a “motherly” figure named Miss 
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Lonelyhearts, a young bachelor with a feminine pseudonym who works as an advice 
columnist. 
In some sense, nothing could be further from Steinbeck’s representation of the 
hordes of migrant workers in the vast landscape of California. Miss Lonelyhearts 
chronicles one anonymous journalist’s microscopic inner world, which undergoes a 
drastic change through his correspondence with his subscribers, a situation which he 
succinctly describes to his girlfriend as follows: 
“Let’s start from the beginning. A man is hired to give advice to his readers of a 
newspaper. The job is a circulation stunt and the whole stuff considers it a joke. 
[. . .] [B]ut after several months at it, the joke begins to escape. He sees that the 
majority of the letters are profoundly humble pleas for moral and spiritual advice, 
that they are inarticulate expressions of genuine suffering.” (32) 
The novel begins at the very moment when Miss Lonelyhearts finds himself facing a 
severe writing block, desperately seeking a language that can reach all his letter writers. 
Just like the evangelical he reads about in a newspaper article, the columnist is trying to 
find a “universal language” that could only be legitimated with biblical authenticity (7). 
This yearning for the “universal language,” in fact, is deeply embedded in the 
cultural context of the 1930s, where various religious symbols were circulated by 
populist sects to express their alleged sympathy for “the people.” The most important 
case was that of Father William Coughlin, a Catholic evangelical known as “the Radio 
Priest,” who, in his weekly radio broadcast, referred to Christ as the symbol of the 
suffering people in the Depression: “My friends, Christ and Christianity are the only 
active, unassailable forces which today have compassion on the multitudes. [. . .] He 
knows what it is to suffer from hunger. [. . .] [T]hrough all the vicissitudes of time his 
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teachings still endure, still shine even in the darkness of our nights of sorrow” (qtd. in 
Brinkley 99). Coughlin’s rendering of Christ’s teachings as the light in “our nights of 
sorrow” clearly resonates with a passage in Miss Lonelyhearts’s unfinished draft, in 
which he symbolizes “faith” as “a clear white flame on a grim dark altar” (1). Despite 
their common use of Christian symbolism of light and shadow to appeal to their followers, 
the two evangelical figures show contrasting measures of success: while Miss 
Lonelyhearts agonizes alone at his desk in front of the unfinished draft, Father Coughlin 
attracts more than 25,000 listeners in a convention hall and receives thunderous applause 
(Brinkley 82).  
 In the light of such religious fervor among those seeking consolation for the 
injuries of modernity, the success of The Grapes of Wrath and the financial failure of 
Miss Lonelyhearts are equally understandable: whereas Steinbeck’s image of archetypal 
motherhood in the figure of Ma Joad had become, as John Veitch suggests, the “echt 
symbol” of “populist ideology” (xiii), West took the same motherly attributes—
consolation and procreation—and made them utterly inadequate for populist use. 
Although West’s subject matter was akin to Steinbeck’s in that both tried to capture the 
sense of ordinary people seeking salvation from a feminine (or feminized) savior, West 
departed from Steinbeck in his refusal to turn his character into “the symbol,” an abstract 
image that could fit on the banner of dominant ideologies.  
This was West’s challenge: if a search for the “universal language” invariably 
promotes the mass production of free-floating symbols, how can a message be delivered 
that at least provisionally resists the full force of the media’s relentless circulation of 
words, a force that immediately turns specific images into ready-made symbols? To be 
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sure, West in Miss Lonelyhearts included a number of symbols, but he did so mainly to 
suggest his attitude of anti-symbolism, an attitude that distinguishes symbols from mere 
things which fail to become symbols. This anti-symbolist stance indicates, in my view, 
West’s ethical choice in writing about what had become the central concern of writers 
during the Depression: the suffering people.
6
 
 In the following sections, my essay primarily focuses on West’s apparently 
obsessive concern with “things” in Miss Lonelyhearts, and the ways in which he uses 
them to show his own emotional investment in the suffering people of his time. In so 
doing, I elaborate on West’s idiosyncratic stylistics, which are usually dealt with under 
the rubric of surrealism or in relation to the comic-strip form.
7
 By featuring a character 
who has two contrasting degrees of productivity—one as a writer who fails to write like 
Christ and the other as a daydreamer with a seemingly inexhaustible imagination—Miss 
Lonelyhearts reveals West’s rejection of the particular writing style used to express one’s 
unconditional surrender to a single object—be it God or a political activity—and his 
attempt to create another kind of style based on things irreducible to any fixed meaning.  
*              *             * 
West’s provocative treatment of materiality and material objects shown in the 
novel is most convincingly addressed by the contemporaneous critic Josephine Herbst, 
                                                 
6
 For the cultural dynamics in the thirties propelled by various social movements, see 
Denning. 
7
 Critics made various responses to West’s commentary on Miss Lonelyhearts as “A 
novel in the form of a comic strip” (“Some Notes on Miss L.” 401). The most extensive 
research on the novel vis-à-vis the comic-strip form is the one demonstrated by Rita 




who considered “things” as the key to understand the stylistic characteristics of Miss 
Lonelyhearts:  
Man’s collaboration with things, the paraphernalia of his suffering, is realized in the 
metaphor where West’s vision takes effect. When a man smiles, his fat cheeks are 
“bunched like twin rolls of smooth pink toilet paper.” Miss Lonelyhearts proposes 
marriage “to a party dress.” Mrs. Doyle’s massive hams are like “two enormous 
grindstones.” […] The tension between the visible and invisible [. . .] is set up and 
released by grim humor, outrageous paradox, by the use of an idiom which serves as 
the “connection” between the world of things and the dream world, between the 
nightmare and the vaguely aspiring. (14, emphasis original, underlines mine) 
Herbst’s comment is useful in thinking about the connection between West’s stylistic 
experiment and his long-standing thematic investment in what Jay Martin termed 
“collective mythmaking,” an act of creation constituted by “the dream lives of all kinds 
and classes of people” during the Depression (170, 172). However, Herbst’s designation 
of the union of “things” and collective fantasy as the working of “the metaphor” appears 
rhetorically misleading. For, as Herbst’s textual quotes show, what Herbst calls “the 
metaphor” are mostly similes: two out of three quotes in her analysis use the word “like” 
as the connecting link between two given objects. Herbst’s otherwise penetrating reading 
of the collaborative relationship between “things” and the human subject thus occurs 
more in the context of similes, in which “things” become as active as human beings.  
West’s emphasis on the significance of similes in the novel can be observed not only 
in the frequency of their appearance (59 times in 58 pages, by my count) but in West’s 
rather baffling process of revision as well. Parts of Miss Lonelyhearts were first published 
in Contact, an avant-garde literary magazine in the thirties with which West himself was 
involved. Based on his meticulous research on West’s revisions of the novel, Carter 
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Daniel argues that simplifications of syntax as well as the eliminations of repetition are 
the principal stylistic strategies for the “laconic precision” of West’s narrative voice (59-
60). Although I celebrate with Daniel and many other critics the superbly economical 
style of Miss Lonelyhearts as a whole, one particular passage in the final version quite 
puzzles me, for it leads the reader to suspect that West deliberately uses a problematic 
style.  
The passage appears in the scene where Miss Lonelyhearts walks around the small 
park, trying to exercise his imagination to turn a thing into something else. The earlier 
version expresses this transformative process in a single sentence:  
He walked into the shadow of a lamp post that lay on the path like a spear, and like a 
spear it pierced him through. (“Miss Lonelyhearts” 80)  
The final version divides this passage into two sentences:  
He walked into the shadow of a lamp-post that lay on the path like a spear. It pierced 
him like a spear. (Miss Lonelyhearts 4)  
By eliminating the inversion, the revised passage appears redundant in its repetition of 
“like a spear.”  West thus seems to have made a risky decision to foreground the impact 
of simile.
8
  More significantly West at this point seems to have shifted his narrative voice 
                                                 
8
 Another notable passage that (over)emphasizes Miss Lonelyhearts’s heavy reliance on 
similes as his essential means to perceive surrounding objects appears in the scene in 
which the columnist meets with one of his subscribers, Mrs. Doyle. On seeing her, Miss 
Lonelyhearts makes “a quick catalogue” of her physical appearance that is filled with 
similes: “legs like Indian clubs, breasts like balloons and a brow like a pigeon [. . .] she 
looked like a police captain” (27).  
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dangerously close to voices otherwise vastly different, namely, those of the letter writers 
whose style is invariably awkward, as in: “Gracie is deaf and dumb and biger [sic] than 
me but not very smart on account of being deaf and dumb” (3). Such a passage clearly 
exhibits the same kind of awkwardness as the one describing Miss Lonelyhearts’s 
perception that transforms “a lamp-post” into “a spear.” We should also note that their 
common redundancy aims at emphasizing something physical, such as “being deaf and 
dumb” and “a spear.” By presenting Miss Lonelyhearts’s visionary perception of things 
emphatically through similes, West relates the columnist’s sensitivity to his subscribers’ 
obsession with bodily matters. In this way, similes not only operate as the definitive 
formal characteristic of the novel but also connect Miss Lonelyhearts’s vision with that of 
his subscribers.  
In general, then, the narrative voice of Miss Lonelyhearts can be closely 
connected with those of the subscribers’ letters. We must bear in mind, however, that 
Miss Lonelyhearts himself never lets “things” appear in his responses to the subscribers, 
since they are not sufficiently consecrated for religious use. Just as West separated his act 
of believing from that of writing, Miss Lonelyhearts seems to make a clear distinction 
between the act of imagining and that of writing. In his columns, Miss Lonelyhearts 
employs religious language even though on the intellectual level he is no less 
disillusioned by the power of religion than his incorrigibly sardonic colleague, Shrike. In 
fact, as Thomas Strychacz aptly observes, Shrike and Miss Lonelyhearts “constantly 
rewrite cultural traditions for a new context, bringing once-authoritative texts (the Bible, 
Pater’s  The Renaissance, probably Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy) uselessly to 
bear on the inarticulate misery embodied in the letters” (174). But we should 
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simultaneously note the difference in the degree to which each of the two characters 
commits himself to this cultural rewriting. While Shrike aggressively presents his diatribe 
against the bourgeois pretension and the high modernists’ enshrinement of “Art,” thereby 
turning himself into a mouthpiece of West’s own “late modernist” response to his 
predecessors,
 9
 Miss Lonelyhearts seems more ambivalent about deconstructing the 
cultural tradition established by religion and art.  
That Miss Lonelyhearts has an almost ineradicable penchant for religion and art as the 
foundation of universal order is illustrated by the sequence in which he indulges in a 
memory from his early teens: a moment when, as he waited with his younger sister for 
their father, a Baptist minister, to come home from “church,” Miss Lonelyhearts began to 
play “a piece by Mozart,” to which his sister danced “gravely and carefully, a simple 
dance yet formal.” From this memory, he pictures an imaginative world filled with 
dancing children: “Every child, everywhere; in the whole world there was not one child 
who was not gravely, sweetly dancing” (15). The nostalgic imagination that seizes Miss 
Lonelyhearts clearly sets up a utopian space in which patriarchal religiosity (father and 
church) dovetails with art (Mozart and dancing children), starkly contrasting with the 
current situation in which he must send his religious messages to the unknown masses 
whose lives always seem to revolve around their destabilized families.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Shrike’s extensive tirade against the modernity’s cultural deadlock becomes most 
fervent when he attacks the bourgeois self-complacency which turns the works of high 
modernist into rapidly consumed goods. Shrike wryly comments, “The South Seas are 
played out and there’s little use in imitating Gauguin. […] You fornicate under pictures 
by Matisse and Picasso, you drink from Renaissance glassware, and often you spend an 
evening beside the fireplace with Proust and an apple” (33-34). 
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*              *             * 
In order to give his sincere responses to the subscribers’ pleas for a familial love that 
is unattainable to them, Miss Lonelyhearts decides that he must cultivate a special kind of 
love that only God could possess. His ideal form of love is modeled on a passage from 
his own favorite novel Brothers Karamazov that narrates Father Zossima’s preaching on 
“Divine Love.” In its insistence on all-embracing love, Zossima’s teaching resonates with 
Steinbeck’s celebration of motherly love: 
 “Love a man even in his sin, for that is the semblance of Divine Love and is the 
highest love on earth. Love all God’s creation, the whole and every grain of sand in 
it. [. . .] And you will come at last to love the whole world with an all-embracing 
love.” (8) 
Zossima’s sermon places “Divine Love” as the “highest” because of its all-
inclusiveness—since it is love’s ultimate form, one should aim at creating “the semblance 
of Divine Love,” becoming, that is to say, one with God.  
Miss Lonelyhearts thus features a particular form of religion that emphasizes total 
submission to a single object. As R. W. B. Lewis aptly notes, religion in Miss 
Lonelyhearts is founded on the concept of “the Eucharist—that holy communion after 
which Miss Lonelyhearts so yearns” (213-4, emphasis original). The basic tenet of the 
Eucharist is that, by eating the bread and drinking from the cup, the disciples of Christ 
incorporate Christ’s body and blood, thereby becoming united with him even after his 
death. The Bible describes this sacramental rite that occurs in the Last Supper as follows:  
And when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat: this is my body, 
which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also 
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he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my 
blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me. (King James Bible, 1 
Co. 11.24-5) 
In this transubstantiation, metaphors serve as the key trope, for in such statements as “this 
is my body” and “this is my blood,” they transform things (the bread and the cup) into the 
symbols of Christ’s body and blood. And since the Eucharist supposedly enables union 
with Christ, the very form of metaphors (“X is Y”) rhetorically befits an expression of the 
fulfillment of the holy communion. That is to say, if the bread is Christ’s body, the 
disciple’s body that consumes the bread becomes Christ’s body as well. In Eucharistic 
form, then, metaphors produce symbols out of objects, urging the human subject to 
become one with symbol, an act of incorporation which ultimately brings forth union 
with Christ.  
It is through this Eucharistic use of metaphors that Miss Lonelyhearts must write 
if he is to achieve the communion with his readers he seeks. The novel includes two 
incomplete drafts of his columns, which share a set of syntaxes and tropes. The first draft 
goes: 
“Life is worth while, for it is full of dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy, and 
faith that burns like a clear white flame on a grim dark altar.” (1, emphasis original)  
Then the columnist goes on to write the second:  
“Life, for most of us, seems a terrible struggle of pain and heartbreak, without hope 
or joy. Oh, my dear readers, it only seems so. [. . .] See the cloud-flecked sky, the 
foam-decked sea. . . . Smell the sweet pine and heady privet. . . . Feel of velvet and 
of satin. . . . As the popular song goes, ‘The best things in life are free.’ Life is . . .”  
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He could not go on with it[.] (26)  
Both drafts show Miss Lonelyhearts’s vain attempt to present the definition of “Life” 
through a religious ecstasy enmeshed in various romantic imageries. As the ellipses in the 
last passage of the second draft (“Life is . . .”) suggests, convention dictates that he 
present at least two definitions of “Life,” but has to give it up. What phrase needs to 
come after the second “Life is . . .” remains a mystery but we can at least surmise the 
form the passage might take.  
A clue lies in one of Shrike’s relentless inveiglings of Miss Lonelyhearts’s “Christ 
Business,” in which Shrike parodies Miss Lonelyhearts by giving out two mocking 
versions of Miss Lonelyhearts’s signature phrase: “Life [. . .] is a club where they won’t 
stand for squawk,” and, “Life for me is a desert empty of comfort” (34, 35). Shrike’s 
caricatures of Miss Lonelyhearts’s punchline make it reasonable for us to assume that the 
second “Life is . . .” should take the form of metaphor. However, Miss Lonelyhearts, who 
feels that he must write with the kind of love that is one with God, finds it impossible to 
adopt the form most suitable, namely, a Eucharistic metaphor that transforms two 
different items into one symbolic meaning.  
As if to compensate for his stagnated writings, Miss Lonelyhearts incessantly 
envisions a dream world that illustrates the phenomenological conflict between what he 
wishes to perceive and what he cannot but perceive. During his regular brooding in the 
small park, he looks up at the sky for a “target” that would give him a sense of orientation 
in his murky situation: 
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He searched the sky for a target. But the gray sky looked as if it had been rubbed 
with a soiled eraser. It held no angels, flaming crosses, olive-bearing doves, wheels 
within wheels. Only a newspaper struggled in the air like a kite with a broken spine. 
(5) 
The scene illustrates Miss Lonelyhearts’s predicament: while his yearning craves biblical 
symbols (angels, flaming crosses, olive-bearing doves), what he actually sees are things 
that lack biblical authenticity (a broken kite and a soiled eraser) and therefore could never 
enter his column. Indeed, Miss Lonelyhearts, struggling to create metaphors in his 
abortive writings, tirelessly generates similes: a newspaper “is like” a broken kite, while 
the sky “look[s] as if” it were soiled paper.  
 By giving primacy to similes over metaphors in the novel, West seems to overturn 
the conventional hierarchy of the two tropes. As recent rhetorical research on metaphors 
and similes indicates, metaphors have long been considered “stronger” than similes. This 
hierarchal relationship between the two tropes dates back to the age of Aristotle who 
claimed that “The simile . . . is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word, 
therefore it is less pleasant because it is longer” (qtd. in Chiappe and Kennedy 371). This 
binary is constructed by the tropes’ respective literal models: while a metaphoric claim is 
modeled on a literal claim of category like “this is a banana” (a statement suggesting that 
the object has all the features needed to be a member of the category “banana”), a simile 
is modeled on such a literal claim about likeness as “this is like a banana” (a statement 
suggesting that the object only has some of those properties of a banana). As a result, 
metaphors have come to be regarded as “stronger,” entailing as they do more properties 
of similarity (Chiappe and Kennedy 374). In other words, similes are “weaker” because 
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they denote only partial semblance between two objects; there remains some excess that 
cannot be subsumed into a single symbolic meaning.  
This alleged weakness of similes—the implication of residue—provides West 
with a productive vehicle for stylistic and thematic challenge in Miss Lonelyhearts. As 
my earlier quotes demonstrate, similes in the novel are generally equated with everyday 
commodities like “twin rolls of smooth pink toilet paper” and “a broken kite.” To 
understand the ubiquitous presence of things and similes in Miss Lonelyhearts, we should 
turn our eyes to an ongoing critical inquiry into the status of things, especially as outlined 
in the theory of Bill Brown. 
*              *             * 
In his seminal work on the “thingness” of things, Bill Brown maintains that, even 
when a thing becomes an object—a phenomenon brought about when a human subject 
projects him or herself onto a thing—it still possesses something uncontainable within 
human perception, something that will not function as a mirror of the self. As a result, the 
“thingness” of things reveals the recalcitrant nature of things, unfathomable in the 
semantic field; in other words, objects contain a kind of residue that will not surface in 
the process of meaning-production: 
We look through objects because there are codes by which our interpretive attention 
makes them meaningful, because there is a discourse of objectivity that allows us to 
use them as facts. A thing, in contrast, can hardly function as a window. We begin to 
confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill 
breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when their flow within the 
circuits of production and distribution [. . .] has been arrested, however momentarily. 
The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed 
relation to the human subject[.] (4, emphasis original) 
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By creating a list of malfunctioning commodities (the broken drill, the engine failure, and 
the dirty windows), Brown draws our attention to the affective quality of “thingness.” 
Encountering senseless things, for Brown, is a painful experience, for they frustrate our 
desire to generate meaning out of everything. The acknowledgement of “thingness” is, if 
not entirely impossible, no easy task.  
Brown’s theory and my argument about Miss Lonelyhearts connect precisely at 
this point. I argue the novel’s focus rests on one’s painful experience of confronting the 
constitutive otherness that haunts objects, an element which Miss Lonelyhearts cannot 
eradicate from his consciousness, as the following passage indicates: 
Miss Lonelyhearts found himself developing an almost insane sensitiveness to order. 
Everything had to form a pattern: the shoes under the bed, the ties in the holder, the 
pencils on the table. […] On that day all the inanimate things over which he had 
tried to obtain control took the field against him. When he touched something, it 
spilled or rolled to the floor. [. . .]  He fled to the street, but there chaos was multiple. 
Brown groups of people hurried past, forming neither stars nor squares. [. . .] No 
repeated groups of words would fit their rhythm and no scale could give them 
meaning. (11) 
Much like Brown’s figure who suddenly has to face senseless things, Miss Lonelyhearts 
is compelled to face a united front of “inanimate things” which confound his will to order. 
Neither the objects in his apartment nor the people on the street can offer the harmonious 
accompaniment Mozart’s piano piece once did in his childhood. Everything around him 
turns into an unfathomable substance, infinitely removed from such biblical symbols as 
“olive-bearing doves” and “wheels within wheels.” If biblical symbols create an instant 
access to meaning, the otherness of things registers the excess of objects that cannot be 
fully conceptualized.  
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Miss Lonelyhearts’s unbearable encounter with inarticulatable things reaches a 
climax when he encounters those unknown subscribers who send him letters filled with 
“inarticulate expressions of genuine suffering” (32). The affective quality of those 
people’s writings, which William Carlos Williams once described as “unbearable letters” 
(“Sordid?” 8), shares a significant commonality. Jonathan Veitch argues that the 
subscribers’ unanimous insistence on their own “physically” devastating experiences 
makes the letters “almost unbearable to read” (74-5). This emotionally jarring effect 
comes from the subscribers’ “inarticulate” cry of physical pain. To be sure, their 
inarticulateness derives from their lack of vocabulary, but it must also be noted that their 
foregrounding of bodily experiences overwhelms Miss Lonelyhearts.  
So strong is the subscribers’ propensity toward bodily matters that even their 
practice of abstraction turns itself into something physical, as is clearly shown in a letter 
from a woman with two children deserted by her husband. This lengthy letter, written “in 
five pages [of] ghastly details” as Stanley Hyman puts it (21), has an uncanny postscript. 
Following the convention of adopting a symbolic signature, the writer names herself 
“Broad Shoulders” at the end, adding, “P. S. Dear Miss Lonelyhearts don’t think I am 
broad shouldered but that is the way I feel about life and me I mean” (43). This postscript 
reveals both her authorial intent and her anxiety concerning the act of symbolization. 
While her pseudonym is meant to be taken symbolically (“Broad Shoulders” as a 
metaphor for the burden she carries), she fears that the physicality of the idiom may 
mislead her reader to take the term as referring to her actual build. Although the 
pseudonyms are supposedly the only place where the letter writers avoid dwelling on 
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their material conditions and practice the act of symbolization, Broad Shoulders’s hasty 
postscript unwittingly betrays the letter writers’ voracious appetite for bodily matters.  
 If the writings within the novel always become either purely abstract (Miss 
Lonelyhearts’s columns) or being confined to the realm of the material (the subscribers’ 
letters), and if Miss Lonelyhearts is acutely aware of this discrepancy, then his 
daydreaming represents his desperate attempt to merge these two contrasting impulses. 
The most extensively depicted hallucination of Miss Lonelyhearts shows his laborious 
effort to suture the abstract and the concrete. The dream, described as a tremendous saga, 
first takes place at “a pawnshop full of fur coats, diamond rings, watches, shotguns, 
fishing tackle, mandolins.” He symbolizes “all these things” as “the paraphernalia of 
suffering,” a recognition which infuses these second-hand objects with intangible 
emotion, thereby crystallizing the material and the conceptual into a meaningful fusion. 
He then embarks on a “doomed” battle with “the physical world” in which “the 
paraphernalia of suffering” challenges his quest for “order”: 
First he formed a phallus of old watches and rubber boots [. . .] after these a circle, 
triangle, square, swastika. But nothing proved definitive and he began to make a 
gigantic cross. When the cross became too large for the pawnshop, he moved it to 
the shore of the ocean. [. . .] His labors were enormous. He staggered from the last 
wave line to his work, loaded down with marine refuse—bottles, shells, chunks of 
cork, fish heads, pieces of net. (31) 
Miss Lonelyhearts’s effort to combat things by forming patterns with them ends up 
producing a symbol that is no longer purely abstract but clearly political: i.e. the 
“swastika.” This failure propels him to create an object that always functions as his 
ultimate abstraction, a religious symbol, and the setting accordingly moves from the 
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pawnshop to the more symbolic seashore, a place of regeneration and salvation. At the 
same time, however, the “gigantic cross” found on the beach is not made of intangible 
concepts like “sin” or “guilt” but discarded objects like “bottles” and “chunks of cork.” 
Miss Lonelyhearts’s laborious construction of a Christian symbol out of “marine refuse” 
thus connotes his attempt to assemble senseless things into a meaningful object.  
 How does this dialectical relationship between meaningful objects and pointless 
things connect itself to another conflicting coupling of metaphors and similes in the 
novel? In order to consider these parallel dialectics, we must return to the earlier passage 
I quoted: “He searched the sky for a target. But the gray sky looked as if it had been 
rubbed with a soiled eraser. It held no angels, flaming crosses, olive-bearing doves, 
wheels within wheels. Only a newspaper struggled in the air like a kite with a broken 
spine” (5). If the clear blue sky (as celestial a space as the blue ocean) is the procreator of 
such meaningful objects as “angels,” “the gray sky” is the generator of those things that 
have failed to become symbols: “a soiled eraser,” “a newspaper,” and “a kite with a 
broken spine.” In other words, while religion can create symbols that actualize the perfect 
union of the signifier and the referent (e.g. “olive-bearing doves” in a biblical term can 
mean nothing but a harbinger of peace), those mere things can imply the semiotic 
slippage between the word and the meaning.
10
 Moreover, since the novel’s religious 
discourse is always presented through metaphors—a trope insisting on the absolute union 
                                                 
10
 In his ecocritical reading of the novel, Lee Rozelle views those discarded objects which 
the columnist finds in the park as “referential litter” that “does not connect” Miss 
Lonelyhearts “to either place or community” (104). Rozelle thus posits a rather negative 
reading of the objects as metaphors of Miss Lonelyhearts’s sense of displacement. 
However, as my analysis suggests, by paralleling discarded objects with biblical symbols, 
West seems to imply a positive potential in such “referential litter” as things irreducible 
to any fixed meaning. 
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of two given items—the objects in the religious context complete total metamorphosis 
into abstract entities. As a result, an object like “olive-bearing doves” in “the sky” gets 
stripped of materiality and becomes meaning per se.  
Through its juxtaposition of biblical symbols, the above-cited passage implies that 
non-consecrated objects like “a kite with a broken spine” retain a certain degree of that 
which cannot be turned into conceptual meaning. And if those mere things are connected 
through simile, it follows that their connection is not rendered as absolute as that 
expressed through metaphor; the similarity between “a newspaper” and “a kite with a 
broken spine” is only partial and thus a certain degree of individuality within each, and/or 
of distinction between the two, is preserved. If symbols and metaphors in the novel strain 
to achieve a production of meaning—the complete union between the abstract and the 
concrete—things and similes always defer such holy communion through their insistence 
on incommensurability and excess, and on those things that cannot be turned into ready-
made meanings.  
*             *             * 
West’s engagement with discarded objects may be seen to reflect a 
quintessentially modernist stance toward everyday commodities. As James Light 
demonstrates, West was indebted to the French surrealists’ modes of image-making (102-
6). But while the surrealists designated the realm of the unconscious as the source of new 
imagery, West seems to consider his act of image-making as highly intense “labor,” as is 
seen in the way Miss Lonelyhearts’s dreamwork is expressed: “his labors were enormous.” 
For West, the tethering of two given things should be presented as excruciating “labor,” 
rather than the product of an aesthetically playful exploration into the unconscious 
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through automatic writing. Through this laborious effort, West shows his acute awareness 
of the frustrating aspect of things that suspends access to meaning. 
 We should note here that when West uses the term “labor,” he does so mainly to 
show the dialectic between symbolic objects and non-instrumental things. Apart from the 
columnist, Peter Doyle is the only character whose actions warrant the word “labor.” The 
character of Doyle, a crippled man who is one of Miss Lonelyhearts’s subscribers, is 
significant as the embodiment of what cannot be made symbolic. As soon as Miss 
Lonelyhearts comes across Doyle, the former senses in the latter something 
uncontainable: “he made many waste motions, like those of a partially destroyed insect” 
(44). The presence of excess in Doyle is doubly emphasized through a simile as well as 
his physical gestures that contain “many waste motions.” Furthermore, all parts of his 
face are depicted as somewhat out of place: “The cripple had a very strange face. His 
eyes failed to balance; his mouth was not under his nose [. . .]. He looked like one of 
those composite photographs used by screen magazines in guessing contests” (45). Doyle, 
in fact, is like a montage of Miss Lonelyhearts’s subscribers: a person suffering from his 
own physical deformity, malfunctioning marriage, economic distress, and most 
significantly, material embodiment or “thingness” itself. Doyle’s uncontainable quality 
becomes most manifest when he starts his labor of speaking:  
When the cripple finally labored into speech, Miss Lonelyhearts was unable to 
understand him. He listened hard for a few minutes and realized that Doyle was 
making no attempt to be understood. He was giving birth to groups of words that 
lived inside of him as things, a jumble of the retorts he had meant to make when 
insulted and the private curses against fate that experience had taught him to 
swallow. (45-6)  
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Doyle’s attempt to make “things” out of suffering, in a sense, resembles Miss 
Lonelyhearts’s own laboring in his daydream: both try to create a bricolage of things out 
of the “paraphernalia of suffering.” And like the sea—Miss Lonelyhearts’s imaginary 
progenitor of symbols—Doyle is equipped with procreative ability, but unlike the sea, 
what he “gives birth to” are “words” that have turned into “things.” If the sea transforms 
things into meaningful objects, Doyle turns meaningful words into things. And, while 
Miss Lonelyhearts labors with the “paraphernalia of suffering” to create one symbolic 
object, “a gigantic cross,” Doyle labors to radicalize the senselessness of things by 
turning words into a “jumble” generated by his own suffering.  
 Both characters, therefore, are driven by their contrasting impulses: Miss 
Lonelyhearts wants to turn frustrating things into one meaningful symbol, while Doyle 
tries to transform his suffering into the bric-a-brac of senseless things. The chasm 
between the two grows wider as Miss Lonelyhearts becomes possessed by the Eucharistic 
desire to become one with God. The novel’s final chapter, “Miss Lonelyhearts Has a 
Religious Experience,” leads to the columnist’s ultimate death through the accidental 
firing of the gun wrapped with a newspaper Doyle carries in order to revenge himself on 
Miss Lonelyhearts for sleeping with Mrs. Doyle, who successfully seduced the columnist. 
Miss Lonelyhearts, now believing that he is almost becoming one with God, is in the very 
process of the holy communion: “He was conscious of two rhythms that were slowly 
becoming one. When they became one, his identification with God was complete” (57). 
For him, Doyle appears as a godsend, a symbolic object in its purest form that helps to 
complete his conversion experience: 
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God had sent him so that Miss Lonelyhearts could perform a miracle and be certain 
of his conversion. It was a sign. He would embrace the cripple and the cripple would 
be made whole again, even as he, a spiritual cripple, had been made whole. (57) 
Immersed in the Eucharistic communion with God, Miss Lonelyhearts can no longer 
view Doyle as a human subject but only as “a sign,” a religious symbol that allegedly 
contains God’s will. Miss Lonelyhearts’s wish to become spiritually complete by 
becoming one with the crippled Doyle is, in a sense, fulfilled by his accidental death, 
which involves Doyle as well. In respect to this bizarre ending, Marc Ratner emphasizes 
the significance of the gun that explodes by itself as emblematic of human corruption in 
the age of the machine:  
[G]iven West’s view of the sordidness and futility of human existence, the most 
logical ending for Miss Lonelyhearts is to be destroyed by a cold, mechanical thing. 
At the end of Miss Lonelyhearts’ “mystic way” lies failure because of the 
pointlessness of loving in a world that is dead to love. (109, emphasis original)  
While I basically agree with Ratner that Miss Lonelyhearts’s death is brought not by the 
human hand but by the mere thing, I do not think that the gun represents the loveless 
modern world. Rather, the gun problematizes the very concept of Miss Lonelyhearts’s 
way of loving, the all-embracing love based on the Eucharistic notion of becoming one 
with God through the metaphoric incorporation of objects. The gun can be seen as the 
culmination of Doyle’s ability to achieve a reversal of the Eucharist, namely, the power 
of incorporating suffering and transforming it into a meaningless thing. Doyle’s 
exploding gun thus reveals the alarming quality of things, the “thingness” that insists on a 
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distance from the human subject by rejecting its designated role as a container of 
meaning.  
*              *              * 
 William Carlos Williams offered one of the most enthusiastic appreciations on 
Miss Lonelyhearts when he wrote about the discontinuation of the literary magazine 
Contact, for which he worked as editor in chief. Claiming that “Contact has produced N. 
West. Now it can die” (“A New American Writer” 48), Williams extolled West’s verbal 
ability to revivify an already clichéd theme: “the terrible moral impoverishment of our 
youth in the cities.” Williams continued: 
But to do that he has discovered that the way to treat this theme is to use the dialect 
natural to such a condition. Since the newspapers are the principal corruptors of all 
that has value in language, it is with the use of this very journalistic “aspect” and 
everyday speech that language must be regenerated. (48) 
According to Williams, the chief reason for the novel’s aesthetic success is precisely in 
the way its theme is presented. But I must add that style is not merely the technique here; 
the search for a writing style that can express feeling is in fact the novel’s central issue. 
While Miss Lonelyhearts draws on the abstracting power of religion, the subscribers are 
propelled to write about physical matters in everyday contexts. The novel’s ending 
signals the precedence of things over religious symbols, thereby revealing West’s 
apprehension that the swift and vast circulation of religious symbols through mass media 
turns once powerful religious language (as suggested by Miss Lonelyhearts’s childhood) 
into clichés, a set of words whose multivalency has become significantly enervated by 
their mass distribution. 
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As Williams pointed out, West “regenerated” the dominant verbal discourse of the 
era with slight but significant alteration. By coupling religious metaphors and symbols 
with their supposedly weaker versions—similes and everyday commodities—West 
attempted to redefine the vernacular of the 1930s. The novel strenuously differentiates 
religious tropes from similes and everyday commodities by suggesting that, while the 
former aims at the subject’s complete identification with the object, the latter gestures 
toward maintaining a certain distance between subject and object.  
As Bill Brown argues, such a recognition of “thingness” is an essentially 
frustrating and hence “ethical” act (12). Quoting Adorno’s theoretical account of radical 
alterity, Brown claims that “accepting the otherness of things is the condition for 
accepting otherness as such” (12). West himself maintained such ethical stance as he 
grappled with the issue of how to represent “the suffering people.” Rather than becoming 
one with “the people,” as Steinbeck and many other populists did, West suggested the 
impossibility of such a metaphoric union by highlighting the constitutive otherness 
inherent in things and the people, the otherness that interferes with the subject’s strong 
drive toward total identification with the object. By so doing, West expressed the almost 




“Only the Flat Irons”: Counter-monuments in The Sound and the Fury 
 
As a postwar southerner who did not actually experience the Civil War, William 
Faulkner had only second-hand access to that epic event, forming a certain kind of 
memory which Marianne Hirsch terms “postmemory,” the experiences of those who 
grow up “dominated by narratives that preceded their birth” (22). In a 1958 interview, 
Faulkner revealed how his own childhood memory was intertwined with the memories of 
the Civil War that aged veterans and female survivors occasionally conveyed via 
commemorative ceremonies and casual reminiscences: 
I was five-six-seven years old around 1904-5-6 and 7, old enough to understand to 
listen. They [=the veterans] didn’t talk so much about that war, I had got that from 
the maiden spinster aunts which had never surrendered. But I can remember the old 
men, and they would get out the old shabby grey uniforms and get out the old battle-
flag on Decoration, Memorial Day. Yes, I remember any number of them. But it was 
the aunts, the women, that had never given up. (249) 
By being constantly exposed to oral and visual witnessing of the Civil War, Faulkner 
found himself thoroughly embedded within the culture of the Lost Cause, an ideology 
prevalent in the New South that elevated Confederate soldiers to the status of self-
sacrificing heroes who sought to protect the white paternalism and plantation economy of 
the antebellum South. As Charles Wilson argues, the Lost Cause movement was 
essentially a religious phenomenon, “a cult of the dead,” which celebrated the noble 
deaths of General Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and many nameless soldiers who died for the 
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holy cause: “Having lost what they considered to be a holy war, Southerners had to face 
suffering, doubt, guilt, a recognition of what seemed to be evil, and above all death. 
Through the ritualistic and organizational activities of their civil religion, Southerners 
tried to overcome their existential worries and to live with their tragic sense of life” (36). 
The campaign for the Lost Cause was a “civil religion,” a spiritual movement arising out 
of mass culture and spreading across various denominations, in which people made 
commemorative rituals into everyday routines, as Faulkner’s aforementioned episode 
suggests.  
The heyday of the Lost Cause movement was around the turn of the twentieth 
century, coinciding with the formative years of Faulkner’s childhood. The movement was 
driven by evangelical fervor, aiming at shaping the southerners’ perception of their defeat 
and constructing a public memory that could help foster a regional pride. Monuments 
became the key apparatus in this manipulation of their past. Descendants of Confederate 
soldiers conducted fundraising campaigns to build monuments which became the tangible 
index of their ancestors’ heroic valor. At unveiling ceremonies, evangelicals utilized 
religious rhetoric to praise the war dead, as was typically shown in the invocation of a 
Methodist Bishop D. S. Doggett at the gathering of Confederate veterans in 1875:  
Grant that the monument erected on this spot, to the honor of thy servant, may ever 
stand as a permanent memorial to thy praise, and a perpetual incentive to a high and 
holy consecration of thy service [. . .]. May it silently and effectually inculcate noble 
ideas and inspire lofty sentiments in all spectators for all time to come. Above all, 
may it teach the youth of the land the solemn lesson of thy word, that the foundation 
of true greatness is fidelity to thee. (Wilson 21) 
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As perpetual reminders of southern nobility, Confederate monuments were designed to 
fill the gap between postwar southerners and those who lived in the Old South by turning 
Confederate soldiers into Christian warriors. As Doggett claims, the monuments give the 
viewer direct access to divine grace and revelation, since they arouse transcendental 
feeling without recourse to words. By transforming Confederate monuments into 
embodiments of Christian benevolence, postwar southerners discovered a usable past in 
their defeat, a kind of past that came to be embraced by northerners as well. As the nation 
embarked on international warfare at the Spanish-American War and World War I, the 
heroic image of Confederate soldiers was favorably remembered by northerners, 
providing an opportunity for sectional reconciliation (Foster 145-159). Through the use 
of monuments, the Lost Cause movement established a positive view of the Confederacy, 
turning into an icon of heroic valor that the subsequent U. S. army would have to pay due 
respect.  
Having lived in the postwar South and through the two major international 
conflicts that followed the Civil War, Faulkner employed Civil War monuments as 
important memory-work in his fiction. His interest in the monuments did not lie in 
depicting them faithfully but in problematizing the notion of monumentality per se. 
Faulkner’s idiosyncrasy as a southern modernist writer can be explored through his 
peculiar use of monuments, especially in The Sound and the Fury. The text treats 
monuments in ways disruptive of the traditional concept of monumentality, which aims 
to glorify lost heroes in timeless statues, made of durable materials such as marble and 
bronze. With its highly fragmented style and complex narrative structure that reject 
cursory browsing, The Sound and the Fury established itself as a modernist novel par 
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excellence, but it never assumes a high-modernist position that seeks to dissociate itself 
from mass culture. On the contrary, the ubiquity of monumental objects in the story 
suggests that the mass-culture movement of the New South was foundational for 
Faulkner’s narrative.  
Of all the numerous studies of the novel, surprisingly few have attempted to probe 
the issue of monuments. In Richard King’s A Southern Renaissance, monumentality 
functions as a key concept, but rather than analyzing the material monuments appearing 
in the narrative, King utilizes monumentality as a purely abstract term suggesting the 
overbearing shadow cast by the historical power of the ancestors. Cynthia Dobbs 
explicitly deals with monumentality in The Sound and the Fury through a reading of 
various black bodies in the novel as a kind of memory-work, framed by “certain reified, 
dehumanizing views” which mythologize black bodies and turn them into an outlet for 
racialist nostalgia (3). Dobbs therefore views monumentality as a potentially debilitating 
concept for the marginalized, for it renders them as ahistorical embodiments cut off from 
the painful ramifications of their history.  
As we shall see later in the chapter, the negative treatment of monumentality is 
not at all a gesture distinctive to our time; it was already a dynamic feature of Faulkner’s 
contemporary art scene. The challenge for Faulkner was thus how to position himself 
both as a postwar southerner and a consummate modernist at the same time, and he seems 
to place monuments at the nexus of those two contrasting perspectives. While 
monuments of the Lost Cause were predicated on the vindication of the territorial claims 
of white planters, the same objects in The Sound and the Fury point to a sense of 
sitelessness, a feeling that resists conventional monumentalization. In other words, the 
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novel touches upon a certain kind of monumentalization that is directly at odds with the 
conventional public sculptures that postwar southerners enshrined. 
In this chapter, I discuss how the process of monumentalization is at work in The 
Sound and the Fury, with a view to investigating Faulkner’s subversive use of 
monuments. Rather than commemorating the holy deaths of Civil War heroes, the 
monuments in the novel signify the material traces of non-heroic people whose lives are 
incessantly driven toward radical self-effacement, including death. First, I discuss 
Faulkner’s upbringing as it led him to conceive a unique kind of monumentality in his 
fiction. Second, I want to put Faulkner’s treatment of monuments in the context of 
modernist art, in which the idea of monumentality was considered obsolete, a blind 
craving for the grandiose. By placing The Sound and the Fury in these two contexts, I 
aim to investigate Faulkner’s response to the two milieus that he felt closest to—the 
postwar South and authentic modernist art—as this response shaped the quintessential 
modernist novel.  
*         *       * 
The story begins with a curious history of the Falkner/Faulkner family, which 
revolved around the (mis)location of monuments; that history led Faulkner to cultivate a 
keen awareness of both the allure and the problems inherent in the notion of 
monumentality. Asked to write a brief biography of his own in 1945, he gave a telling 
account of his great-grandfather, Colonel William Falkner, whom he described as “a 
considerable figure in his time and provincial milieu” (Selected Letters 211). This 
ancestor was so prominent in his home environment, Faulkner goes on to claim, that “the 
county raised a marble effigy which still stands in Tippah County” (212). As the footnote 
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attached to this passage points out, Faulkner’s account of the history of this marble 
semblance of his great-grandfather is rather misleading; it was in fact a self-
commissioned monument placed within his cemetery plot, a purely private enterprise that 
had nothing to do with county planning or commemoration (213). Whether Faulkner 
intentionally revised the monument’s history to enhance the nobility of his great-
grandfather remains a mystery, but the episode does highlight a particular kind of mindset 
that engages itself in monument-building. Whether people erect monuments to celebrate 
the feats of others or their own, they usually do it to vindicate their own interpretation of 
the past. The two key figures who inspired Faulkner to incorporate monumental objects 
in his fictional writings, W. C. Falkner and Sallie Murry Falkner, his paternal 
grandmother, exemplify such monument-building as a form of self-vindication.  
As I have noted, Faulkner specified the beginning of the twentieth century as the 
period when his initial encounter with Civil War memories as a cultural phenomenon 
took place. This was also a signal moment in the cultural history of the South, one when 
Confederate monuments began to crowd its landscape. The year 1907 in particular 
marked a telling event that made a lasting impact on Faulkner’s novelistic imagination; it 
was the year when a Confederate monument was unveiled on the courthouse square of his 
hometown, Oxford. This monument would become a key landmark in his 
Yoknapatawpha Saga, most memorably featured in The Sound and the Fury.   
For Faulkner, this monument carried not only public memories of the war but also 
ones very intimate for him, namely, the unfailing effort and commitment of his paternal 
grandmother to erect a monument in the square. As an ex-president of the Albert Sidney 
Johnston Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, Sallie Murry engaged 
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herself in the conservation of Confederate history (Blotner 96). As Karen Cox argues, the 
UDC was the driving force of the Lost Cause movement, aiming at the resurrection of 
“an idyllic Old South” by erecting monuments in local southern towns. The monuments 
were generic in form, modeled on a white Confederate soldier, and purportedly served to 
“educate coming generations of white southerners” (1). Eager to build a kind of 
monument that would commemorate all the soldiers from Lafayette County, Sallie 
insisted on erecting a monument in the square of the county-seat town rather than placing 
it within the University of Mississippi campus, as the committee had planned.
11
 Sallie’s 
wish was partially fulfilled: although the monument was erected on the university campus, 
another sculpture honoring common soldiers was placed in front of the courthouse 
(Figure 1). So when Faulkner, in mapping out the fictional town of Jefferson, decided to 
relocate the original statue from the university campus to the Jefferson town square, he 
was clearly carrying out his grandmother’s original wish.  
Faulkner’s occasional references to the courthouse monument in his fiction can 
thus be considered a written form of commemoration of his grandmother. In The Sound 
and the Fury, the death of the Compsons’ grandmother is a focal point of the story, as 
Faulkner declares in the novel’s introduction: 
[I]n The Sound and the Fury I had already put perhaps the only thing in literature 
which would ever move me very much: Caddy climbing the pear tree to look in the 
window at her grandmother’s funeral while Quentin and Jason and Benjy and the 
negroes looked up at the muddy seat of her drawers. (“Introduction” 227) 
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 On Sallie Murry and her campaign for the soldier monument, see Doyle, especially 
Chapter Ten.  
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Although this passage is often discussed in the context of Caddy’s budding sexuality, 
what I want to emphasize here is Faulkner’s staging of the funeral of the Compsons’ 
grandmother at the center of the plot. Although her nickname “Damuddy” readily recalls 
Lelia Butler, Faulkner’s maternal grandmother—who was actually called Damuddy by 
her grandson—it is very probable that some aspect of Sallie Murry went into the making 
of the Compsons’ Damuddy, especially her involvement with the Confederate monument. 
 Sallie’s death in 1906 was somewhat untimely, for the unveiling of the 
courthouse monument took place the following year. When Faulkner specifically referred 
to the years 1904-7 as his formative period for learning of the Confederacy, he may very 
well have had in mind Sallie’s unyielding commitment to the place on which to erect the 
monument until the very end of her life. By envisioning Damuddy as a dead figure about 
to be buried, and by relocating the university monument “in its ordered place”—to quote 
from the novel’s renowned closing remark—Faulkner thus paid tribute to Sallie Murry, 
whose passion for monuments was a broadly shared sentiment among white southerners. 
If Sallie Murry represented postwar southern white women’s preoccupation with 
the manipulation of their past through the monumentalization of their male compatriots in 
the form of marble figures, the novelist’s great-grandfather W. C. Falkner embodied a 
more direct impulse for self-monumentalization, an option still available for those 
nineteenth-century southerners who did not live long enough to witness the real demise 
of the South that began around the century’s turn. A legendary figure whose uniformed 
portrait was hung in the living room of Rowan Oak, Faulkner’s house, W. C. Falkner had 
established himself in such various lines as landowning, creative writing, and the railroad 
business. But what ultimately defined him was his wartime identity as “Colonel” Falkner. 
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As an ambitious self-made man and a southern patriarch seemingly free of self-doubt, W. 
C. Falkner commissioned a Carrara marble statue of himself and attempted to have it 
placed in the main square of Ripley, his hometown (Figure 2). The town was reluctant to 
accede to Falkner’s rather ostentatious plan; the statue ended up being placed in his own 
plot in the town’s cemetery (Williamson 62). This monument is reincarnated as the statue 
of Colonel John Sartoris in Flags in the Dust, the first novel of the Yoknapatawpha series, 
and Faulkner intimates that it is evocative of the insolent personality of his ancestor: “He 
stood on a stone pedestal, in his frock coat and bareheaded, one leg slightly advanced and 
one hand resting lightly on the stone pylon beside him. His head was lifted a little in that 
gesture of haughty arrogance” (427). This language suggests Faulkner’s own act of 
remembering his great-grandfather, replicating not only the model’s physical appearance, 
but also the will to power crystallized in his deathbed act of self-monumentalization. 
Although both W. C. Falkner and Sallie Murry were involved in monument-
building, we can see a signal difference between the two. While W. C. Falkner wanted to 
place his marble image on the town’s square to honor a personal success that he 
considered the pride of the entire community, Sallie Murry worked hard to place a 
Confederate soldier monument on Oxford’s town square so as to reconfigure the 
shameful past of defeat into a symbol of the Lost Cause. The semiotic difference between 
the two—the former a mimetic embodiment of triumphant success, the latter an iconic 
transmutation of the once defeated into a self-abnegating hero—captures the conceptual 
shift in the desire for monumentality that took place at the century’s turn. As James 
Young notes, monuments of the nineteenth century can be characterized as “heroic, self-
aggrandizing figurative icons” that celebrated “national ideals and triumphs” (Memory’s 
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Edge 93). W. C. Falkner’s act of self-monumentalization exemplifies nineteenth-century 
optimism concerning monument-building, based upon the assumption that a successful 
individual should be commemorated as a community’s treasure. Such straightforward 
optimism was no longer available to Sallie Murry: she lived in the Reconstruction South 
and experienced the significant rehabilitation that ensued after the South’s defeat. As 
Charles Aiken points out, most Confederate monuments were erected between 1900 and 
1917, about half a century after the war (124). Such a belated upsurge in the production 
of Confederate monuments reveals the intense degree of anxiety Southerners suffered and 
from which they sought to escape, as John Winberry succinctly argues: “At that time, the 
present and the future held, it seemed, empty promises and the Southern mind retreated 
into the past and a memorialization of the Southern cause” (116). White southerners’ 
infatuation with the remote past, materialized in monuments for Confederate soldiers, 
reveals the crucial absence of any spiritual bulwark within their reach. Michael North 
claims that the cardinal rule for monuments is “that they should make reference to 
something” (25). Monuments in the New South exhibit a stunning referential 
anachronism; they highlight the signal loss of an objective correlative for faith among 
postwar southerners. 
The referential obsolescence that figured in the monuments of the Lost Cause 
movement became an object of harsh attack by modernist artists and critics. Their 
skepticism could most notably be seen in Lewis Mumford’s 1937 essay, tellingly titled 
“The Death of the Monument.” In it, Mumford takes a quintessentially modern standpoint, 
claiming that contemporary people were “oriented toward life and change” rather than 
“toward death and fixity” (264). Amidst the cultural atmosphere that gave precedence to 
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change and progress, the concept of monumentality—what Mumford defined as “the 
notion of material survival by means of the monument”—went against a modern transient 
lifestyle that was not unlike the lifestyle of “the nomad” who “travelled light” (264). 
Hence the incompatibility of monuments and modernity: “The very notion of a modern 
monument is a contradiction in terms: if it is a monument, it cannot be modern, and if it is 
modern, it cannot be a monument” (264). Modernist art, according to Mumford, should 
be art that “represents the deeper impulses of our civilization,” which are the impulses for 
transience and renovation (264). So long as monuments signified permanence and fixity, 
they never reached the state of modernist art, but merely remained outmoded obelisks 
whose hackneyed logic had no place in a social milieu that furiously pushed toward 
innovation and progression. 
Similar apprehension was expressed by another modernist art critic, Sigfried 
Giedion, a Swiss architectural historian who castigated nineteenth-century monuments as 
embodiments of “pseudo-monumentality”: “There was a helpless undirected and, at the 
same time, routine use of shapes from bygone periods. They were used indiscriminately 
everywhere, for any kind of building. Because they had lost their inner significance, they 
had become devaluated, mere clichés without emotional justification” (550). For 
modernist artists, monuments appeared as clichés, petrified leftovers from their 
nineteenth-century predecessors that should be superseded.  
Andreas Huyssen describes modernists’ repugnance toward the monumental as 
“anti-monumental,” suggesting the surprising persistence of this stance; it becomes, he 
argues, an aesthetic consensus reaching from “the modernisms of the earlier twentieth 
century all the way to the various postmodernisms of our own time” (195). Huyssen goes 
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on to list the various reasons why the monumental came under attack from both 
modernists and postmodernists:  
The monumental is aesthetically suspect because it is tied to nineteenth-century bad 
taste, to kitsch, and to mass culture. It is politically suspect because it is seen as 
representative of nineteenth-century nationalisms and of twentieth-century 
totalitarianisms. It is socially suspect because it is the privileged mode of expression 
of mass movements and mass politics. It is ethically suspect because in its 
preference for bigness it indulges in the larger-than-human, in the attempt to 
overwhelm the individual spectator. It is psychoanalytically suspect because it is tied 
to narcissistic delusions of grandeur and to imaginary wholeness. (195) 
What Huyssen seems above all to emphasize in this passage is the embeddedness of 
monuments within mass culture, especially of the populist kind, which seeks to use 
monuments to buttress dominant ideologies. Put in this context, the commemorative zeal 
of the Reconstruction South may appear to epitomize all the negative traits of the 
monumental that both modernists and postmodernists rejected. As mentioned above, the 
Lost Cause movement was a certain kind of civil religion, spread widely across various 
denominations, including Methodist and Baptist, and the Confederate soldier monuments 
were the very materialization of evangelical fervor through which various evangelicals 
enshrined the defeat of the Confederacy as the martyrdom of the South. No wonder that 
H. L. Mencken, in his vehement attack against “the Baptist and Methodist barbarism” 
which he considered the source of the cultural decay of the postwar South, included a 
public monument as one of the exemplary figures of “the Sahara of the Bozart”: “In all 
that gargantuan paradise of the fourth-rate there is not a single picture gallery worth 
going into, [. . .] or a single public monument that is worth looking at, or a single 
workshop devoted to the making of beautiful things” (158-159). Because of their 
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association with mass religion, Confederate monuments appeared to Mencken as the 
sordid embodiments of the superstitious South, whose feigned grandiosity he and 
contemporary art critics granted no aesthetic value.  
 With respect to Faulkner, all the available biographical details point to the fact 
that he was in his apprenticeship one of the many ambitious young writers who tried to 
master various mannerisms and accrue the knowledge required to become a consummate 
modernist.
12
 He must, then, have been well aware of the inherent problem that the various 
monuments in his native region posed, namely, postwar white southerners’ penchant for 
concretizing their past in a highly nostalgic and manipulative manner. Responding both 
to the modernist aesthetic trend toward anti-monumentalism and his own postmemory as 
it was interwoven with the meaning of the Confederate monuments, Faulkner attempted 
to carve out, as it were, an alternative kind of monument in his definitively modernist 
fiction, The Sound and the Fury. The following section will look at closely how 
monuments function in the novel, and how Faulkner’s treatment of them sheds light on 
those things and people whose marginalized positions in the South made them into the 
most unmonumental. 
*           *          * 
Although The Sound and the Fury is cluttered with monumental objects that 
supposedly commemorate lost ones, Faulkner makes clear that the most meaningful 
monuments for the Compson children utterly lack the luster of those Confederate 
monuments that dominated the New South. Contrary to the overtly white-supremacist 
tendency of the Lost Cause movement, Civil War commemoration in The Sound and the 
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 On Faulkner’s self-fashioning strategies, see Watson, William Faulkner. 
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Fury most prominently emerges in the figure of a black ex-soldier. As Kirk Savage points 
out, the Civil War soldier monuments built in profusion at the beginning of the twentieth 
century were always modeled on white soldiers. Since the monuments were intended to 
arouse national pride rather than immortalize a “brotherhood” of race, erecting a black 
soldier monument was considered harmful for a nation which sought to repress the newly 
emergent voices of African Americans (188). In the case of The Sound and the Fury, 
however, the initial afterimage of the Civil War is not a white Confederate soldier 
monument, but a black veteran costumed in a Union uniform. A tricksterish figure who 
has a magical talent for discerning southern-born Harvard students, the black man named 
“Deacon” is explicitly linked to the commemorative act of the Civil War, the Decoration 
Day parade, in which he participates as a Union veteran. Since the Decoration Day 
parade is the ritualized form of visiting the gravesites of the Civil War dead and 
decorating them with flowers, Deacon is closely associated with Civil War monuments. 
More specifically, he becomes the living monument of a black soldier, as Quentin 
describes him: “He [=Deacon] hadn’t quite recovered from the parade, for he gave me a 
salute, a very superior-officerish kind” (97). 
Many critics have considered Quentin’s search for Deacon as indicative of a 
racialist nostalgia that seizes him ever so forcefully at the end of his life. For instance, 
Thadious Davis views Deacon as “a projection of Quentin’s cultural past,” since 
Deacon’s arresting eyes remind Quentin of those of Roskus, a black caretaker of the 
Compson family, whose eyes expressed the same sadness as Deacon’s (71). In addition, 
Davis cogently suggests the likeness of Quentin’s grandfather, “General” Compson, to 
Deacon as a G. A. R. reenactor whom Quentin compliments as fine-looking as “a general” 
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(71). Similar as they may appear, however, it is still important to note the fundamental 
differences between Colonel Falkner and Deacon; after all, Deacon is not a white ex-
Confederate but a black ex-Union soldier, and he has never been a landowner, but works 
as a mere street cleaner.  
The occupational difference between the two is crucial in understanding the 
significance of Deacon’s role as a Civil War reenactor, for his main role in the parade is 
that, as a street cleaner, he has to follow the parade and clean up after the horses. Like the 
litter of the parade, Deacon’s reenactment can be seen as an untoward relic of the past; 
the image of Deacon giving a military salute at the Decoration Day parade represents a 
memorial act that can only be momentarily embodied through reenactment, never fully 
materialized in durable stone. Bound up with the litter of the Decoration parade, framed 
by the text as the unrecorded image of a black soldier whose commemorative statue has 
never officially been sanctioned, Deacon represents the antithesis of monumentality. That 
is, what James Young terms the “counter-monument” (Texture 48), challenging the 
traditional notion of monumentality that postwar southerners embodied.  
Deacon’s counter-monumental reenactment is connected with the family legacy of 
the Compsons, a kind of heritage which Mr. Compson tries to bequeath to Quentin, as 
André Bleikasten succinctly puts it:  
Through his father, he is heir to the Southern tradition, to its code of honor with all 
the aristocratic and puritanical standards it implies. When this pattern of values is 
passed on, however, it has already lost its authority, the more so in this case as the 
appointed transmitter of the Southern creed is an inveterate skeptic. (110) 
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What Mr. Compson passes on to his son is a renewed version of the Old South, the 
“refined and romanticized” image of the Confederacy envisioned by the Lost Cause 
movement. But as “an inveterate skeptic,” Mr. Compson refuses to adopt the redemptive 
theory that the movement proposes, namely, the belief that the Lost Tradition will 
eventually be recovered by God’s grace. And, whereas in the Lost Cause movement, 
monuments function as a token of ultimate redemption, what Mr. Compson confers to 
Quentin in the form of monument is loss itself, as is clearly seen in the way he presents 
General Compson’s watch to Quentin:  
It was Grandfather’s and when Father gave it to me he said I give you the 
mausoleum of all hope and desire; it’s rather excruciating-ly apt that you will use it 
to gain the reducto absurdum of all human experience which can fit your individual 
needs no better than it fitted his or his father’s. I give it to you not that you may 
remember time, but that you might forget it now and then for a moment and not 
spend all your breath trying to conquer it. (76) 
This family heirloom, which once belonged to the Civil War hero, turns into a monument 
of all dead hope and desire through Mr. Compson’s words, which convey a sense of utter 
loss. Having turned the watch into a monument, Mr. Compson goes on to assign to it the 
exact opposite of those attributes associated with normative Confederate monuments. 
While they usually serve as mnemonic devices for remembering countless soldiers killed 
in the war, Compson’s watch registers forgetfulness and a momentary retreat from the 
battle against “time,” the Southern tradition. The watch therefore undoes itself, 
functioning against its own assigned role as a conveyor of past southern glory.  
The watch becomes counter-monumental through Mr. Compson’s worldview, which 
duly influences his children; it is a sort of in-between vision that can neither be contained 
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within the self-aggrandizing celebration of the Old South that Colonel Falkner aimed at, 
nor within the nostalgic recourse to the past in the New South that Sallie Murry so 
fervently pursued. As a result, Quentin inevitably feels oppressed by the air of 
monumentality permeating his surroundings, as Bleikasten suggests: “To Quentin the 
Ancestor is a mute and massive transcendence, crushing him with all his invisible weight, 
fating him to helpless paralysis” (113). Although Bleikasten quite aptly employs 
monumental imagery—such as “a mute and massive transcendence”—he does not point 
to the important fact that such imagery is the very means through which the Compson 
family members perceive and indicate their own situation. Just as Mr. Compson turns the 
watch into “a mausoleum,” Quentin frequently utilizes monumental images as he tries to 
express the discrepancy between actual and ideal images of himself, a gesture which 
seems to be the novelist’s own projection. James Watson points out the profound extent 
to which Faulkner’s lack of actual experience in the First World War influenced the 
novelist’s treatments of military figures in his fiction. Watson suggests that, for Faulkner, 
“the men of [his] generation who had been in the army and killed men” remained “larger 
than life” (30). As is well known, Faulkner once made a false claim that he had 
participated in the Great War, a crucial fabrication which he never retracted throughout 
his life. According to Watson, this imposture remained such a mental burden for Faulkner 
that he projected his anguish onto Quentin, a character who never enlists as a soldier and 
intensely envies Caddy’s ex-lover Dalton Ames, a belligerent drifter who once—as 
Quentin stresses in his interior monologue—“had been in the army had killed men” 
(Watson 30).  
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I want to further argue that Faulkner’s impulse to monumentalize soldiers is also 
transposed onto Quentin’s peculiar way of associating Ames with sculptural materials:  
Dalton Ames. Dalton Ames. Dalton Shirts. I thought all the time they were khaki, 
army issue khaki, until I saw they were of heavy Chinese silk or finest flannel 
because they made his face so brown his eyes so blue. Dalton Ames. It just missed 
gentility. Theatrical fixture. Just papier-mache, then touch. Oh. Asbestos. Not quite 
bronze. (92) 
Quentin’s obsessive repetitions of his rival’s name modulate into “army issue khaki,” 
suggesting his keen awareness of Dalton’s war experience. Quentin then goes on to use 
sculptural metaphors to downplay Ames’s career. Falling short of becoming a soldier 
monument, Ames, Quentin reckons, is “just papier-mache,” “[n]ot quite bronze.” Later 
when Quentin recalls the crucial moment as he tried to warn Ames against approaching 
Caddy, Quentin returns to the same sculptural metaphor, but in this case he 
straightforwardly connects Ames to the image of a bronze soldier: “he looked like he was 
made out of bronze his khaki shirt.” The fragmentary style highlights Quentin’s 
trepidation at directly facing Ames, an ex-soldier whose overwhelming presence 
smothers him to such a degree that Ames appears to him a larger-than-life statue “made 
out of bronze” armored with his uniform. Just as Faulkner projected colossal images onto 
the soldiers of both the Civil War and the Great War, Quentin monumentalizes Ames to 
suggest the latter’s affinity to General Compson, a Confederate hero whose afterlife 
achieves monumentality in a postwar southern imagination that both Quentin and his 
father share. 
 Quentin and Mr. Compson’s way of monumentalizing veterans can therefore be 
regarded as a typical gesture of the postwar southern craze for a heroic past, but when 
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such a monumentalizing impulse is directed toward themselves, they come to conceive a 
certain kind of counter-monumentality that goes against the nineteenth-century 
triumphalism that the Lost Cause movement embodied. This imagery figures in the way 
Quentin envisions his own death. As Quentin carries around “the flat irons” which he 
plans to use for drowning himself, he constantly imagines what will happen to his body 
after he jumps into the river: 
And I will look down and see my murmuring bones and the deep water like wind, 
like a roof of wind, and after a long time they cannot distinguish even bones upon 
the lonely and inviolate sand. Until on the Day when He says Rise only the flat-iron 
would come floating up. (80) 
Quentin visualizes the total decomposition of his body as it commingles with the sand. 
What eventually remains is “only the flat-iron,” not his own body; God resurrects not a 
human being but a nonhuman, everyday commodity. This image occasionally comes into 
Quentin’s mind, each time with slight revisions: 
That’s where the water would be, healing out to the sea and the peaceful grottoes. 
Tumbling peacefully they would, and when He said Rise only the flat irons. (112) 
When you leave a leaf in water a long time after a while the tissue will be gone and 
the delicate fibers waving slow as the motion of sleep. […] And maybe when He 
says Rise the eyes will come floating up too, out of the deep quiet and the sleep, to 
look on glory. And after a while the flat irons would come floating up. (116) 
Quentin’s body dissolves like “a leaf in water,” a negligible object, the antithesis of the 
monumental. The visual element of this phantasmagoria is highlighted through Quentin’s 
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constant references to his own eyes, the disembodied vision witnessing his own body 
becoming the detritus of the river. But Quentin’s eyes do not retain their omniscience, for 
in his daydream it is “only the flat irons” that ultimately remain. Quentin’s obsessive 
recalling of his previous dialogue with Mr. Compson reveals that these recurrent images 
of flat irons and his decomposing body originate from his father’s worldview, which does 
not fully subscribe to an anachronistic recourse to the past. Rather, Mr. Compson chooses 
to countenance the lack of an objective correlative within the New South, the 
unavailability of the self-reliant optimism that his antebellum predecessors embraced: 
Father was teaching us that all men are just accumulations dolls stuffed with 
sawdust swept up from the trash heaps where all previous dolls had been thrown 
away the sawdust flowing from what would in what side that not for me died not. 
(175) 
Just as Mr. Compson envisions human beings as dolls made of sawdust, Quentin equates 
his own body with a leaf and grains of sand. Ultimately, Quentin inherits the penchant for 
figuration from his father, expressed most powerfully as shared inclination toward 
monumentalizing their ancestors and counter-monumentalizing themselves.  
Quentin contrasts his self-image with that of Ames whom Quentin sees as a 
monumental bronze soldier. The material which Quentin conceives as appropriate for his 
own monument sharply differs from the one that he applies to Dalton Ames. If bronze and 
marble have traditionally functioned as suitable materials for monuments, flat iron is the 
least appropriate material. But it is precisely flat iron’s unabashedly prosaic quality, its 
stout resistance to the magisterial that Quentin finds most appropriate to himself. 
Quentin’s impulse for self-monumentalization might be the projection of Faulkner’s great-
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grandfather, but unlike Colonel Falkner who created his semblance of Carrara marble, 
Quentin chooses an inconspicuous industrial material for his monument, the flat irons 
whose obvious dullness signifies nothing but the unmonumental. Quentin grafts the 
antebellum southerners’ self-aggrandization into a self-consciously diminishing vision of 
the postemancipation South, a view originating from Mr. Compson, which turns a human 
being into a figure made of detritus and dust, not of marble and bronze.  
 It is this countermonumental impulse that leads Quentin to meet Deacon, the only 
person with whom he feels eager to communicate. Quentin’s final remark to Deacon—“I 
hope you’ll always find as many friends as you’ve made” (100)—may be seen as a 
quintessentially white southern gesture of paternalistic condescension, but if we consider 
the fact that both are deeply tied to the act of commemoration, Quentin’s message can be 
taken as the expression of his sense of allegiance to Deacon. If Quentin’s imagining of 
his own flat-iron monument deviates from the traditional form of commemorative 
statuary, Deacon’s reenactment of the Union soldier at the Decoration Day parade is 
engaged to an alternative kind of commemorative activity, fully embodying the process 
of monumentalizing what could not be fixed in stone, namely, the black soldiers of the 
Civil War. If Quentin counts himself as one of  the “dolls stuffed with sawdust swept up 
from the trash heaps”—an aphorism which he recalls at the last moment of his life—
Deacon’s occupation as a street sweeper who cleans up the litter of the Decoration Day 
parade complements Quentin’s self-monumentalizing project. That is to say, if Quentin’s 
recurrent daydreaming about the afterimage of his suicide is essentially counter-
monumental in its anti-heroic, trash-oriented quality, Deacon as a street cleaner seems to 
be the most appropriate figure to look after Quentin’s death, the belated death of a 
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postwar southerner who fails to be memorialized in marble or bronze. It also envisions an 
alternative kind of reunion that sharply differs from the actual historical reunion that the 
Lost Cause movement sought to achieve. Contrary to the reunion envisioned by the 
public memory of the Civil War shared by the white veterans, Quentin and Deacon 
engage themselves in a historically unsanctioned reunion between the black Yankee who 
cannot be monumentalized and the white southerner who fails to participate in the war. 
Quentin’s suicide and Deacon’s reenactment can therefore be regarded as challenges to 
the Civil War commemorative practices rampant in turn-of-the-century southern culture.  
*             *           * 
It has often been suggested that a monument is a link between past and present. 
As Michael North puts it, “the monument is a perfect embodiment of [the] mediation 
between future and past” (38). Faulkner explores this temporal aspect of monuments by 
rendering monument-building an intergenerational enterprise, involving both parents and 
their children. Donald Kartiganer claims that the act of inheritance in Faulkner’s fiction is 
largely a “male, white, ‘aristocratic’” engagement, allowing no space for female 
protagonists to experience such “pressures of inheritance” (Quentin 399-400), and his 
observation seems correct if the pressures of inheritance are limited to the traditions of 
southern chivalry. But the most important thing Quentin inherits from Mr. Compson is 
the counter-monumental impulse directed toward self-effacement. The impulse to 
monumentalize in the most self-diminutive style becomes a kind of a family legacy, and 
it can be seen in the mother-daughter relationship as well. In the only scene in which 
Caddy appears in the narrative present (as opposed to in someone’s reminiscences), she 
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makes a desperate plea to Jason, asking him to use her money for her daughter, Miss 
Quentin: 
“Just promise that she’ll—that she—You can do that. Things for her. Be kind to her. 
Little things that I cant, they wont let [. . .] if sometimes she needs things—If I send 
checks for her to you, other ones besides those, you’ll give them to her? You wont 
tell? You’ll see that she has things like other girls?” (209-210) 
Caddy sends checks to Jason to equip her daughter with the “little things,” things that 
make Miss Quentin just like “other girls,” who are untroubled by their familial 
background. “Little things” may refer to perfume (like the one Caddy wore in her youth), 
accessories, or some other items meant for young women, and Caddy’s emphasis on their 
littleness suggests that they do not have to be conspicuous; rather, those objects should be 
as inconspicuous as possible, so that her daughter, arrayed with “little things,” would 
look like a typical southern belle with a normal upbringing. Such little things will later 
become the material trace of Miss Quentin as she elopes with a nameless stranger, taking 
away all the money Jason hoarded. As Jason and other family members rush into Miss 
Quentin’s room, what they discover is nothing but the “little things”: 
It was not a girl’s room. It was not anybody’s room, and the faint scent of cheap 
cosmetics and the few feminine objects and the other evidences of crude and 
hopeless efforts to feminize it but added to its anonymity, giving it that dead and 
stereotyped transience of rooms in assignation house. [. . .] She [=Mrs. Compson] 
went to the bureau and began to turn over the scattered objects there—scent bottles, 
a box of powder, a chewed pencil, a pair of scissors with one broken blade lying 
upon a darned scarf dusted with powder and stained with rouge. (283-283) 
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Scattered with little “feminine objects,” Miss Quentin’s deserted room shows the 
occupant’s desperate attempt to create a room of her own, an attempt which ends up 
turning “little things” into a series of broken objects, such as “a broken blade” and “a 
darned scarf.” Associated as they are with the image of death, Miss Quentin’s trashy 
feminine objects can be seen as a certain kind of monument. Contrary to the traditional 
funereal monument intended to leave an indelible trace of a particular person, Miss 
Quentin’s discarded little things become the material emanation of anonymity and 
transience. Rather than signifying the rootedness of a particular individual in a specific 
place, they embody a sense of displacement and sitelessness which she inherits from her 
mother by means of the “little things.”  
Just as Quentin’s suicide becomes a certain kind of self-monumentalization that 
goes utterly against conventional ideas of monumentality, Miss Quentin’s little things 
embody counter-monumentality, reaching the state of modernist art with the pronounced 
transience that Mumford designates as the definitive characteristic of modernity. And, 
just as Quentin puts into practice his father’s teachings by willfully imagining himself in 
the image of a most unmonumental monument, Miss Quentin fills her room with the sorts 
of trivial items that her mother presumably wanted her to possess, turning them into her 
own monument through elopement, the same kind of self-effacing act as Quentin’s 
suicide.  
 Both Quentin and Miss Quentin erect counter-monuments made of trash to 
commemorate their sense of dislodgement, and such a counter-monumental impulse 
drives the entire section of Benjy’s narrative. Virtually all of his actions are related to 
some kind of commemorative practice: his habitual errands to the cemetery via the 
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Confederate soldier monument in the town’s square, and his constant craving for Caddy’s 
slippers, for instance. Because of his mental and physical impairment, Benjy has long 
been considered “an emblem of subhumanity” (Broughton 189), “merely a filter” (Polk 
144), and simply a character who “cannot create” (Kartiganer, Meaning 329). However, 
Benjy also engages in monument-building, an explicit act of creation which can be seen 
in his assiduous maintenance of what Dilsey calls “Benjy’s graveyard,” which he 
decorates with jimson weeds. Benjy’s graveyard is a most primitive kind of monument, a 
small mound with two blue bottles in which he puts these flowers. Benjy recycles the 
discarded bottles and decorates the monument with the most common and readily 
available flowers, jimson weed. The monument consists entirely of found objects, far 
removed from the marble Confederate soldier monument that W. C. Falkner built to 
commemorate his own glory. Benjy’s monument is aligned with Quentin’s flat irons and 
Miss Quentin’s broken feminine objects, making a triad of counter-monuments which 
materialize the intergenerational act of self-effacement.  
The Sound and the Fury reveals Faulkner’s exploration into the possibility of the 
monument, which he reframes as an object of modernist experimentation. As a postwar 
southerner brought up during the era of the Lost Cause movement, Faulkner could not but 
cultivate a keen awareness of the ever-proliferating Confederate soldier monuments to 
which his grandmother had become devoted. He incorporated his family’s passion for 
monuments into The Sound and the Fury, expressing and inverting it through the 
Compson family’s counter-monumental impulse, sharply at odds with the traditional 
nineteenth-century enshrinement of the past. Unlike marble and bronze monuments 
which signify permanence and rootedness, the Compson monuments are made up of 
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discarded objects, signifying transience and displacement. In this way Faulkner 
developed a radical form of monumentality which aspires to commemorate what is 














Damned Facts: Materiality and the Animation of Facts in An American Tragedy 
                                               
  
In 1909, when working as the editor of a short-lived literary journal Bohemian 
Magazine, Theodore Dreiser urged H. L. Mencken to revise an essay that Mencken had 
sent to the journal. Mencken’s draft appeared, in Dreiser’s view, too facile in its whole-
hearted endorsement of the classic binary of modernity, that between science and religion. 
Mencken claimed that, while science is predicated on a willful act of “fighting [one’s] 
own way in the world,” religion often ends up in an act of prayer, a complete 
renunciation of human will by throwing oneself on God’s grace. For Mencken, prayer 
signified a retreat from reality, which caused in people’s minds a mere sense of 
“abasement, of incapacity” (38). To this Dreiser responded as follows: 
[I]sn’t seeking knowledge (scientific) a form of prayer. Aren’t scientists & 
philosophers at bottom truly reverential and don’t they wish (pray) ardently for more 
knowledge. […] [T]he truth is men are not less religious—they are religious in a 
different way—and that’s a fact. (Dreiser-Mencken Letters 37) 
The letter clearly reveals two seemingly contrasting aspects of Dreiser’s personality—
namely, his acute appreciation of the coming new age, founded on scientific principle, 
and his persistent faith in the lasting power of a certain kind of spirituality.  
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To be sure, Dreiser was keenly persuaded of the ineffectuality of institutional 
religion, which seemed incapable of properly responding to the actuality shared by a 
number of impoverished people whose growing anxiety was the product of rapid 
modernization. As Dreiser famously noted in Tragic America: 
The Church itself, as much as anything, has made the spiritual life unfashionable, 
and has degraded it. Against the sole hope and inspiration of Christ, it has given way 
to commercial standards of corporations and just when people need a simple 
aesthetic and mental haven to escape from corporate speed and complexity. (155).  
While sharing Mencken’s distaste for organized religion, then, Dreiser was insistent on 
emphasizing the dire need for “the spiritual life” which should stand against the powerful 
corporate capitalism to which the Church had seemingly succumbed.  
It is this lack of a persistent faith in spirituality that Mencken, a fierce proponent 
of literary naturalism, considered to be Dreiser’s crucial weakness. In his long preface to 
Dreiser’s writings, Mencken pointed out Dreiser’s constant vacillation between two 
contrasting identities: as a “thoughtful […] sound artist,” and as “the Indiana peasant, 
snuffing absurdly over imbecile sentimentalities, giving a grave ear to quackeries” (92).  
However obsessive does Mencken’s attitudes appear with the dialectics of the 
modern, namely, science/spirituality, city/country, and art/everyday, the observation he 
makes about the novelist’s “lingering superstition,” and his expressed fascination with a 
certain kind of spirituality are worth our attention. For the works of Dreiser, in my view, 
have  too long been approached from the angle of such secular matters as cultures of 
commodity, leisure, and finance. The flourishing of the culturalist approach since the 
1980s has encouraged critics of Dreiser to place too much emphasis on the ways in which 
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his novels showcase the cacophony of a commercialized America in the modern age. 
Considering that so many of the influential critics who paved the ways to approaching 
literary texts not as closed, immanent aesthetic objects, but as ones embedded in 
historically specific occasions focused on Dreiser’s works, one may conclude that his 
works are most suitable for secular-culturalist interpretations. As the editors of The 
Cambridge Companion to Theodore Dreiser make clear in their introductory essay, 
Dreiser was not the first novelist to tap into consumerist civilization and its 
discontents, but his exploration of them may have been the deepest. His concern 
with material culture was so far ahead of its time that today’s practitioners of 
American studies are only starting to catch up with him. In effect, Dreiser was 
performing his own cultural studies long before the practice had a name. His book 
stand together as a gigantic textbook of modern America life, shedding light on 
everything from fin-de-siècle urbanization to contemporary advertising. (Cassuto 
and Eby 4) 
What is noticeable in the passage is the editors’ assumption that Dreiser’s deep 
engagement with material culture resided squarely in the secular realm. To be sure, 
Dreiser showed his deftness in describing secular phenomena such as “urbanization” and 
“advertising,” most famously in Sister Carrie, but the editors seem to be much too 
circumscribed by the secular mode of reading, the mode that has become quite normative 
in contemporary American literary criticism.  
Thus the question arises: is it pertinent to read Dreiser’s interest in material 
culture solely in the context of secular culture? Couldn’t it be more productive to view 
Dreiser’s investment in things in a wider scope, a vision that would not only capture 
Dreiser’s treatment of commodity culture but also his lifelong interest in spirituality? 
How should we deal with the biographical fact that Dreiser had long-standing 
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companionship with his contemporary writer Charles Fort, who was an idiosyncratic 
collector of newspaper articles which reported various anomalous happenings that were 
inexplicable by the normative science of the day? 
Indeed, when we consider that almost all of Dreiser’s novels include religious 
elements, it is quite amazing how consistently his critics have failed to recognize this 
aspect in his writings. In Sister Carrie, for example, Dreiser introduces an eccentric 
evangelical who helps the impoverished Hurstwood, and in his next novel, Jennie 
Gerhardt, the German father of the heroine is presented as a Catholic fanatic who 
disowns Jennie because of her untimely pregnancy. Likewise, in The Stoic, the third piece 
of “The Trilogy of Desire,” the Indian yoga guru induces a certain epiphany in Bernice, 
the last mistress of Frank Cowperwood, and The Bulwark, Dreiser’s final novel, features 
the lives of a pious Quaker family torn between the strict Quaker doctrines and the lax 
atmosphere of secular American culture.  
Among the rare critics who have paid attention to the significance of the religious 
aspect in Dreiser’s works are Ellen Moers, F. O. Matthiessen, and Paul Giles. However, 
their focus is primarily on The Bulwark, the most overtly religious of all Dreiser’s works, 
and they are hence unable to give due consideration to the more important earlier works, 
among which the most notable is An American Tragedy. In fact, the critics’ tendency to 
elide Dreiser’s spiritual aspects seems most incongruous in their treatments of An 
American Tragedy, for not only is the life story of protagonist Clyde Griffith visibly 
bound up in his excessively religious upbringing but the very structure of the novel itself 
is framed by a religious element: the opening and final scenes of the novel both involve 
street preaching conducted by Clyde’s parents.  
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One of the reasons for the conspicuous omission of a spiritual approach in Dreiser 
studies can be ascribed to the devotion Dreiser showed toward the theory of evolution 
that was dominant in the contemporary science. An ardent reader of Darwin, Spencer, 
and Huxley, Dreiser was fascinated by the notion that human behaviors are governed by 
what could be regarded as a kind of chemic element which has nothing to do with God’s 
will. In the famous opening scene of The Financier, in which the young Cowperwood 
watches a lobster eating a squid, we see Dreiser employing the idea of “the survival of 
the fittest,” a concept that denies the intervention of God in the process of animal 
evolution. And it is this aspect of Dreiser—the “scientific” side, so to speak—that has 
rendered him a key figure in the field of literary naturalism.   
As we will see in more detail in this chapter, naturalism can primarily be viewed 
as a product of modernity in its strong allegiance to scientific observation devoid of any 
supernatural elements. It marked a sharp departure from romanticism, which was 
characterized by its affinity with a sense of the sublime caused by a certain kind of 
transcendental experience. As Robert Penn Warren famously argued, An American 
Tragedy successfully established itself as an epitome of American literary naturalism 
mainly because of its uncompromising execution of the naturalistic vision:  
His [= Clyde’s] “tragedy” is that of namelessness, and this is one aspect of its being 
an American tragedy, the story of the individual without identity, whose responsible 
self has been absorbed by the great machine of modern secularized society, and 
reduced to a cog, a cipher, an abstraction. (25) 
The mechanistic imagery that Penn Warren employs in this passage exemplifies a typical 
approach to An American Tragedy: that the society presented in the novel is thoroughly 
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“secularized,” and has become “the great machine” that turns a human being into a 
reified object. Thus, the materialism that Penn Warren identifies in the novel squarely 
follows the set formulae of naturalism: the enervation of human agency under the 
dominating force of modernity, described through an objective third-person narration that 
enumerates a massive amount of details in order to express the material reality that 
oftentimes overwhelms Dreiser’s protagonists.  
 In this chapter I intend to refute these predominantly secular readings of An 
American Tragedy by excavating the elements long excluded from previous studies, 
namely, the elements of the supernatural that can be associated with the author’s constant 
engagement with a certain kind of spirituality. My reading explores those moments in 
which the novel deviates from the normative procedures of literary naturalism as was set 
out by Emile Zola in his essay “The Experimental Novel.” To be sure, An American 
Tragedy’s settings appear quintessentially modern—ranging from a gorgeous hotel (the 
site where Clyde learns urban sophistication), a large shirt factory monitored by the 
Taylor system, and the powerful mass media that fabricates various tales about Clyde and 
circulates them as established “facts,” to the courtroom and state prison that embodies the 
secularized modern disciplinary apparatus. What is remarkable about An American 
Tragedy, however, is that some of those sites seem to be at once mundanely secular and 
uncannily spiritual. By uncovering the spiritual aspect of the “things” that are deemed 
secular, Dreiser seems to critique the problematic assumptions of organized religion, 
thereby suggesting a certain form of spirituality viable in modernity.  
Unlike the widely held image of An American Tragedy as a representative work 
of American naturalism, then, my reading will attend to the key element of the novel that 
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deviates from one of the most important fundamentals of literary naturalism: writing from 
the standpoint of scientific objectivity. In order to probe this topic, I will pay close 
attention to the importance of in An American Tragedy (and in Dreiser’s novels more 
generally), presenting it as a work infused with the kinds of “facts” that tend to circulate 
through mass media and judicial procedures. I consider such “facts” to be a linchpin of 
Dreiser’s claim that a latent spirituality exists within secular objects. In other words, I 
want to argue that Dreiser tried to recontextualize the notion of “facts” from the realm of 
science to the realm of uncanny spirituality. By so doing, I will highlight Dreiser’s 
movement beyond the boundary of  the secular, science-based standpoint of literary 
naturalism. 
 To do this, I will first touch upon Emile Zola’s seminal essay “The Experimental 
Novel,” in which he promoted the idea of the centrality of “facts” in literary naturalism. I 
will then examine Dreiser’s own idiosyncratic conceptualization of “facts” through a 
reading of An American Tragedy. In the course of my analysis, I will deal with the 
hitherto neglected relationship between Dreiser and Charles Fort, who exerted profound 
influence on Dreiser in the formation of his notion of the supernatural phenomena. My 
final goal is to show the ways in which Dreiser sought to provide a viable form of 
spirituality by displacing “facts” from the realm of reason and objectivity. 
*             *           * 
 Naturalism can be defined as a quintessentially modern literary movement that 
emerged out of a major ideological shift from religion to science at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Emile Zola’s “The Experimental Novel” (1880) functioned as a 
literary manifesto that provoked a new kind of approach to fictional writing based on the 
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scientific model. Zola insisted that a novelist should keep an eye on various phenomena 
of a given society until she or he can gather enough data to figure out the ways in which 
environmental and hereditary determinants shape human behaviors. What Zola viewed as 
the ultimate strength of science was its adherence to materiality, something which 
romantic literature overlooked in favor of the “abstract” and “metaphysical” qualities of 
human existence. Naturalist literature considered human beings as embedded in the world 
of materiality, which had exorcised the supernatural. Zola thus concludes: 
In short, everything is summed up in this great fact: the experimental method in 
letters, as in the sciences, is in the way to explain the natural phenomena, both 
individual and social, of which metaphysics, until now, has given only irrational and 
supernatural explanations. (54) 
Zola’s closing remark is a harsh attack on metaphysics and its literary derivative, 
romanticism, mainly for their “irrational” and “supernatural” manner of perception. We 
should also note the very style Zola employs when he concludes the essay. When Zola 
insists on the precedence of “the experimental method in letters” over “metaphysics,” he 
seems to be making sure that such precedence be established as the irrefutable “fact.” 
Zola uses a stylistic device in order to render a personal statement into a “fact,” attaching 
a preliminary statement (“everything is summed up in this great fact”) before making his 
point. In so doing, he highlights his complete departure from the tradition of romantic 
literature which he criticized as lacking in reason and objectivity. 
 “Facts,” therefore, function as the basis for Zola’s theory of literary naturalism. 
The central role of “facts” becomes most clear when Zola sets out the procedures of 
writing naturalistic fiction, as follows: 
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[T]he whole operation consists in taking facts in nature, then in studying the 
mechanism of these facts, acting upon them, by the modification of circumstances 
and surroundings, without deviating from the laws of nature. Finally, you possess 
knowledge of the man, scientific knowledge of him, in both his individual and social 
relations. […] [Therefore] the naturalistic novelists observe and experiment […] to 
analyze facts, and to master them. (13) 
What Zola emphasizes throughout this passage is the embeddedness of “ facts” within 
“the laws of nature.” As objects of scientific experiments, “facts” strictly belong to the 
realm of reason. By closely attending to “facts,” novelists can avoid taking a facile leap 
into the realm of the supernatural, an act which Zola considered to be bad habit of the 
romantics.  
 At first glance, such a concept—that “facts” are essential components of the 
physical world worthy of scientific scrutiny—can also be traced in Dreiser’s writings. In 
fact, Shelly Fishkin’s influential reading of An American Tragedy in From Facts to 
Fiction squarely situates Dreiser’s treatment of “facts” within the framework presented 
by Zola. As the title of her book suggests, Fishkin’s main project revolves around the 
ways in which modern American writers transformed “facts” into “fiction,” or, more 
specifically, transformed facts found in newspaper articles into creative writings. Paying 
close attention to Dreiser’s engagements as a newspaper journalist and a magazine editor, 
Fishkin delineates how the author incorporated into his fiction the actual “facts” provided 
by newspaper articles.  
To a certain extent, Fishkin’s decision to feature An American Tragedy in her 
chapter on Dreiser is quite appropriate, since the novel is based on an actual murder that 
happened in 1902, the so-called “Gillette Case.” The incident was firstly recognized as a 
mere accidental drowning of a young woman, but later turned out an intentional murder 
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committed by a young man named Chester Gillette. Sensational in its gradual unfolding, 
this incident drew nationwide attention resulting from the intense media coverage, of 
which Dreiser obviously took careful note. As Donald Pizer’s meticulous research shows, 
Dreiser carefully scrap-booked a number of articles on the case in order to use them as 
his future resources for what turned out to be his bestselling novel, An American Tragedy 
(Pizer 105). Fishkin insists that this method for preparing the novel testifies to Dreiser’s 
faith in the infallibility of “facts,” a faith highly evocative of Zola: 
[I]n a book like An American Tragedy, implicit in the writer’s project is a sense of 
how important it is to replace misleading romantic illusions with new metaphors, 
images, analogies—in short, new visions—rooted not in fantasy, but in fact. 
(Fishkin 108) 
By regarding “fact” as an antonym of “fantasy,” Fishkin locates “fact” at the very core of 
what Zola considered to be the main concern of literary naturalism, namely, “replac[ing] 
misleading romantic illusions” promoted by those erratic predecessors of naturalism.  
 It is true that newspaper articles not only function as inspiration for the 
composition of An American Tragedy, but also figure as significant material objects in 
the story. However, Fishkin’s view of “ facts” in Dreiser’s novel seems to reinscribe the 
rigid binary of modernity that Dreiser himself questioned in his correspondence with 
Mencken, quoted at the beginning of this chapter. If, as in Mencken’s bitter criticism, 
Dreiser had a split self that swayed between the scientific and the supernatural, there 
remains a possibility that Dreiser used “facts” in a highly ambiguous way, turning them 




 In order to fully capture Dreiser’s remarkable use of “facts” in his fiction, we may 
be better turning our eyes to the relationship Dreiser had with the aforementioned Charles 
Fort. It is my contention that Fort’s highly idiosyncratic conception of “facts” was 
foundational in Dreiser’s understanding of both the scientific and supernatural, an 
understanding demonstrated most vividly in An American Tragedy. Although Fort’s 
influence on Dreiser has rarely been discussed in Dreiser studies, one exception is Louis 
Zanine’s monograph Mechanism and Mysticism. By carefully tracing the trajectory of 
Dreiser’s philosophical framework as it appears in his novels, Zanine suggests that 
Dreiser underwent a major shift in his perception of the world, from one founded on a 
mechanistic vision of human behavior to one predicated on mystical insights into the 
realm of the supernatural.  
However, while Zanine offers invaluable resources helping us to explicate Dreiser’s 
ambivalent worldview, a topic that most critics have chosen to avoid, his readings of the 
novelist’s major works remain rather too schematic. Zanine divides Dreiser’s career into 
two phases: the earlier Dreiser as a hardcore evolutionary thinker who wrote Sister 
Carrie and An American Tragedy, and the later Dreiser as an esoteric mystic who wrote 
Notes on Life and The Bulwark. Zanine states that “absorption in the supernatural […] is 
almost totally absent in the stark materialism of his first six novels.” Praising An 
American Tragedy as the “finest expression” of “the mechanistic point of view that 
Dreiser embraced in the 1920s” (103), Zanine goes on to present a typical reading of the 
novel that is almost identical to that of Robert Penn Warren, cited earlier: 
In this novel, Dreiser combined his conception of the individual as a seeking, 
hungering mechanism of desire with an indictment of those aspects of American 
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society that encouraged greed, the lust for power, and social and economic 
inequality. (103) 
Zanine thus reads the novel predominantly in secular terms, neglecting another 
significant aspect of Dreiser that Zanine’s intuits, namely, Dreiser’s “superstitious side” 
which was decidedly cultivated through his contact with Charles Fort. Since Dreiser’s 
relationship with Fort became most intimate in the 1910s, especially in 1919, the time 
when Dreiser was about to write An American Tragedy, it is very likely that Dreiser’s 
worldview in the novel was strongly influenced by Fort’s rather eccentric philosophy on 
the unknowable. And so, in order to explore this hidden aspect of Dreiser, I will focus on 
the very idiosyncratic understanding of facts that Fort developed in his unconventional 
writings.  
*               *              * 
Let us start with a brief biographical sketch of the friendship Dreiser enjoyed with 
Fort for over thirty years. Their first meeting took place in 1905, when Dreiser was 
working as the editor of a pulp magazine called The Popular Magazine. Taking an 
interest in Fort’s short stories, published in other magazines, Dreiser decided to ask him 
for contributions. As a young, unknown writer living in obscurity in New York, Fort 
gladly obliged and sent several stories to the magazine, but soon became weary of writing 
fiction. He began to produce a very unique kind of writing that can at best be described as 
an assortment of supernatural phenomena based on various newspaper and magazine 




Aside from his earlier fictional prose, Fort published four books, all more-or-less 
following a scrap-book format, each accompanied by Fort’s wry comments on academic 
science, which he believed failed to take account of the supernatural. For instance, he 
took up an article that reported some “luminous objects” seen at a mountain in North 
Carolina. According to Fort, “a geologist” was sent from “the United States Geological 
Survey”:  
One imagines [. . .] the superiority of this geologist from Washington. He heard 
stories from the natives. He contrasted his own sound principles with the 
irresponsible gab of denizens, and went right to the investigation, scientifically. He 
went out on a road, and saw lights, and made his report. 47% of the lights that he 
saw were automobile headlights; 33% of them were locomotive headlights; 10% 
were lights in houses, and 10 % were bush fires. Tot that up, and see that efficiency 
can’t go further. [. . .] Scientists, in matters of our data, have been like somebody in 
Europe, before the year 1492, hearing stories of lands to the west, going out on the 
ocean for an hour or so, in a row-boat, and then saying, whether exactly in these 
words, or not: “Oh, hell! there ain’t no America.” (624-625).  
Fort suggested that the kind of “data” that he handled was somewhat uncontainable in 
contemporary science. Fort therefore made a subversive use of the word “data”—a term 
that conventionally has a scientific connotation—as a set of information that are unusable 
for science.  
Expressed in a highly fragmented prose that at times borders on the unreadable, 
Fort’s idiosyncratic stance toward science and the supernatural was largely poorly 
received. Nevertheless, Dreiser was persistent in his efforts to promote Fort’s works. In 
1919, Dreiser helped Fort to publish the Book of the Damned, the most well-known of 
Fort’s works, and sent it to H. G. Wells, only to receive a very disappointing response:  
 
 81 
I’m having Fort’s Book of the Damned sent back to you. Fort seems to be one of the 
most damnable bores who ever cut scraps from out-of-the-way newspapers & 
thought they were facts. And he writes like a drunkard. (Letters 531) 
Angered by Wells’s repudiation, Dreiser tried to vindicate Fort in such a manner as to 
reveal his own faith in the extrasensory perception that comes out of the harsh reality of 
modern living:  
I only know that I respond in various ways with the five that I have, but around and 
beyond me, lie nothing but mysteries which, instruments or no instruments, I have 
not the slightest ability to solve—nor have I found others who have. And since I 
have gone through life so far without any particularly valuable solution of anything 
that has occurred, and know really that behind me in the depths of time have passed 
billions and billions of people, creatures as confused and mentally defeated as 
myself, I am ready to at least meditate upon, if not accept, such items of strangeness 
as are suggested by Fort in his curious explorations among, as you say, “items of 
newspapers.” (Letters 535) 
Although their responses to Fort’s work could not have been further apart, both Dreiser 
and Wells seem to have agreed on one thing—that Fort had found his inspiration from a 
distinctly modern medium, newspapers. And, whereas Wells seems to have employed a 
“scientific” method of treating only “facts” (as opposed to anomalous phenomena which 
he denounces as “scraps”) as worthy of analysis, Dreiser suggests that “such items of 
strangeness” that could be found in mass-circulation newspapers require more serious 
attention, for they give a glimpse into a certain kind of transcendental presence, a 
presence arising out of the felt experience of everyday life. Fort thus imbues “facts” with 
the supernatural, a gesture which, as Wells pointedly suggests, potentially destabilizes the 
status of facts as the basis of academic science.  
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Book of Damned can be read as the apocrypha of scientific investigations, 
attempting to salvage those “data” excluded from modern science, as the opening of the 
book defiantly claims: 
A procession of the damned. 
By the damned, I mean the excluded. 
We shall have a procession of data that Science has excluded. 
Battalions of the accursed, captained by pallid data that I have exhumed, will march. 
You’ll read them—or they’ll march. Some of them lived and some of them fiery and 
some of them rotten. (3) 
By collecting “data” that “Science” had excluded, Fort explored a proscribed territory in 
which various occurrences that people might encounter contain a supernatural element, 
an element which established science utterly disregarded (e.g. various falling objects 
from the sky, such as stones, fish, and blocks of ice, witnessed and reported in newspaper 
articles and personal letters). Fort thus pointed out that dogmatism was the shared trait of 
organized religion and academic science, both of which belonged to a system of belief 
based on the logic of exclusion: “Religion is belief in a supreme being. Science is belief 
in a supreme generalization. Essentially they are the same” (Wild Talents, 999).  
 Fort’s confrontational attitude toward “Science” as a “belief in a supreme 
generalization” led him to conceive a peculiar use of “data” and “facts.” Although all of 
his major works are composed from an array of “damned facts,” these facts never stack 
up as a neatly organized database of occult phenomena. Utterly lacking in tight 
structuring and coherent indexing, Fort’s works reject any “system of belief” enshrined 
by academic science. Fort’s facts cannot thus be subsumed under any grand theory, 
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achieving a certain kind of materiality that refuses abstraction, as Jim Steinmeyer aptly 
observes:  
Instead of assembling his data to support a theory, he treated these oddities like his 
characters [. . .] —releasing them in front of his audience and then stepping back to 
watch them perform; whispering suggestions in the reader’s ear, playing the master 
of ceremonies with an occasional wry comment or observation. (163)  
It is by employing this technique of animation that Fort contrived to highlight the 
singularity of “facts.” As he claims in the opening passage, his data are never the passive 
object of reading; rather, they “march” forcefully into the reader’s eyes, thrusting their 
uncontainable thingness that resists abstraction. 
 Fort’s notion of “facts” as resistant to theory chimes with Lorraine Daston’s 
formulation that they contain robust thingness. In her historicist analysis of the 
production of “scientific facts,” Daston makes a clear distinction between “facts” and 
“evidence,” as follows: 
On their own, facts are notoriously inert—“angular,” “stubborn,” or even “nasty” in 
their resistance to interpretation and inference. They are robust in their existence and 
opaque in their meaning. Only when enlisted in the service of a claim or a conjecture 
do they become evidence, or facts with significance. Evidence might be described as 
facts hammered into signposts, which point beyond themselves and their sheer, brute 
thingness to states of affairs to which we have no direct access. (93) 
While evidence can potentially serve as a tool for imagining a certain kind of 
hypothetical notions or situations, “facts” reject such an instrumentalist use by insisting 
on their own “sheer, brute thingness.” By foregrounding the substantial thingness of 
“facts,” Fort revivifies those “damned facts” in such a way as to problematize the very 
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dogmatism shared by both institutional religion and academic science. And it is this 
remarkable use of “facts”—“facts” not as the mere substructure for any grand theory, but 
as the animated entity that mediates between everyday life and the supernatural—that 
Dreiser also employs in An American Tragedy. In the following section, I discuss 
Dreiser’s “facts” in order to demonstrate that his conception of “facts” is more akin to 
that of Fort than to formulations traditionally associated with the novel, specifically 
Zola’s naturalistic conception of scientific facts. 
*                *              * 
 In An American Tragedy, readers are constantly exposed to a dialectical 
relationship between the “facts” of science and those of the supernatural. The centrality 
of “facts” becomes most manifest in Book Three, the last part of the novel, in which the 
criminality of Clyde is thoroughly investigated by legal institutions. The “facts” here 
function to reveal the truth of his case, since they supposedly offer an objective 
explanation of Clyde’s misguided conduct, which leads to Roberta’s death. This attitude 
toward “facts” is most extensively espoused by Nicholson, a former lawyer and now a 
death-row inmate, who encourages Clyde to make an appeal for retrial: 
Nicholson had begun to advise him [. . .] one important point in connection with his 
own case—on appeal—or in the event of any second trial, i.e. —that the admission 
of Roberta’s letters as evidence, as they stood at least, be desperately fought on the 
ground that the emotional force of them was detrimental in the case of any jury 
anywhere, to a calm unbiased consideration of the material facts presented by 
them—and that instead of the letters being admitted as they stood they should be 
digested for the facts alone and that digest—and that only offered to the jury. (815) 
Nicholson, commenting on the case from the standpoint of a professional lawyer, insists 
that Clyde’s trial was incorrectly executed, since the prosecutor read aloud Roberta’s 
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letters to Clyde verbatim. As Roberta’s letters were written during the time when Roberta 
was becoming increasingly dubious of Clyde’s fidelity, they have a highly emotional 
quality that makes it difficult for listeners to make an impartial judgment on the case. 
Nicholson thus suggests that “material facts” should be derived from the letters and 
presented to the juries.  
The same point is made by another lawyer who, in preparation for Clyde’s trial, 
decries the fact that Roberta’s letters will make a crucial impact at court, calling the 
letters “the toughest things we’re going to have to face,” for “[t]hey’re likely to make up 
any jury cry if they’re read right” (638). His prediction turns out to be correct: as the 
prosecutor reads the letters aloud, “the moist eyes and the handkerchiefs and the coughs 
in the audience and among the jurors attested their import” (694). “Their import” is, of 
course, expressed as Roberta’s tearful plea, and it is this intense emotionalism that makes 
Roberta’s letters seem inappropriate to the professional lawyers. In other words, what the 
court—the site of modernity, supposedly controlled by reason—should count as a reliable 
resource for investigation are “the material facts,” not the letters that are filled with 
personal emotions.  
 While An American Tragedy presents the letters as a kind of writing that triggers 
strong emotional responses, it also includes another kind of textual material, which 
superficially seems to operate in a distinctly different mode to the emotive letters. This is 
the newspaper article on the accidental drowning which Clyde comes across at a time 
when he is becoming increasingly entrapped in the double affair between Roberta and 
Sondra. Here, I quote the article side by side with Roberta’s letter: 
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 Oh, Clyde, you can’t realize what all this means to me, I feel as though I shall never 
see my home again after I leave here this time. And mamma, poor dear mamma, 
how I do love her and how sorry I am to have deceived her so. She is never cross 
and she always helps me so much. Sometimes I think if I could tell her, but I can’t. 
She has had trouble enough, and I couldn’t break her heart like that. (696) 
The man is recalled as being tall, dark, about thirty-five years of age, and wore a 
light green suit and straw hat with a white and blue band. The girl appears to be not 
more than twenty-five, five feet five inches tall, and weighs 130 pounds. She wore 
her hair, which was long and dark brown, in braids about her forehead. On her left 
middle finger is a small gold ring with an amethyst setting. The police of Pittsfield 
and other cities in this vicinity have been notified, but as yet no word as to her 
identity has been received. (457) 
Whereas Roberta’s letter is punctuated by agonized emotion, the article employs a dry, 
descriptive mode that refers to the accident based solely on facts, devoid of any personal 
inferences. Indeed, the newspaper article is nothing but the accumulation of material facts, 
a kind of description that Nicholson would consider as most appropriate for legal 
proceedings.  
 However, as the story unfolds, this article is gradually transformed from a mere 
chain of “facts”—the kind that Zola regarded as the essential component of naturalist 
fiction—into something uncanny, closer to the one that Fort called “the damned facts.” 
When Clyde first encounters the article, he takes little notice of it, thinking that the 
accident is “commonplace enough in the usual grist of summer accidents” (457), but the 
article comes to possess him as his romantic entanglement veers toward disaster. After 
his depressing meeting with Roberta, Clyde’s mind keeps hovering over those facts 
described in the article: “in spite of himself [=Clyde] drift[ed] back to the thought that the 
item in the paper had inspired—and yet fighting it—trying to shut it out entirely.” The 
more Clyde tries to “shut out” the contents of the article, the more threatening it becomes 
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for him—so much so that the narrative, usually written in the third-person, eventually 
takes up the voice of Clyde himself: “Why must he think of that other lake in 
Massachusetts! That boat! The body of that girl found—and not that of the man who 
accompanied her! How terrible, really!” (477). This passage stylistically shows Clyde’s 
emotional tension by rapidly shifting from a complete sentence into fragmentary phrases. 
The simple itemization of facts is punctuated by occasional exclamations, which 
highlights the uncanny quality of material facts—the same kind of animation effect that 
Fort sought to produce in order to allow facts to exert their brutal power over Clyde.  
 The overwhelming presence of the article becomes most manifest when Clyde 
realizes he can no longer prevaricate with Roberta: 
But now once more in Lycurgus and back in his room after just explaining to 
Roberta, as he had, he once more encountered on his writing desk, the identical 
paper containing the item concerning the tragedy at Pass Lake. And in spite of 
himself, his eye once more followed nervously and yet unwaveringly to the last 
word all the suggestive and provocative details. (479) 
This scene can be considered as a classic case of the return of the repressed. The article, 
which first appeared to be a “commonplace” report of a daily accident, now seems to 
Clyde to be full of “suggestive and provocative details,” details that arouse an intense 
emotional response. The article undergoes a qualitative transformation, from the most 
mundane kind of writing consisting solely of material facts into a text full of  haunting 
details that is no less affective than Roberta’s letters. Dreiser thus shows that a seemingly 
mundane description may effect an uncanny provocativeness that can influence, and 
potentially control, the human psyche. 
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 Dreiser ascribes more radical power to material facts by providing them with an 
ability to generate a sort of phantasmagoria in Clyde’s mind, a vision that borders on the 
realm of the supernatural. What should be recalled at this point is the fact that, even while 
the novel tells in exhaustive detail the ways that Clyde prepares to murder Roberta, it 
does not specify exactly at what moment Clyde actually decides to take such a definitive 
step. In other words, the story goes on without describing the crucial moment of heroic 
decision—the sort of moment we occasionally encounter in realist fiction, most 
memorably in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, when Huck defiantly claims that he 
will “go to hell” to save Jim.  
The absence of such an epiphanic moment in An American Tragedy suggests that 
Dreiser offers an alternative way to induce his protagonist to take action, and he does so 
by intensifying the provocative power of the same newspaper article discussed above. 
Clyde’s preparation to commit murder is featured in Book Two, Chapter 45, which 
begins with a meditation on the chaotic condition of a human mind when faced with an 
extreme predicament—moments when the mind is befuddled “to the extent that for the 
time being, at least, unreason and disorder and mistaken or erroneous counsel would 
appear to hold against all else” (482). What this passage captures is the monstrous birth 
of the “erroneous counsel” that is the newspaper article, which has been internalized in 
Clyde’s psyche, transformed from mere matter into a creature-like being: 
 And yet again at moments the solution suggested by the item in The Times-Union 
again thrusting itself forward, psychogenetically born of his own turbulent, eager 
and disappointed seeking. And hence persisting. (482)  
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The article is persisting, self-birthing, becoming a progenitor of the “erroneous counsel,” 
a phantasmagoric creature which ultimately transforms itself into a character that belongs 
to the realm of fantasy, the efrit in Aladdin’s lamp: 
Indeed, it was now as though from the depth of some lower or higher world never 
before guessed or plumbed by him . . . a region otherwhere than in life or death and 
peopled by creatures otherwise than himself . . . there had now suddenly appeared, 
as the genie at the accidental rubbing of Aladdin’s lamp—as the efrit emerging as 
smoke from the mystic jar in the net of the fisherman[.] (482-483) 
Just as Aladdin summons the genie by rubbing the old, discarded lamp, Clyde 
“accidentally” calls forth the efrit by recalling the newspaper article, which originally 
seemed so innocuous. The passage thus captures the transformative moment when objects 
transmute: from the mundane, negligible scraps (the old lamp and the platitudinous 
article) into objects with magical power. Rather than staging a moment of heroic decision 
by the main protagonist, then, Dreiser chooses to animate the material facts, assigning 
them the commanding force of the supernatural. Dreiser’s conception of facts thus 
manifestly counters the one theorized by Zola, and comes very close to the one 
formulated by Fort. While Zola saw facts as entities that strictly resides in the realm of 
reason, Dreiser viewed those seemingly disinterested facts as imbued with the 
supernatural. Just as Fort discovered rich veins of the supernatural within the most 
neglected newspaper articles, Dreiser featured a newspaper article as a product of 
material facts that becomes fully alive, generating a supernatural entity that overpowers a 
human being.  
 
*              *              *   
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In “I Found the Real American Tragedy,” an essay written as a sequel to An 
American Tragedy, Dreiser explicitly stated his qualms about the treatment of facts in 
legal procedures: 
I was absolutely convinced that the ordinary procedures of any court […] in 
America or elsewhere were not fitted to deal with it. For the law itself in regard to 
any crime of this kind reads that only the facts of the crime, not the deeper 
psychologic and psychiatric background, are to be considered. Sympathy is out. (“I 
Find the Real American Tragedy” 40) 
Dreiser’s critique of legal proceedings directly conflicts with the one presented by 
Nicholson cited in the previous section. Whereas his fictional characters engaged in legal 
professions are preoccupied with “material facts,” Dreiser feels that their conception of 
facts is utterly severed from the actual context of the crime they examine, thereby 
rendering facts impervious to the felt experience of everyday lives.  
What Dreiser posits as a way to recontextualize facts within the reality of modern 
life is to suggest how they can be related to certain kinds of supernatural phenomena, 
born out of a particular human psychology placed in an extreme situation. Instead of 
featuring a tragic hero endowed with a firm will, Dreiser sought to animate facts to show 
how the seemingly most disinterested “material facts” can be a producers of affects that 
triggers magical experience.  
The reason why Dreiser was so much impressed with Fort’s works is that they 
show how institutionalized science has suppressed the spiritual side of facts by 
thoroughly secularizing them. What sets Dreiser apart from the dominant school of 
literary naturalism is his attempt to suture the material and the supernatural by revealing 
the phantasmagoric quality of facts that haunts the most mundane kind of writing, such as 
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newspaper articles. By so doing, Dreiser suggests the persistence of spirituality in the 





Chapter 4  
Beauty is Trash, Trash Beauty: The Enchanting Heaps in The Great Gatsby 
 
 
When The Great Gatsby made its first appearance in 1925, the publisher provided 
a jacket copy that, in retrospect, appears too vague to serve as an effective blurb: “It is a 
magical, living book, blended of irony, romance, and mysticism” (qtd. in Bruccoli, New 
Essays 3). Although the leading Fitzgerald scholar Matthew Bruccoli regards the copy as 
indicative of the publisher’s uncertainty about the nature of its product (3), the blurb’s 
emphasis on the “magical” quality of the book does conform with Fitzgerald’s own 
explanatory comment on the novel, written in a letter to his friend: “That’s the whole 
burden of this novel—the loss of those illusions that give such color to the world that you 
don’t care whether things are true or false as long as they partake of the magical glory” 
(A Life in Letters 102). 
The professed intent of the author regarding his most ambitious work Gatsby—
taking hold of the elusive power of illusions along with their sense of “magical glory”—
is more or less applicable to many of his other works as well. This task, which Fitzgerald 
suggested was his “burden,” was by no means an easy one. Faced with the overwhelming 
power of hard reality, the sparkle of illusions will sooner or later be extinguished, giving 
way to a far more somber mood of disenchantment. Although initially enraptured by his 
wonderous encounter with all the promises of utopian hopes, each of Fitzgerald’s 
protagonists is destined to dwindle into a sad state of disillusionment.   
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It is not sufficient simply to argue, however, that all of Fitzgerald’s works are just 
about loss and futility, leading his readers into some kind of nihilistic void. What 
Fitzgerald was most intent on, in my view, was achieving some alternative worldview 
from which he could take hold of the “magical glory” of elusive illusions, while not 
losing sight of the overwhelming power of reality.  
The reality of the Gatsby’s time, namely the 1920s, consisted of a cluster of new 
social phenomena of which Fitzgerald was part and parcel: the rise of the “New Women,” 
claiming not only political rights but sexual freedom, and who were soon labeled by the 
rapidly growing mass media as “flappers” or even “vampires”; an increasing number of 
low-paid immigrant workers, crowding the slum districts of the metropolitan areas; the 
unprecedented expansion of business corporations run on the basis of a highly monitored 
production system; and the frantic interest in profit-raising among the general American 
public that accompanied their voracious desire to consume any new commodities. All 
these factors, combined with the sense of void in the aftermath of World War I, 
engendered in the entire nation a sense of inanity or alienation, a sense that life was to a 
large extent socially controlled. It was in such an atmosphere that Fitzgerald tried to push 
forward his project, namely, to reinstate the sense of “magical glory” or “wonder” amidst 
what one might regard as the litters of modernity.  
Indeed, the gain and loss of “magical glory” is a recurring theme in many of 
Fitzgerald’s works. And it is notable that its exploration depended not just on Fitzgerald’s 
use of a popularized form of romantic love plot, but also on the rise and fall of religious 
faith on the part of his protagonists. In his first novel, This Side of Paradise, Fitzgerald 
chronicles a young dilettante’s pursuit of a holy grail (embodied as a beautiful and rather 
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flirtatious woman, Rosalind) and his subsequent failure to attain it. Shattered by his 
lover’s marriage and his own loss of financial security, Amory Blaine feels as if he has 
been placed in a world with “all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken” 
(307). He tries to find solace in the Catholic Church, which once seemed “the only 
assimilative, traditionary bulwark against the decay of morals,” only to conclude that “the 
Church” exercises only “empty ritual,” and that there is “no God in his heart” (306, 307). 
Amory’s crucial loss of faith in institutional religion is encapsulated in his bitter 
realization that “It’s all a poor substitution at best” (307). The novel’s closing remark 
prefigures subsequent protagonists’ sense of loss vis-à-vis a social world that lacks any 
accepted moral codes: “He stretched out his arms to the crystalline, radiant sky. ‘I know 
myself,’ he cried, ‘but that is all.’” (308). While Amory’s physical gesture, set against 
“the crystalline, radiant sky,” is unabashedly romantic, his utterance does not show any 
sign of expanding the notion of selfhood glorified by nineteenth-century romanticism. 
Rather, Amory’s remark delimits the self through an acute sense of disillusionment 
brought forth by the coming of an age devoid of any ethical and religious “bulwark.”  
For many readers, Amory’s outstretched arms at the novel’s end are surely 
reminiscent of the celebrated last passage in The Great Gatsby: 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes 
before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter—tomorrow we will run faster, 
stretch out our arms further. . . . And one fine morning—  
    So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. 
(144) 
Notably, however, the general tone of this latter conclusion significantly differs from that 
of Fitzgerald’s debut work. The nominative shift from the singular (“Gatsby”) to the 
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collective (“we”) clearly carries a positive vibe, signaling a Whitmanesque expansion of 
selfhood. More significantly, Gatsby’s faith never wavers: unlike Amory, whose very 
stance at the end of the novel embodies disillusionment, Gatsby remains a devoted 
believer till the end. Their contrasting attitudes toward faith seem to derive from the 
difference in their religious orientations: while Amory fails to believe in the Catholic 
Church—the embodiment of institutionalized religion—Gatsby manages to keep his faith 
by believing in a non-consecrated object, “the green light.” In other words, by celebrating 
Gatsby as a believer of an object unauthorized by the church, Fitzgerald seems to be 
making a radical attempt to find an alternative way of believing that he could not find in 
religious institutions.  
The main bulk of Gatsby criticisms so far has strangely neglected the positive 
tone of this last scene: commentators have almost unanimously claimed that Fitzgerald’s 
outlook in the text is tainted with disillusionment in the face of modernity. Both secular 
and religious readings of the text agree that objects appearing in the novel have a 
beguiling allure that ultimately leads those who follow them into nothingness. From a 
secular standpoint, the novel is hopelessly inundated with what Marx believed to be the 
source of modernity’s corruption, namely, objects-as-commodities. Beginning with 
Malcolm Cowley’s Marxist reading of Gatsby, a number of materialist critiques have 
related every aspect of the novel to the capitalist system of exchange. For instance, Ross 
Posnock regards Gatsby as a character “transformed into a commodity that Nick sells the 
reader” (211), and Meredith Goldsmith considers Gatsby’s smile “a reproducible 
commodity [. . .] that extends his social power” (450). Even death becomes commodified 
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through the circulation of objects of grief (Schiff 104).
 13
 Consequently, critics have 
tended to suggest that the novel offers nothing but an unrelievedly bleak vision of 
modernity: 
In its totality The Great Gatsby sketches the evolution of America from “fresh green 
breast of the new world” to “valley of ashes,” from continent with a spirit 
“commensurate to man’s capacity for wonder” to place of nightmare, exhaustion, 
and death. (Callahan 12) 
This assertion fairly represents the general tendency of Gatsby analyses, which elide any 
positive elements in the novel’s ending. The “valley of ashes” is a nightmarish 
embodiment of capitalist exploitation in which “man’s capacity for wonder” is lost for 
good.  
Similarly, critics who shed light on the religious aspect of the novel have mainly 
focused on Fitzgerald’s Catholic sensibility, insisting on that he was invested in 
expressing the failure of transubstantiation.
14
 Paul Giles notes that Gatsby’s obsession 
with the green light and many other things surrounding Daisy (including her voice) 
                                                 
13
See also Richard Godden’s Fictions of Capital: The American Novel from James to 
Mailer. Godden’s otherwise breathtaking reading of Gatsby becomes slightly reductive 
when the discussion includes an overtly Marxist passage, as follows: “Rather, Gatsby 
loves Daisy because she is his point of access to a dominant class. […] [H]is love ties 
him to a woman formed to display merchandise, who consequently has repressed her 
body and cashed in her voice” (83). 
14
 Along with Giles, see also Joan Allen, Candles and Carnival Lights: The Catholic 
Sensibility of F. Scott Fitzgerald; Giles Gunn, “F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Gatsby and the 
Imagination of Wonder”; Benita Moore, Escape into a Labyrinth: F. Scott Fitzgerald, 
Catholic Sensibility, and the American Way. For a stimulating analysis that tries to 
connect religion to commodity culture, see Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: 
Religion, the Secular and American Literature. Fessenden argues that Fitzgerald’s 
frequent references to luxurious commodities in his fiction work to support the novelist’s 
self-refashioning of his Irish Catholic origin into a WASP identity: “so keen was 
Fitzgerald to distance himself from the Irish Catholic provincialism of his own 
upbringing that he had even his army uniforms made by Brooks Brothers” (183). 
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shows “his attempts to transubstantiate Daisy and defy the limitations of linear history by 
mingling her worldly existence with a timeless essence” (180). Giles concludes that 
Gatsby’s Catholic-inflected endeavor ultimately leaves us with “a sense of the vacancy 
surrounding the icons” that haunts the end of the novel (184). While I agree with Giles’s 
comment on the novel’s temporal nonlinearity (a trait which becomes most marked in the 
last line, “borne back ceaselessly into the past”), his interpretation of the tone of the novel 
seems to ignore the complexity of Nick’s narrative voice, which contains both a tenacious 
faith in innocence as well as a deep-seated awareness of the difficulty in holding such a 
belief in modern America. Indeed, Giles’s argument seems more cogent in the context of 
This Side of Paradise, in which Amory’s growing sense of the failure of iconicity is 
clearly indicated as a source of disillusionment.  
The overall problem of both secular and religious readings of Gatsby is that they 
tend to assign negative meanings to the materiality inscribed in the text: while the secular 
readings reduce various objects to mere commodities in the capitalist marketplace, the 
religious approach inevitably reads those objects as a series of failed transubstantiations. 
Neither of them gives any satisfactory account of the forward-looking tone that Fitzgerald 
seems to painstakingly emphasize. If the positive atmosphere of the last passage of 
Gatsby is partially made possible by the nonlinearity of the narrative vision—a vision 
that enables the coexistence of past and present—it follows that the novel does not 
merely discredit things past as useless trash. Rather, what appears as useless trash 
achieves a certain kind of transcendental force that Fitzgerald thought was crucially 
lacking in institutional religions, including Catholicism. I argue that the novel’s 
remarkable power derives from the ways in which Fitzgerald transformed rubbish—
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things that have neither commodity value nor idolizable quality—into objects of intense 
worship.  
As a writer highly susceptible to the ubiquity of commodities in the culture of the 
twenties, Fitzgerald seems to probe an alternative ontology of objects that might 
pertinently be called fetish. According to William Pietz, the fetish is “essentially a 
material, terrestrial entity” that sharply diverges from the Catholic idol in its rootedness 
in physicality. The subordinate status of fetish to Catholic idol originates in the colonial 
encounter between Europeans and Africans, when fetish became the concept that 
explained the Africans’ misguided worship of “trifles and trinkets”— things that had 
absolutely no value in European culture.
15
 Thus, the divinity of the fetish exists in its 
being trash both from the Christian and secular-materialist viewpoints. To be sure, the 
fetish functioned as a critical linchpin in the two most broadly influential theories of 
modernity—Marx’s critique of commodity culture and Freud’s castration complex. My 
analysis of Gatsby departs from these foundational readings, however, in treating the 
fetish not as that which stands for something else, as it does in the case of Marx 
(commodity) and Freud (phallus).
16
 Rather, I’m interested in the incorrigible quality of 
the fetish, which eliminates any possibility of its becoming an analogue for anything 
other than itself.  
While it has become almost a critical commonplace to see Gatsby as inextricably 
linked with the meteoric rise of the consumer culture in the twenties, my textual analysis 
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 See also Patricia Spyer, ed, Border Fetishisms: Material Objects in Unstable Spaces; 
Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things. 
16
 For a very useful overview of fetishism, see Laura Mulvey, Fetishism and Curiosity; 




attempts to shed a different light on the status of commodity—that it not only shaped 
consumer culture, but also defied it through its ineradicable materiality as rubbish. As the 
ultimate embodiment of the thingness of materiality, rubbish becomes an aesthetic object 
of wonder, provoking something akin to genuine faith. Unlike the nineteenth-century 
romantics, who had discovered wonder and beauty within nature, Fitzgerald brought 
those concepts into the least picturesque site of modernity, the landscape of urban trash. 
By so doing, Fitzgerald attempted to relocate the act of believing from the Church to the 
secular world of modernity, a world he termed “Godless.”  
In the following sections, I discuss the ways in which Fitzgerald challenged the 
notion of disillusionment—a mental epidemic in modernity—through his idiosyncratic 
rendition of material spirituality, by featuring various kinds of trashy heaps that evoke an 
aesthetic sense of wonder. Before going into the actual reading of the text, I elaborate on 
how the discourse of disillusionment was widely shared in the twenties, by focusing on 
two of the most influential cultural theories of the twenties—by H. Richard Niebuhr and 
G. K. Chesterton—and clarify what I regard to have been the main predicament that 
Fitzgerald had to face, namely, the disillusioned temperament generated by the fraught 
relationships between religion and materialism, civilization and primitivism, beauty and 
modernity.
17
 I also examine a number of Fitzgerald’s short stories that contain 
medievalist settings in order to demonstrate his lifelong concern with Catholicism, and 
                                                 
17
 For the Catholic responses to the issue of disillusionment at the time, see William 
Halsey, The Survival of American Innocence: Catholicism in an Era of Disillusionment 
1920-1940. Halsey argues that American Catholics defended against the tide of 
disillusionment through recourse to the ideas of a higher order that Scholastic and neo-
Thomistic philosophy embraced. Halsey devotes a chapter to Fitzgerald’s lingering 
fascination with Catholicism. Although very thoughtfully conceived, Halsey’s reading 
does not fully account for Fitzgerald’s investment in alternative types of religious interest 
that are not necessarily based on Catholic premises of balance and order.  
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suggest that his investment in medievalism ultimately resulted in a kind of alternative 
spiritualism without institutional affiliations. Finally, my textual analysis of Gatsby 
demonstrates how such spiritualism emerges in the form of a definitively modern 
(by)product of commodity culture: heaps of trash. By turning heaps into fetishes, 
Fitzgerald sought to recover the rapidly fading affects—wonder, enchantment, and 
religious ecstasy—within the world of disillusionment.  
*              *             * 
In 1925, the same year Fitzgerald wrote Gatsby, H. Richard Niebuhr, a leading 
theologian of the time, published an article, “Back to Benedict?” to comment on what he 
saw to be the sense of “disillusionment” that seemed to plague the entire nation. He 
observed that “a new resurgence of the old pessimism” got under way, as Christianity had 
been “painfully disillusioned of its dream of the automatic progress of the world toward 
the kingdom of God” (860). The glorious road to heaven was hampered by the rise of 
secularization, which Niebuhr defined as “the divorce between Christian ethics and the 
ethics of business and industry” (860). For Niebuhr, such “earthly callings” devoid of 
“Christian content” only aggravated “the over-indulgence […] of the instincts of 
acquisition,” thereby generating the vicious circle of capitalism in which “a man cannot 
own a square foot of property or accept a salary without coming dangerously near to 
compromise with the whole evil and selfish system which issues in class and race 
exploitation” (861).  
Niebuhr’s grim diagnosis of the ills of the secular modern world echoes Max 
Weber’s well-known thesis in his 1917 lecture Science as a Vocation, in which he 
defined the coming of Western modernity as the “disenchantment of the world” (5). 
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According to Weber, the secular principles of “rationalization and intellectualization” had 
exterminated the “mysterious incalculable forces”—the governing forces of premodern 
societies—and broken away from the realm of transcendence: “One need no longer have 
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did savages, for 
whom such mysterious powers existed” (6). Weber and Niebuhr were alike in their claim 
that secularization had exorcised the possibility of transcendental power in the public 
realm, albeit with different focuses: while Weber focused on the secularity of the social 
system, Niebuhr attended most closely to the excessively materialistic cultural 
atmosphere that defined the American twenties, a “luxurious and self-indulgent age,” as 
he termed it. 
Niebuhr further developed his own thesis of disillusionment in search of a 
possible strategy for regaining faith in a lecture titled “Theology in a Time of 
Disillusionment.” In it he defined “disillusionment” as the “most striking attribute” of 
“modern Western civilization,” one that set it apart from nineteenth-century optimism 
based on a “faith in human goodness and rationality” (102). Although Niebuhr admitted 
that “Henry Brooks Adam’s disillusionment was a rare occurrence in the later nineteenth 
century,” he insisted that in the twentieth century this sentiment might be deemed “the 
significant experience which mirrored the experiences of thousands” (104). Niebuhr was 
wary of the possibility that modernity’s ever-expanding control, enforced through secular 
strategies (bureaucratization and scientific instrumentalism, for instance) could spread a 
sense of powerlessness in the face of the absence of “a meaningful advance toward the 
coming of the rule of love and peace and joy” (106). Niebuhr considered that the 
appearance of Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy—a novel published in the same 
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year as Gatsby—was the best proof of the extent to which America was plagued by 
disillusionment. What he considered to be the defining characteristics of modern 
America—the unequal distribution of wealth, and the essentially secular upheavals of 
middle class morality and science—promulgated “perplexity,” causing the loss of “the 
revelation of almost tangible certainties” (109).  
What Niebuhr offered as an alternative to the prevailing mode of cynicism was 
not to “curse the whole sorry scheme of things” but to face modernity’s “perplexity” 
itself. By so doing, one could look at the “mysteries” with “wonder”: 
[T]he theology of a time that confronts mysteries, because it has lost dogmas, and 
which sees the world once more in a strange and unfamiliar guise as the realm of 
irrational as well as rational manifestation of reality feels a new kinship for the awe 
and the tremor of primitive man facing wonder at the boundaries of his intelligence. 
(112) 
Niebuhr made a telling analogy between modern subjectivities and those of the primitive 
to suggest their common lack of authorized principles. The disillusioned modern 
subjectivities might regain their faith by recalling the way primitive people had viewed 
their surroundings, in a mode of perception Niebuhr termed “the apprehension of divine 
qualities in the world of natural and aesthetic objects” (112). In other words, the recovery 
of faith was no longer possible within institutionalized religion but via what he called 
“mana”: a certain kind of material substance imbued with a transcendental quality that 
could inspire “awe and mystery” (111). Just like Weber, Niebuhr detected an affinity 
between modern and primitive culture, but, unlike Weber, he did not regard the return to 
the primitive as a symptom of degeneration. Rather, to “face wonder” promised a renewal 
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of the possibility of transcendence no longer available in the excessive formality of 
religion in his time.  
While Niebuhr attempted to recover transcendence by countering disillusionment 
with the very antithesis of modernity—wonderment and mana—G. K. Chesterton insisted 
that magicality was the vile constituent of modernity itself. Chesterton, an English writer 
whose proto-surrealistic novel The Man Who Was Thursday makes a cameo appearance 
in Fitzgerald’s first novel, as Amory’s favorite book, was an outspoken defendant of 
democracy and Catholicism (38). His commitment to democracy naturally led him to 
focus on America and its subsequent transformation from Jeffersonian democracy to the 
market-driven capitalism of the twenties, a turn most trenchantly treated in his 1922 
travelogue, What I Saw in America. The book presents the radical proposition that 
democracy seems to decline in proportion to the extent to which a nation turns its back on 
religion in favor of science.
18
 For Chesterton, democracy was essentially Catholic in that 
the ideal of citizenship and equality could only be realized through the founding of 
“brotherhood” under God the Father. Modernity turned the Americans into “Pagan[s]” 
who cultivated an excessively antidemocratic sense of beauty by indulging themselves in 
a “laxity in dress or manners” (Why Catholic, 23). This “Pagan” quality was particularly 
entrenched in New York, a city of magic which Chesterton viewed with both fascination 
and distaste:  
I disagree with the aesthetic condemnation of the modern city with its skyscrapers 
and sky-signs. I mean that which laments the loss of beauty and its sacrifice to utility. 
It seems to me the very reverse of the truth. As a matter of art for art’s sake, they 
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 On Chesterton’s views on democracy and Catholicism, see Eugene McCarraher, 
Christian Critics: Religion and the Impasse in Modern American Social Thought, 
especially Chapter 2. 
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seem to me rather artistic. […] Indeed I am in a mood of so much sympathy with 
fairy nights of this pantomime city, that I should be almost sorry to see social sanity 
and a sense of proportion return to extinguish them (58).
19
 
From a purely “artistic” viewpoint, skyscrapers and sky-signs might represent beauty, but 
from the standpoint of a social critic, their conspicuous presence signifies the rise of 
business corporations announcing the victory of antidemocracy. Chesterton bitterly 
concluded that the beauty of New York, arising out of capitalistic exploitation was indeed 
nothing but a heap of trash: 
[W]hen I say that the Republic of the Age of Reason is now a ruin, I should rather 
say that at its best it is a ruin. At its worst it has collapsed into a death-trap or is 
rotting like a dunghill. What is the real Republic of our day as distinct from the ideal 
Republic of our fathers, but a heap of corrupt capitalism crawling with worms; with 
those parasites, the professional politicians? (172)  
In Chesterton’s bleak vision of New York, beauty has irrevocably fallen into a state of 
waste. Chesterton thus maintained a disillusioned persona in order to unveil the 
illusionary nature of the metropolis and to confront the outcome of corrupt capitalism that 
produced only rubbish, “a heap” and “a dunghill.” 
 Chesterton shared Niebuhr’s assumption that nationwide secularization was the 
source of excessive materialism and robust social stratification; each believed these 
developments went against their own understandings of equality under Christianity. 
However, while Niebuhr saw the potential in fetish worship as an alternative form of 
transcendence that could not be wholly contained in Christian theology, Chesterton 
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 William Leach offers an insightful analysis of the way in which Chesterton viewed the 
glittering cityscape of New York in Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a 
New American Culture, 346-347. 
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viewed this “Pagan” quality as to be an impediment to a democratic ideal. The magical 
atmosphere of urban life, as exemplified in advertisements and skyscrapers, was more 
delusional than imaginative.  
Chesterton’s disillusionment thus sharply puts into question Niebuhr’s recourse to 
primitivism: how can a pristine sense of “wonder” be recuperated in a society that keeps 
manufacturing delusional images of affluence in the wasteland of democracy? As we 
shall see in the next section, the same issue is at stake in Fitzgerald’s fiction, in which 
primitive religion figures as a sustainable form of faith.  
Significantly, Fitzgerald often placed primitive settings side by side with those of 
the medieval, and while his main protagonists usually embrace the grandeur of 
medievalism without any significant reservation, their attitudes toward primitivism 
remains rather ambivalent, containing both sympathy and estrangement. Although 
readings of Fitzgerald have mostly focused on the author’s proclivity for promoting 
medievalism,
20
 arguing that Fitzgerald’s longing for premodern culture signals his 
disillusionment with contemporary society, I suggest that his investment in primitivism is 
ultimately all the more telling, for it shows the centrality of recovering faith in 
Fitzgerald’s writings. 
*               *              * 
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 The most comprehensive analysis of the issue is by Kim Moreland, The Medievalist 
Impulse in American Literature: Twain, Adams, Fitzgerald, and Hemingway, especially 
Chapter 4. Moreland focuses on Fitzgerald’s devotion to the courtly love tradition and his 
conviction that such kind of love is impossible to sustain in modern America, a 
conviction which turned into disillusionment. See also T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of 
Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920, 





Fitzgerald’s treatment of “primitive people” underwent a signal transformation 
from negative to positive as his career matured. As seen in his 1922 short story, “The 
Diamond as Big as the Ritz,” Fitzgerald’s earlier works tend to view primitivism as 
indicative of anomie caused by modernization.
21
 The story is a slapstick fairy tale of a 
dazzling romance experienced by a boy named John, a fictional version of the teenage 
Fitzgerald. Prior to the scene of John’s arrival at the diamond mountain, Fitzgerald 
describes a deserted village called “Fish” and its inhabitants’ fascination with “the 
Transcontinental Express from Chicago” that takes John to his millionaire schoolmate’s 
residence on the mountain (185). The village of Fish is depicted as “minute, dismal, and 
forgotten,” and its inhabitants “a race apart [. . .] like some species developed by an early 
whim of nature, which on second thought had abandoned them to struggle and 
extermination” (185). As the living remnants of a superseded primitive culture, the 
villagers are incapable of establishing any organized religions, including Christianity. But 
this does not keep them from having faith. Indeed, just looking at the transcontinental 
express with “anemic wonder” has become “a sort of cult” that has “no altar, no priest, no 
sacrifice” (185). This reference to Catholic rituals serves to highlight the peculiar mindset 
of “the cult” that worships a non-ecclesiastical object, the express train.
22
 The equation of 
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 Other earlier works of Fitzgerald that problematize the excessive ritualism of 
Catholicism are “The Ordeal,” “Benediction,” and “Absolution.” The fact that 
“Absolution” (a story of a young boy who cannot believe in the act of confession) was 
originally part of Gatsby suggests the novel’s latent impulse to move beyond the realm of 
Catholic formality. On Fitzgerald’s fraught relationship with Catholicism, see Halsey, 
especially Chapter 7.  
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 In Freud, Religion, and the Roaring Twenties: A Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Secularization in Three Novelists: Anderson, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald, Henry Idema 
III quite reasonably argues that the scene shows the secularizing process of religion in the 
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the villagers’ wonderous primitivism with an icon of modernity (the train) is 
counterposed with John’s fascination with the medieval setting in which Percy, his 
schoolmate, lives. John is “enchanted by the wonders of the chateau and the valley,” and 
also by a girl of unreal beauty. Unlike the villager’s “anemic wonder,” John’s wonder is 
at first pristine and vivid in its quality, but at the story’s end, a sense of disillusionment 
takes hold of him: “There are only diamonds in the whole world, diamonds and perhaps 
the shabby gift of disillusion. Well, I have that last and I will make the usual nothing of it” 
(216). The eventual transformation of the medievalist idyll into “the shabby gift of 
disillusion” indicates that the distinction between the savage and the civilized ultimately 
collapses through their common lack of vivacious surprise and wonder. Just as 
Chesterton blurred the binary between the barbarians and the moderns by turning them 
both into “Pagan,” the early Fitzgerald’s writings tend to treat primitivism as a metaphor 
for the enervation of modern subjectivity.  
Later in his life, however, Fitzgerald sought to explore a more positive aspect of 
primitivism, one that offered a certain kind of religious asylum for those dispossessed of 
institutional faith. The so-called “Philippe stories” best illustrate Fitzgerald’s leaning 
toward primitive religion. Written at the last stage of his life, the Philippe stories recycle 
the familiar motifs of medievalism and primitivism, but their approach significantly 
differs from that of his earlier works. Set in France in the Dark Ages (A. D. 872), the 
Philippe stories feature one knight’s heroic endeavor to establish a feudal hierarchy in the 
face of various foreign threats and conspiracies. While the earlier episodes draw a clear 
                                                                                                                                                 
age of the machine (204). However, such a reading does not fully explain the reason why 




line between the civilized Philippe and the “barbaric” natives, the two groups become 
increasingly intertwined as the series progresses. In the first installment of the series, “In 
the Darkest Hour,” Philippe is depicted as the very embodiment of pious chivalry. His 
conquests of the natives are repeatedly sanctified by institutional Christianity, as is shown 
in his proud declaration, “I’ll do nothing without the approval of the Church” (519). 
When he finally obtains the rulership of the region, he is taken up “in a sudden fervor,” 
kneels down, and thanks God “for His goodness.”  
At this point, he is a man of honor impervious to the seductions of women. But in 
the third and the last stories, “The Kingdom in the Dark” and “Gods of Darkness,” 
Philippe’s stance toward the natives shifts, moving from outward hostility to equivocal 
complicity, a change effected by Griselda who is a former mistress of the French king. In 
“The Kingdom in the Dark,” Philippe chooses to make a false oath upon when 
interrogated by the king about the whereabouts of Griselda. The impatient king calls for a 
raid on Philippe’s castle, and the ever-defiant Philippe becomes a Christian renegade as 
he chooses to be avenged on the king: “I took a false oath this morning, and maybe 
Almighty Providence doesn’t believe me any more. But some day, by God, I’ll build a 
fort of stone that all the kings of Christendom can’t burn or knock down!” (68).  
Philippe’s decision to break away from Christian institutions (the Church and the 
anointed king) is described more radically in the final episode, “Gods of Darkness.” As 
the title suggests, the episode focuses on the cult worship that spreads among the 
plebeians in Philippe’s region. The cult is defined as a folk religion that existed prior to 
Christianity, “a pagan worship [. . .] left over from the days before [the establishment of] 
the Holy Word” (85). At first, Philippe decides to persecute the cult, but upon learning of 
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Griselda’s intense devotion to the cult, he chooses to “use this cult—and maybe burn in 
hell forever after.” Significantly, the story ends with Griselda’s mocking suggestion that 
he build a totemic beast of half lion, half pig as a symbol of the cult (91). Griselda’s joke 
shows her self-awareness of belonging to the religious minority, and the way she 
materializes her faith into the totem shows Fitzgerald’s propensity toward material 
spirituality that is essentially hostile to Christian institutions. As Peter Hays aptly notes, 
Fitzgerald carefully revised the last story to emphasize a positive aspect of the cult: that it 
is potentially empowering for women (300). Philippe’s complicitous relationship with the 
cult reveals Fitzgerald’s own fascination with a mode of faith that undermines civilization. 
While many critics regard Fitzgerald’s attraction to medievalism as a symptom of his 
Catholic inclination, the Philippe stories—the only works of Fitzgerald that directly deals 
with medieval culture—shows his interest in totem rather than idol. By focusing on the 
formative period of Catholic feudalism, Fitzgerald exposes the oppressive nature of 
institutional religion, while featuring the positive potentiality of folk religion, which 
worships such a nonconsecrated object as a totem. 
Just as Niebuhr conceived “mana” as the source of regaining wonder in the age of 
disillusionment, Fitzgerald regarded totem as a symbol of potent faith that idol fails to 
transmit. Indeed, idols in Fitzgerald’s works tend to perpetuate a sense of disillusionment, 
as we see toward the end of his first novel in which Amory feels as if surrounded by the 
hallowed Gods. If the singularity of Gatsby resides in its significant move from 
disillusionment to faith, Fitzgerald accomplished it by attributing a certain kind of 
transcendental power to objects that should more appropriately be called fetishes rather 
than idols. But what kinds of objects of wonder did Fitzgerald discover amidst the “heap” 
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and “dunghill” of capitalist exploitation that Chesterton so abhorred? Like Chesterton, 
Fitzgerald was obsessed with the image of overwhelming heaps of refuse in modern 
America, but the ways in which he magnified their presence in Gatsby did not merely 




*              *            * 
As a number of his writings indicate, Fitzgerald frequently employed imageries of 
rubbish to express dissatisfaction with his own short stories, thereby distinguishing them 
from his book-length novels, including Gatsby. In The Beautiful and Damned, one 
promising writer says with self-deprecation that he “write[s] trash” after his debut (150). 
Obviously, this remark refers to Fitzgerald’s own notorious party life, which forced him 
to produce a series of short stories to make a living. A similar comment appears in one of 
his letters, written just prior to the completion of Gatsby: “I’ve done about 10 pieces of 
horrible junk in the last year tho [sic] I can never republish or bear to look at—cheap and 
without the spontaneity of my first work. But the novel [Gatsby] Im [sic] sure of” (101). 
In another letter, Fitzgerald used the same negative images of trash to express the success 
of his creative imagination in writing Gatsby: “So in my new novel I’m thrown directly 
on purely creative work—not trashy imaginings as in my stories but the sustained 
imagination of a sincere and yet radiant world” (67). For Fitzgerald, “the novel” was the 
                                                 
23
 My reading of Gatsby may align itself with the ongoing revisionist approaches to the 
issue of primitivism in modernist art. Unlike the earlier interpretations which attacked 
modernists’ treatments of primitivism as a malignant form of cultural appropriation (see 
Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives), more recent 
works like Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush, eds, Prehistories of the Future: The 
Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism present more nuanced analyses of the 




place where his creativity (what he termed as “the sustained imagination”) had integrity, 
whereas his short stories remained mere repositories of “trashy imaginings.” However, it 
is my belief that Gatsby is a novel studded with “trashy imaginings,” and that the 
accumulation of “trashy imaginings” which various protagonists envision paradoxically 
constitutes “the sustained imagination” of the novel.  
Exerting a regenerative power at pivotal moments of the text, trashy imaginings 
emerge as masses of immaterial objects called heaps. The novel’s most prominent 
instance of trashy heaps is “a valley of ashes,” the socially degraded area of New York 
where Wilson and Myrtle live. Nick calls this wasteland “ashheaps” (we should recall the 
fact that one of the candidates for the novel’s title was “Among Ash-Heaps and 
Millionaires”), and he describes the valley as a territory protected by some divine but 
monitory power:  
This is a valley of ashes—a fantastic farm where ashes grow like wheat into ridges 
and hills and grotesque gardens; where ashes take the forms of houses and chimneys 
and rising smoke and, finally, with a transcendent effort, of ash-gray men, who 
move dimly and already crumbling through the powdery air. (21) 
In this inverted version of the Edenic idyll, the divine agent who executes the power of 
creation turns out to be yet another figure of trash: the discarded advertisement of T. J. 
Eckleburg.
24
 In Fitzgerald’s version of the dunghill of modern civilization, to adopt 
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 Various critics argue about the pastoral elements in Gatsby and equate them with the 
sense of disillusionment that Fitzgerald supposedly suffered. In their analyses, 
Fitzgerald’s parodic use of fairytale motifs functions as proof of his pessimistic vision of 
modernity, a world in which the American dream has become as otherworldly as a fairy 
tale. See Peter Hays, “Gatsby, Myth, Fairy Tale, and Legend”, and also Laura Barrett, 
“From Wonderland to Wasteland: The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, The Great Gatsby, and 
the New American Fairy Tale.” 
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Chesterton’s phrase, dead matters becomes the source of animation. While the dominant 
secular and religious discourses view ashes as dead matter (the secular as the end point of 
commodity circulation, the religious as a dead body), Fitzgerald endows ashes with the 
power of creation, just as he does with Eckleburg, which seems to lead an afterlife far 
more meaningful than its original function as an advertisement. The ashheaps and 
Eckleburg thus signal an idiosyncratic logic of animation within the novel that is 
precisely the opposite of Chesterton’s bleak view of modern America. In Gatsby, those 
worthless objects within the culture of consumption ultimately turn out to be the most 
productive.  
As is clearly shown in Tom Buchanan’s obsession with racialist pseudo-science, 
the rationalistic vision registered in the novel perceives trashy heaps negatively—heaps 
that includes not only masses of discarded objects but also discarded human beings, the 
emergent social group that becomes a threat to the dominant class with its reproductive 
capabilities. Influenced by a book called “The Rise of the Colored Empires,” Tom fears 
that “the white race [. . .] will be utterly submerged” by the population increase of the 
formerly-colonized nations in Asia and Africa. White-supremacist hegemony is violently 
shaken by those “colored” people, and as a result, “[c]ivilization’s going to pieces” (14). 
By imagining the consequence of such foreign threats as a victory of racially inferior 
masses, Tom envisions a similar landscape of ashheaps: just as the valley of ashes is the 
sum total of discarded objects, “the colored empires” appear to Tom as the heaps of racial 
abjection. Considering the fact that Tom rationalizes his racist view with science—he 
insists that the book is “all scientific stuff” (14)—heaps in the novel emerge not merely 
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as the debris of consumer culture but also as a projection, or symptom, of the racial logic 
promulgated through scientific rationalism.
25
 
While a proponent of science like Tom is traumatized by the imaginary heaps of 
racial litters, those who openly scorn such scientific racism—Daisy and Nick—view 
refuse heaps as things that recover a lost sense of pristine wonder. Indeed, both Daisy and 
Nick form a similar conception of what counts as “beautiful,” an adjective that surfaces 
when they face rubbish heaps. In the case of Daisy, we should note that her personality is 
modeled on a classic example of the American flirt, Henry James’s Daisy Miller,
26
 a 
heroine constantly accused by James’s narrator/protagonist Winterbourne of being “a 
little American flirt”: 
Winterbourne felt a superior indignation at his own lovely fellow-countrywoman’s 
not knowing the difference between a spurious gentleman and a real one. [. . .] 
Would a nice girl—even allowing for her being a little American flirt—make a 
rendezvous with a presumably low-lived foreigner? (89-90) 
Not unlike Tom, with his xenophobic obsession, Winterbourne becomes exasperated by 
Daisy’s outright flirtation with a man whom he considers a social, and racial, inferior. 
Winterbourne decides that Daisy is not “a nice girl” but “a little flirt,” for she seems to be 
obsessed with accumulating romantic relationships without paying much attention to the 
social status of her dating partners.  
                                                 
25
  Tom’s anxiety might be seen as an expression of the collective fantasy widely shared 
among the dominant class, most famously pronounced by Theodore Roosevelt’s address 
on “race suicide.” See, Bederman, Chapter 5.  
26
 In a very different vein, Bryan Washington presents a comparative analysis of Gatsby 
and Daisy Miller in The Politics of Exile: Ideology in Henry James, F. Scott Fitzgerald, 
and James Baldwin, especially in Chapter 2.  
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This quantity-over-quality attitude toward men can also clearly be seen in 
Fitzgerald’s Daisy. In her premarital days at Louisville, Daisy had been notorious for 
dating soldiers indiscriminately until she met Gatsby. Soon after Gatsby’s departure from 
the town, Daisy resumed her flirtatious ways, since the long-distance relationship with 
Gatsby caused great strain. As Jordan Baker describes it, the men Daisy hung around 
with at that time were obviously sexually less attractive than those she used to date: they 
are “flat-footed, short-sighted young men in town, who couldn’t get into the army at all” 
(60). Daisy is thus the mirror image of her partner, Tom, in that both have a tendency to 
become obsessed with accumulation; however, they assume contrasting attitudes toward 
it. While Tom is horrified by his racialized fears of quantity over quality (i.e. the racially 
inferior overtaking the superior), Daisy positively craves a sexualized version of the same 
thing (i.e. she doesn’t care whether a man is attractive; at least, not as long as she has a 
number of other male suitors).  
 Given this logic, it is not surprising that the scene in which Daisy achieves the 
utmost emotional height in the novel involves a description of the formation of a heap 
consisting of Gatsby’s shirts. While critics have emphasized the sacramental aspect of 
Gatsby’s heaping shirts, I want to suggest that the transcendental element of the scene is 
not predicated on Catholic conceptions of sacred objects but on the transformative quality 
of a heap that turns valuable commodities into a disorderly mass. Before Nick describes 
Gatsby tossing them into a heap, Gatsby explains that they are the latest imports from 
England. As if to demonstrate their high market-value, the shirts are stored in a cabinet 
with almost geometrical precision, “piled like bricks in a dozen high” (73). However, 
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these expensive garments undergo a qualitative transformation as Gatsby throws them 
onto his bed one by one, creating a heap: 
He took out a pile of shirts and began throwing them, one by one, before us, shirts of 
sheer linen and thick silk and fine flannel, which lost their folds as they fell and 
covered the table in many colored disarray. While we admired he brought more and 
the soft rich heap mounted higher—shirts with stripes and scrolls and plaids in coral 
and apple-green and lavender and faint orange, with monograms of Indian blue. 
Suddenly, with a strained sound, Daisy bent her head into the shirts and began to cry 
stormily.     
      “They’re such beautiful shirts,” she sobbed, her voice muffled in the thick folds. 
“It makes me sad because I’ve never seen such—such beautiful shirts before.” (74) 
Struck with the beauty of the shirts, Daisy bursts into tears of admiration, a curious 
reaction considering the fact that, with her wealthy upbringing, the sight of gorgeous 
shirts must have appeared almost too familiar. However, instead of being underwhelmed 
by Gatsby’s naive display of sartorial wealth, Daisy is immensely moved by it, precisely 
because his act captures the moment in which the “pile” of brick-like shirts transforms 
itself into “the soft rich heap.” The comparison of the neatly arranged shirts to a brick-
like pile characterizes them as somewhat stiff and rigid: so compartmentalized and 
homogenized that they exemplify  neatly packaged, mass-produced commodities. In 
contrast, the heap of shirts created as Gatsby throws them is described as soft, malleable, 
disorderly, and colorful, as is clearly seen from the series of patterns and colors 
introduced in the passage. It is this transformative process—the square-shaped folded 
shirts turning into a “many colored disarray”—that elicits Daisy’s feverish response. And 
no one is better suited to appreciate the beauty of the heap than Daisy, an exquisite case 
of the American flirt who esteems variety over uniformity. And the sadness that follows 
her enthusiastic appreciation of the beautiful shirt-heap may derive from the fact that, as a 
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married woman, Daisy can no longer enjoy the life of a flirt as much as she could in her 
youth. Gatsby’s act of transforming a pile into a heap thus allows Daisy to re-experience 
vicariously the pleasure of the past, and the very sensuous way she reacts to the heap 
takes her into the realm of beauty.  
 If Daisy’s flirtatious aesthetics appreciates the sensuousness of the heap, Nick’s 
aesthetic judgment considers heaps to be objects full of wonder. What appears beautiful 
for Nick is the sight of New York seen from the Queensboro Bridge, “the city rising up 
across the river in white heaps and sugar lumps all built with a wish out of non-olfactory 
money” (54). Just as Daisy senses beauty in the shirt-heap that is born out of Gatsby’s 
illegally earned money, Nick is arrested by the sight of the city, believing that it 
visualizes the vain desires of a metropolis in the shape of “white heaps and sugar lumps.” 
After imaginatively materializing the corrupt nature of capitalism into heaps, Nick goes 
on to aestheticize them: “The city seen from the Queensboro Bridge is always the city 
seen for the first time, in its first wild promise of all the mystery and the beauty in the 
world” (54). The city-as-heaps is beautiful since it is always “seen for the first time,” 
never failing to evoke wonder within the viewer’s mind.  
 If Daisy’s aesthetic temperament derives from her abundantly flirtatious 
inclination, Nick’s aestheticizing vision also reflects his characteristic approach toward 
people. Faithfully following his father’s advice, Nick tends to “reserve all judgment,” a 
habit that has made himself “the victim of not a few veteran bores” (5). As a result of his 
constant exposure to “the intimate revelations of young men,” Nick was “unjustly 
accused of being a politician” during his college years (5). His relentless engagements 
with “not a few veteran bores” thus bring him unwittingly close to Daisy’s promiscuous 
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attitude toward men: Nick is a politician as much as Daisy is a flirt. Although he never 
hesitates to pronounce his repugnance toward the bores, he is also irresistibly attracted to 
them. At Myrtle’s party, Nick tries to separate himself from the rest of the attendants, 
whom he considers to be a bunch of drunkards, but the harder he attempts to maintain his 
distance, the more he is allured by the bric-a-brac of human affairs: 
Yet high over the city our line of yellow windows must have contributed their share 
of human secrecy to the casual watcher in the darkening streets, and I was him too, 
looking up and wondering. I was within and without, simultaneously enchanted and 
repelled by the inexhaustible variety of life. (85) 
It is when his urge to escape from the skewed situation reaches its climax (his mind 
hovering outside Myrtle’s apartment) that Nick comes fully to appreciate “the variety of 
life.” What lies underneath Nick’s contradictory economy of affects—what repulses him 
most turns out to be most enchanting—is a sense of wonder, as embodied in his 
imaginary figure of a streetwalker “looking up and wondering.”  
In his useful theorization of wonder, Phillip Fisher notes that the English word 
“wonder” preserves the connection between intellectual curiosity (“I wonder if. . .”) and a 
sensuous pleasure of amazement at an object. Encompassing both realms of intellect and 
corporeality, wonder becomes an affect deeply responsive to the aesthetic qualities of 
things, as Fisher suggests: “wonder [is a feeling] taken in the aesthetic sense of 
admiration, delight in the qualities of a thing” (11). By assigning an intellectual curiosity 
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to the imaginary onlooker with whom he identifies (“wondering”), Nick can feel the 
aesthetic sense of wonder (he is “enchanted”).
27
  
Nick’s susceptibility to the heap of repulsive bores culminates in his only compliment 
to Gatsby, a man Nick introduces at the novel’s outset as a character “who represent[s] 
everything” to which Nick gives his “unaffected scorn” (5): 
“They’re a rotten crowd,” I shouted across the lawn. “You’re worth the whole damn 
bunch put together.” 
    I’ve always been glad I said that. It was the only compliment I ever gave him, 
because I disapproved of him from beginning to end. 
By lumping together all those people surrounding Gatsby and regarding them with 
intense contempt, Nick’s compliment rhetorically generates a heap made of corrupt 
people. He then goes on to say that Gatsby is worth the heap itself, a curious compliment 
because, literally speaking, it is dubious whether one would feel grateful of being 
compared to a human-heap (“the whole damn bunch put together”). However, for Nick 
and Daisy, what is worthy of compliment is actually those worthless objects amassed in a 
heap. It is when an object becomes “rotten” or loses its object-as-commodity status that 
an alternative form of collective beauty appears in the shape of heaps.  
                                                 
27
 Other insightful theories on wonder include Caroline Walker Bynum, “Wonder”; 
Lorraine Daston and Susan Parks, Wonders and the Order of Nature: 1150-1750. The 
ending of the latter book includes a telling remark on wonder, a claim that it became a 
repressed emotion after the Enlightenment swept away all the elements of magic: “One 
cannot imagine a diarist of the social and literary stature of Samuel Pepys—Leonard 
Woolf, say, or Edmund Wilson—faithfully recording monsters he read about or saw. To 
be a member of a modern elite is to regard wonder and wonders with studied 
indifference; enlightenment is still in part defined as the anti-marvelous. But deep inside, 
beneath tasteful and respectable exteriors, we still crave wonders” (368).  
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 Nick’s conception of beauty connotes a certain kind of religiosity that Gatsby 
firmly embraces, and, with its association with pejorative adjectives, this sacred beauty 
that Nick describes is strongly evocative of heaps: “He [Gatsby] was a son of God [. . .] 
and he must be about His Father’s business, the service of a vast, vulgar, and meretricious 
beauty” (78). Beauty is defined as something of great magnitude (“vast”), crude in its 
taste (“vulgar”), and trashy in its quality (“meretricious”). In short, the heap is the 
materialization of beauty itself, and Gatsby’s contiguous relationship to various kinds of 
heaps places him under God’s reign. 
 The transcendental element of heaps presents itself most forcefully in the Valley 
of Ashes, where George Wilson, the shadowy double of Gatsby, identifies himself as 
God’s missionary. After his wife’s untimely death, Wilson experiences a moment of 
conversion as he witnesses the discarded advertisement of T. J. Eckleburg:  
Wilson’s glazed eyes turned out to the ashheaps, where small gray clouds took on 
fantastic shapes and scurried here and there in the faint dawn wind.  
  “I spoke to her [Myrtle],” he muttered, after a long silence. “I told her she might 
fool me but she couldn’t fool God. […]” 
  Standing behind him, Michaelis saw with a shock that he was looking at the eyes 
of Doctor T. J. Eckleburg, which had just emerged, pale and enormous, from the 
dissolving night.  
Convinced that Myrtle’s death was not an accident but a murder, Wilson vows vengeance, 
his eyes intently fixed on what he considers to be the very embodiment of God himself. 
This radical transformation of Wilson—from the inane, almost nonhuman figure leading 
a kind of non-existence, to a fully determined subject—has long been neglected by critics. 
For instance, Greg Forter regards Wilson as the most oppressed subaltern throughout the 
story, claiming that he is “deprived of any vitality whatever [. . .] lacking both the 
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immaterial animation (spirit) that distinguishes human from nonhuman and the more 
physical, animal vitality (iron in the blood)” (147, emphasis original). To be sure, 
Wilson’s feeble-mindedness often makes him look like a lifeless creature; as Tom’s 
slighting remark goes, “He’s so dumb he doesn’t know he’s alive” (23). Not only his 
personality but also his physical appearance are rendered alarmingly akin to inanimate 
objects; he mingles “with the cement color of walls,” and with a crumbling dust: “A 
white ashen dust veiled his dark suit and his pale hair as it veiled everything in the 
vicinity” (23). At the story’s beginning, Wilson therefore confirms Forter’s assumption 
that his nonhuman existence figuratively suggests his lack of vitality. However, what is 
absent from this reading is the fact that his proximity to nonhuman objects ultimately 
becomes the source of his empowerment. As his radical moment of conversion shows, 
Wilson achieves his utmost vitality when he willfully identifies himself with trash: 
ashheaps and the discarded advertisement. Wilson’s animation is effected by his full 
immersion into rubbish, not by extrication from it. Indeed, Wilson becomes such an 
obsessive bearer of trash that he eventually turns Gatsby into trash, as is seen in the way 
Nick discovers Gatsby’s floating body in the pool with “the cluster of [dead] leaves” 
(129). 
 It should be stressed that Wilson’s conversion experience in no way turns him 
into a pious churchgoer. Just before his conversion takes place, his neighbor, Michaelis 
tries in vain to coax him into attending the church for spiritual salvation: 
“Have you got a church you go to sometimes, George? Maybe even if you haven’t 
been there for a long time? Maybe I could call up the church and get a priest to come 
over and he could talk to you, see?” 
“Don’t belong to any.” 
    “You ought to have a church, George, for times like this. You must have gone to 
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church once. Didn’t you get married in the church? Listen, George, listen to me. 
Didn’t you get married in a church?”  
   “That was a long time ago.” (125) 
Having long been alienated from Christian establishments, Wilson never finds “a church” 
a site for regeneration. So when he calls T. J. Eckleburg “God,” he apparently has no 
mind to conceptualize his savior as part of any religious sects. Eckleburg thus embodies a 
certain kind of transcendental entity that resides outside religious formalities: 
“God sees everything,” repeated Wilson. 
  “That’s an advertisement,” Michaelis assured him. Something made him turn 
away from the window and look back into the room. But Wilson stood there a long 
time, his face close to the window pane, nodding into the twilight. 
While their dialogue may indicate a clear epistemological discrepancy between the zealot 
and the realist, Michaelis’s subsequent reaction to the advertisement shows that both of 
them are actually witnessing the same thing. Finding himself caught up in a gothic 
situation, Michaelis senses the presence of “something” that he cannot bear to watch. The 
mere advertisement turns into “something,” becoming a fearful entity which does not 
belong to any institutional religions. This unnamable “something” is at once divine, and 
quite literally, the scum of the earth.  
*              *              * 
The fact that only Gatsby and Wilson in the novel—the two most strongly associated 
with heaps—turn out to be outlandishly fanatical believers of “God” suggests 
Fitzgerald’s idiosyncratic formulation of spirituality, which is predicated on useless 
objects. As my reading of the Philippe stories suggests, Fitzgerald’s ineradicable disbelief 
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in the formalities of the Catholic Church led him to the form of belief that Niebuhr 
proposed, namely, to find a recourse in older forms of religion that worship those 
unconsecrated objects of divinity we call the fetishes.  
In Gatsby, the ubiquitous presence of heaps and the transcendental power of T. J. 
Eckleburg clearly suggest Fitzgerald’s fetishistic impulse. Stripped of any exchange- or 
use-value, heaps and Eckleburg reject reification and insist on their untranscended 
materiality. The recalcitrant nature of trash can, in turn, become a source of its divinity, 
as Tomoko Masuzawa succinctly puts it:  
[F]etishism as a category is repeatedly and consistently characterized as inchoate, 
erratic, and unprincipled. In effect, fetishism is said to be no more than an incidental 
assortment of “the worship of odds and ends of rubbish,” a misguided adoration of 
objects that are intrinsically worthless, such as “stones, shells, bones, and such like 
things”—in other words, “casual objects which, for some reason or other, or it may 
be for no reason at all, were considered endowed with exceptional powers.” (248, 
emphasis original) 
Fetish emerges out of the erratic attribution of divine power to rubbish. Just as Wilson 
misrecognizes the discarded advertisement as God, Gatsby’s intense love for Daisy is 
precariously founded on his unruly imagination, which finally vanishes as he meets her 
after the marriage: “the colossal vitality of [Gatsby’s] illusion [. . .] had gone beyond her, 
beyond everything” (76). Once the object of “colossal significance,” the green light of the 
East Egg has suddenly lost its symbolic status, “his count of enchanted objects [has] 
diminished by one” (74). Like Amory in This Side of Paradise, Gatsby cannot sustain a 
sense of enchantment through idolization. 
But as we have seen, enchanted objects do persist throughout the story, not in the 
form of a feminine idol but embodied as those trashy objects that stand outside both the 
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capitalist marketplace and religious institutions. Following Weber, if disenchantment is 
the definitive temperament of modernity, those heaps in Gatsby manifest themselves as 
re-enchanting objects within the rationalized secular world. As Michael Saler points out, 
enchantment is the nemesis of rationality, and thus condemned as “residual, subordinate 
‘other’ to the modernity’s rational, secular, and progressive tenets” (695). As an affect 
déclassé, Saler continues, enchantment aligns itself to those other subordinates of 
modernity, namely “wonder and surprise” (695).
28
 Here, we should recall that Gatsby’s 
initial reaction to discovering his own love for Daisy is that of surprise: “He knew that 
Daisy was extraordinary, but he didn’t realize just how extraordinary a ‘nice’ girl could 
be. [. . .] ‘I can’t describe to you how surprised I was to find out I loved her, old sport’” 
(119). What lies at the core of Gatsby’s love for Daisy is an indescribable “surprise,” the 
“extraordinary” quality of Daisy that he finds himself marveling at.  
Although Gatsby’s love for Daisy ultimately fails, the nature of his love is 
reincarnated into various kinds of heaps that trigger feelings of enchantment and wonder. 
Indeed, the positive tone that permeates the novel’s ending emanates from such a 
regenerated sense of wonder through the accretion of trash. Nick’s final meditation on 
Gatsby’s wonder culminates in the hallucinatory vision of the New World made up of a 
heap: 
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 On the intersectionality of enchantment, wonder, and magic in modernity, see: Peter 
Pels, Magic and Modernity: Interfaces of Revelation and Concealment; Gustavo 
Benavides, “Magic, Religion, Materiality”; Mark Schneider, Culture and Enchantment; 
Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics; 
Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, eds, The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic 




And as the moon rose higher the inessential houses began to melt away until 
gradually I became aware of the old island here that flowered once for Dutch sailor’s 
eyes—a fresh, green breast of the new world. Its vanished trees, the trees that had 
made way for Gatsby’s house, had once pandered in whispers to the last and greatest 
of all human dreams; for a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his 
breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic contemplation 
he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with 
something commensurate to his capacity for wonder. (143) 
If Gatsby’s tragedy exists in his failure to find within Daisy “something commensurate to 
his capacity for wonder,” Nick, at least vicariously, recuperates this wonderful 
“something” by exerting his visionary imagination of turning things into a heap. Just as 
New York becomes wondrous when it turns into “heaps and sugar-lumps” in Nick’s eyes, 
“the inessential houses” dissolve into marvelous objects as they lose their contours and 
re-surface as “the old island.” This visual transformation follows exactly the same 
process of Gatsby’s shirt-heap, in which the brick-like shirts lose their folds and melt into 
“many colored disarray.” And, just as Daisy cannot help bursting into tears upon 
discovering the beauty of the shirt-heap, Nick is “compelled into an aesthetic 
contemplation” that “the old island” provokes. Heap thus becomes generative of a certain 
kind of aestheticism that modernity abolished, namely, the aestheticism of wonder and 
enchantment.  
Fitzgerald’s aestheticism can be regarded as what Terry Eagleton terms “a 
discourse of the body” (13). According to Eagleton, while rational thinking aims at 
constructing abstract universal laws, aesthetics closely attends to concrete particulars that 
we perceive in our lived, embodied, everyday experiences:  
The aesthetic, then, is simply the name given to that hybrid form of cognition which 
can clarify the raw stuff of perception and historical practice, disclosing the inner 
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structure of the concrete. Reason as such pursues its lofty ends far removed from 
such lowly particulars. (16) 
The realm of beauty associates itself with the kind of materiality that resists abstraction, 
which explains the reason why heaps in Gatsby become objects of “aesthetic 
contemplation.”  
In an important sense, Eagleton’s formulation of aesthetics as rooted in “lowly 
particulars” echoes Tony Tanner’s well-known discussion about the centrality of wonder 
in American literature in The Reign of Wonder. Through a series of insightful readings of 
various American writers, ranging from Emerson to Fitzgerald and Walker Percy, Tanner 
argues that American writers tend to oscillate between “the unbiased notation of concrete 
particulars” and “the haste towards generalizations” (338). According to Tanner, the chief 
achievement of the best works of American literature exists in their ability to suture those 
two conflicting impulses by discovering wonder within seemingly insignificant everyday 
objects, including rubbish: “The scrap from the garbage can—the pebble by your foot: it 
is yet another expression of the recurring American resolution to start with the nearest 
and next, the potluck of the day, the small proximate particular” (354).
29
 Tanner’s insight 
is useful in thinking about the centrality of heaps and wonder in Fitzgerald’s fetishizing 
vision, a vision which confers an accumulation of discarded objects with divinity without 
resorting to facile idolization. In other words, it is to recognize beauty in a dunghill, to 
                                                 
29
 Tanner goes on to praise Fitzgerald’s treatment of Gatsby for “never [falling] into 
cynical disillusion,” but his insistence that Fitzgerald “explore[d] the limits of wonder” 
seems to align itself with those criticisms that somewhat circumscribe Fitzgerald’s scope 
of wonder (360, emphasis original). Rather, as I have suggested, Fitzgerald’s ingenuity 
exists in his attempt to regain wonder even after the disappearance of idols. 
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transform a heap into mana, thereby avoiding blindness from the devastating aspect of 
modernity.  
*              *             * 
  In Budd Schulberg’s The Disillusioned, a thinly-veiled autobiographical fiction 
published in 1950 that recounts his bizarre encounter with Fitzgerald in the thirties 
(named Manley Halliday in the novel), Fitzgerald (i.e. “Manley”) is described as a man 
surrounded with heaps of trash, unable to clean his room without the help of his lover, 
Ann: 
Manley was sprawled on the couch in the other room, surrounded by familiar debris, 
the evening papers (along with yesterday’s as well), magazines, half-read mail, 
library books.  [. . .]  
        At least once a week Ann devoted an hour to restoring some kind of order to 
this accumulation. But she accused him of preferring the disarray. Although his 
habits inevitably produced the clutter, it really disturbed him, as a tangible 
expression of his being at loose end.  He was simply unable to extricate himself. He 
had never learned where to put things. (81)  
As the novel’s title tellingly suggests, Fitzgerald is depicted as an autumnal writer deeply 
caught in a sense of disillusionment, an affect that is materialized as heaps of trash. 
Although Schulberg’s fictional rendition of Fitzgerald does vividly capture the novelist’s 
defeatist mindset, which grew more pronounced after the economic crash, The 
Disillusioned neglects the more complex stance that Fitzgerald held toward the 
accumulation of trash. Rather than resorting to the typically modern imagining of heaps 
of trash as a metaphor of disillusionment, Fitzgerald saw their potentiality for rejecting 
the projection of human desire (rejecting being relegated to commodity, that is), and 
linking them to the affect that modernity disowned: wonder. Fitzgerald thus challenged 
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the progressivist assumption that trash is an unusable materiality, and that is an irrational 
temperament of primitive subjectivity. By making heaps into fetishes, Fitzgerald sought 
to reinvigorate both spirituality and the materiality of things, both of which were, as 
Niebuhr points out, rapidly fading from the world of scientific rationalism.  
As fetish, heaps retain the unexchangeable quality of things, a quality to which, 
according to Eagleton, our body is most responsive. As is seen in Daisy’s rapturous 
interaction with Gatsby’s shirt-heaps, heaps become aesthetic objects that provoke 
sensuous delight. The penultimate line of the novel clearly points to such jouissance: 
“Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. 
It eluded us then, but that’s not matter—” (144). According to the textual history of 
Gatsby, Fitzgerald’s intention to emphasize the sensuousness of believing was so strong 
that, when his editor advised him to replace the word “orgastic” into something less 
sexual, Fitzgerald refused, insisting that “it expresses exactly the intended ecstasy” (qtd. 
in Bruccoli, The Great Gatsby liv).  
By featuring the ecstatic joy of believing at the novel’s end, Fitzgerald avoided 
offering the sort of unabashedly disillusioned vision of modernity that G. K. Chesterton 
did. The novel is certainly inundated with commodities, but its investment in materiality 
is not the kind of materialism that both Niebuhr and Chesterton lamented. It is the 
materiality of things that achieves divine power because of its abject status in commodity 
circulation. What Fitzgerald excavated from ashheaps was thus a potentially sustainable 
form of religiosity at a time when traditional religion had lost its substance. The fact that 
both Fitzgerald and Niebuhr brought up permutations of fetish—totem and mana—as 
alternatives to Christian worship shows their shared interest in a certain kind of 
 
 128 
materiality that is at once rubbish and spiritual. Standing at the periphery of value 
systems, Jonathan Culler notes, rubbish has “no use-value, nor any value in an economic 
system of exchange” (5). It is the non-significative quality of rubbish that Fitzgerald 
features in Gatsby, an aspect that obtains transcendence by rejecting any attributions of 
utility whatsoever. The elusive green light may vanish at some point in history, when 
modernity relegates enchantment to the realm of superstition, but Fitzgerald recuperates it 
by aestheticizing trashy accumulations of objects, and calling them heaps.  
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Coda: A Nameless Religious Experience and Material Things 
 
In 1922, amidst the heated campaign against evolutionism led by William 
Jennings Bryan, John Dewey expressed concerns about the general reticence regarding 
the campaign on the part of intellectuals. Dewey argued that, rather than assuming an 
attitude of “mingled amusement and irritation” (303), intellectuals should have seriously 
interrogated the significance of Bryan’s overwhelming popularity within mainstream 
society. He considered the phenomenon indicative of the profound degree to which 
evangelicalism was a part of American modernity. 
According to Dewey, evangelical Christianity formed the moral basis of “the 
masses,” those “middle-class” people who made up the dominant social group after the 
end of the frontier which was announced in 1890. They were the chief supporters of 
Bryan’s campaign against science “in favor of obscurantism and intolerance”: 
What we call the middle classes are for the most part the church-going classes, those 
who have come under the influence of evangelical Christianity. These persons form 
the backbone of philanthropic social interest, of social reform through political 
action, of pacifism, of popular education. They embody and express the spirit of 
kindly goodwill toward classes which are at an economic disadvantage and toward 
other nations, especially when the latter show any disposition toward a republican 
form of government. (303) 
While acknowledging the wide range of contributions made by middle-class reformist 
zeal, Dewey ends this passage by pointing to the limit of their social engagements. He 
considers Bryan “a symptom and symbol of the forces which are most powerful in 
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holding down the intellectual level of American life” (304). For Dewey, what was 
symptomatic about Bryan was that his vehement attack on contemporary science derived 
from the fear of radical thinking, a subversive mode of inquiry which might potentially 
destabilize the orderliness of “a precariously attained civilization”: 
He [=Bryan] does not represent the frontier democracy of Jackson’s day. But he 
represents it toned down and cultivated as it exists in fairly prosperous villages and 
small towns that have inherited the fear of whatever threatens the security and order 
of a precariously attained civilization, along with pioneer impulses to neighborliness 
and decency. Attachment to stability and homogeneity of thought and belief seem 
essential in the midst of practical heterogeneity, rush, and unsettlement. We are not 
Puritans in our intellectual heritage, but we are evangelical because of our fear of 
ourselves and of our latent frontier disorderliness. (304) 
Dewey defined evangelicalism as a fearful reaction against heterogeneity, which 
threatened institutional boundaries that American modernity sought to establish. As the 
subject of the last sentence—“we”—suggests, the fear seemed to him thoroughly 
pervasive among those living in the 1920s, including not only “the masses” but also 
intellectuals like himself.  
Dewey did not so much seek to criticize babbittry; rather, he tried to problematize 
the intellectuals’ lack of self-awareness, their inadvertent self-distancing from a sense of 
anxiety which was symptomatically shown in Bryan’s evangelical social reform 
movement. Unless they faced the unsavory fact that evangelicalism was constitutive of 
their own academic milieu, the intellectuals’ democratic aspirations would turn out as 
delusional as Bryan’s populist tactics: 
We have been so taught to respect the beliefs of our neighbors that few will respect 
the beliefs of a neighbor when they depart from forms which have become 
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associated with aspiration for a decent neighborly life. This is the illiberalism which 
is deep-rooted in our liberalism. No account of the decay of the idealism of the 
progressive movement in politics or of the failure to develop an intelligent and 
enduring idealism out of the emotional fervor of the war, is adequate unless it 
reckons with this fixed limit to thought. (305) 
Coming to terms with radical otherness is contingent upon accepting evangelicalism as a 
defining characteristic of modern Americans. Rather than assuming a detached attitude to 
religious fervor, intellectuals should actively engage with middle-class people’s desperate 
craving for faith, which formed an exclusionary system that authenticated a certain mode 
of belief and repressed others modes.
30
  
 My dissertation has aimed to respond to Dewey’s call for a serious inquiry into a 
certain kind of faith that people in the early twentieth century experienced in an everyday 
context. I have offered a type of analysis that literary critics have long been reluctant to 
undertake, in the face of cultural attitudes they have typically preferred not to deal with. 
Gauri Viswanathan argues that the reason why literary studies tends to shun topics of 
religion is that literature assumed its role as a successor to religion in conveying “the 
values and direction once supplied by a religious ethos” (466): 
While the subject [of religion] has engaged historians, sociologists, and religious 
scholars for a long time, yielding a vast and proliferating body of work [. . .] the 
                                                 
30
 Dewey’s critique of “a decent neighborly life” finds resonance in Judith Butler’s call 
for “cohabitation.” Drawing a distinction from neighborliness, Butler defines 
“cohabitation” as a way to accept “the nonchosen character” of our coming into being: 
“we not only live with those we never chose, and to whom we may feel no social sense of 
belonging, but we are also obliged to preserve those lives and the plurality of which they 
form a part” (Butler 84). It is important to note that both Dewey and Butler stress the 
essential heterogeneity of human communities by way of critiquing organized religion. 
Butler suggests that Protestant Christianity was the essential component of secularization 
in modern America, a dominant ideology that formed a public sphere and ostracizing 
other forms of religion into private realms. 
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field of literary studies has not witnessed a corresponding breadth of scholarship. 
This may be partly due to literature’s self-definition as a secular vehicle for ideas 
whose possible religious origins were subsequently effaced as religious sensibility 
became absorbed into aesthetic form and imagery, especially in modernist writing. 
(466) 
While I wholeheartedly agree with Viswanathan’s claim that literary criticism has not yet 
fully investigated religious issues, as its neighboring fields have done, I do not think 
modernist writing merely incorporated religious sensibility into secular aesthetic 
experimentations. To be sure, modernist writers—such as Hemingway, Fitzgerald, 
Dreiser, West and Faulkner—showed skepticism toward organized religion, but they 
never considered religion to be anterior to, or supplanted by, literary aesthetics. That, in 
other words, is an attitude grafted onto their works by later critics. 
What I have traced throughout my dissertation are the very ways in which 
modernist writers posited as their central project a viable form of spirituality no longer 
available in mainstream Christianity. Initially, when I came up with this topic, my interest 
revolved around modernist representations of organized religion. I was struck by 
modernist writers’ tendency to include evangelical figures in their novels, and I thought 
(or so it seemed at a glance) this was merely to lampoon those figures as embodiments of 
the corrupt nature of modern Christianity. But as I continued to work on my chosen 
materials, I realized that modernist writers did not end their novels with a merely dismal 
view of religion. Rather, they depicted a conflicting relationship between formal religion 
and everyday spirituality, a dialectical coupling often anchored to another dichotomy: 
between religious language and the nonsemantic materiality of objects. Modernist verbal 
experimentations can be considered a reaction against the massive proliferations of 
clichés caused by mass media’s incessant emissions and circulations of words. As my 
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readings of A Farewell to Arms and Miss Lonelyhearts suggest, modernist writers seem to 
consider religious language a telling victim of mass media, an explicit instance of a 
decided enervation of the expressive power of language. What they discovered to be a 
potential source of transcendence in its stead was the materiality of things, the 
nonsemantic aspect of matters resistant to facile signification so frequently observed in 
mass media.  
In the course of writing my dissertation, my point had shifted away from 
characterological functions of evangelical figures to the materiality of objects in 
modernist fiction. As I noted at length at the end of my first chapter, Williams offered a 
very provocative reading of the novel, by pointing out the significant role mass media 
played in turning certain verbal expressions (especially religious phrases) into mere 
cliché. Williams also suggested that West sought to uncover the materiality of words 
precisely through writing a novel about a newspaper man, Miss Lonelyhearts. In 
completing my chapter, I was struck with the fact that this suggestion was offered by 
none other than Williams himself, the modernist figure who was emphatically concerned 
with the thingness of objects, and probed, both in his poetry and prose, the way to express 
physical reality. It is a kind of reality in which, according to J. Hillis Miller—followed 
more recently by Bill Brown—“there is neither subject nor object, but a single realm in 
which all things are both subjective and objective at once” (Miller 7). What is intriguing 
about the interpenetration of subject and object in Williams’s writings—as in his 
extraordinary fusion of poetry and prose in Spring and All—is that he considered this 
phenomena as “a sort of nameless religious experience.” In a letter to Marianne Moore, 
Williams recounts that “something which occurred once when I was about twenty, a 
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sudden resignation to existence, a despair—if you wish to call it that, but a despair which 
made everything a unit and at the same time a part of myself. I suppose it might be called 
a nameless religious experience. I resigned, I gave up” (Miller 7). Yet in his account, the 
despair he experienced in his youth has a transformative quality. Unlike Mencken, who, 
as I note above in Chapter 3, claimed that the act of prayer debilitates human will since it 
signifies a complete renunciation of self, Williams believed that the renunciation of self 
brings about a new kind of unity with the other, and this new interaction between subject 
and object is what he considered an alternative spiritual experience.  
Williams’s nameless religious experience, it seems to me, resonates with what I 
have discussed in my reading of Fitzgerald and also in Upton Sinclair’s Jungle, that is to 
say, re-enchantment through disillusionment, a utopian moment that comes only after one 
experiences dissolution of self. In addition, Williams’s resignation of his self seems 
resonant with the idea of trash I have discussed throughout my dissertation. That is to say, 
when things are discarded and become trash, that situation comes to form a new kind of 
connection between things and people, a relationship that is not based on the 
instrumentalist human/product binary, but a more reciprocal interpenetration of things 
and people, which revivifies not only the thingness of objects but also the personhood of 
people who have been reduced, under the sway of modernity, to the state of mute objects. 
Finally, the aspiration of my project, in my dissertation and beyond, is to reveal and 
explore a hitherto underanalyzed concern of American modernist fiction by highlighting 
the presence spiritual manifestation of objects inscribed in the texts. By probing into the 
cultural and material aspects of religion in the age of modernity, I seek most broadly to 
contribute to the expansion of our notions of the matter of American modernist literature: 
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its concern with materiality and material things, and its ways of making meaning in and 
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